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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis explores the role of social capital and domestic savings mobilisation, as demand 
and supply determinants of access to formal credit for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
in developing countries. The thesis provides evidence on how the domestic banking sector in 
developing countries can address information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, and 
supply of loanable funds for SMEs, by considering other non-conventional determinants. The 
research focuses on Malawi, a developing economy in Sub Saharan Africa, to conduct micro-
level and macro-level analyses. Analysis of cross sectional data uses probit models to reveal 
evidence of the effect of social capital on access to formal credit. Analysis of time series data 
uses vector autoregressive model to document evidence of the effect of domestic savings 
mobilisation on credit extended to the private sector by banks. The findings indicate that 
social capital is a determinant of access to formal credit and should be considered in credit 
risk assessments, for a more comprehensive process. The Findings also suggest that bank 
deposits influence credit provided to the private sector, providing evidence that domestic 
savings mobilisation also matters for economic growth in less developed countries. Evidence 
further suggests that although banks lend to the Government, the effect of the lending on 
mobilised deposits is not significant. The research recommends acknowledgement of, and 
more use of social capital, especially for first-time borrowers, to complement other 
quantitative risk assessment approaches. Initiatives to improve the flow of information 
between lenders and borrowers would not only improve access to credit but also increase 
savings mobilised domestically, to provide a readily available pool of funding for banks, and 
hence the supply of credit to entreprises, ceteris paribus. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Worldwide, there are 2.5 billion people who do not have access to formal financial services 
(Cull et al., 2013), of which 80% live in Sub Saharan Africa (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 
2012). Although the proportion is high, this does not mean Sub Saharan Africa is not 
servable, but rather, access to formal financial services is still a challenge. The effect of this 
challenge on economies is worsened through its effect on small and medium enterprises 
(SME), who significantly contribute to economic development (Kuntchev et al., 2012). 
Unavailability and a lack of access to credit for SMEs potentially constrain development and 
ultimately unattained Millennium Development Goal (MDG)
1
 of poverty reduction. This is 
because a lack of access to external finance has been shown to obstruct human and physical 
capital accumulation (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008: p.384). Therefore, for a deeper 
understanding, it is worth investigating the question of what causes the lack of access to 
finance for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). An answer to this question reveals 
determinants, which can be categorised as supply or demand side factors. This thesis 
examines social capital and savings mobilisation as the potential determinants. 
 
On the supply side, investigation of the determinants of access to finance has focused on 
market design, regulation and market conditions (Beck et al., 2009; Claessens, 2006). On the 
demand side, the concentration has been on firm characteristics (Burger and Udell, 2002; 
Fatoki and Asah, 2011), neglecting savings mobilization (Mavrotas, 2005; Murinde, 2012) 
and social capital (Qizi and Hung-gay, 2006). Recent attention on the demand side factors has 
shifted focus to include subjective and psychological factors towards financial access and 
inclusion as potential determinants (Bauer et al., 2012). This thesis advances knowledge in 
the development finance literature in its conclusions that domestic savings mobilization, a 
supply factor, and social capital, a demand factor, are determinants of access to credit in 
developing countries. The evidence presented in this thesis focuses on SMEs because they 
play a significant role in economic growth (Kuntchev et al., 2012). Continued research on 
this subject is still a development priority because lack of access to formal credit is still a 
major problem affecting growth of SMEs (World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2010). 
                                                 
1
 International development goals established following the adoption of the United Nation millennium 
declaration http://www.undp.org/mdg/.   These have now been preceeded by Sustainable Development Goals. 
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1.1.1 Demand and Supply Nexus Focus  
 
Microeconomic theory dictates that supply needs to equal demand to have equilibrium in the 
market place. It therefore follows that studying factors affecting demand for credit only 
cannot result into improved access or usage unless supply of credit factors are also 
considered. This thesis differs from the usual one-sided approach analysis, by considering 
both the demand and supply factors affecting access to formal credit, using a case study of a 
developing economy.  
  
Despite vast research studies on availability and access to formal finance (Hall et al., 2000; 
Burger and Udell, 2002; Beck et al., 2005, 2006, 2009; Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006; 
Claessens, 2006; Fatoki and Asah, 2011), there are still unfilled gaps regarding factors 
affecting formal credit demand and supply. On the supply side, research has concentrated on 
affordability, availability, accessibility and designing of products in a flexible and reliable 
manner as the key factors (Claessens, 2006). Although ensuring an enabling environment and 
making financial services accessible is necessary, access would still not be guaranteed if 
financial institutions cannot easily and sustainably obtain the funds to lend. The demand side 
analysis has mainly cited firm-level characteristics as the key determinants (see Hall et al., 
2000; Burger and Udell, 2002; Fatoki and Asah, 2011), with little attention on perceptions, 
behaviour and attitudes of users until recently (Bauer et al, 2012). Therefore, Social capital, 
defined as connections among individuals, social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam, 2000: p.19), and domestic savings 
mobilization, are the variables of interest. Malawi is preferred as a case study because it is 
one of the few developing countries in Africa where credit reference bureaus are not yet fully 
functional. Therefore, the key research question to be addressed in this thesis is ‘What are the 
demand and supply determinants of access to formal credit for small and medium enterprises 
in developing countries’? 
 
Further evidence reveal that there is less documented research on demand side barriers 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012), to potentially reveal insights into viable solutions to the 
problem of access to financial services. Research has concentrated on understanding the 
visible (conventional) factors i.e. firm characteristics, deterring access to formal finance for 
SMEs, and ultimately economic growth and development. However, between 40% and 60% 
of economic growth is still left unexplained by the conventional ‘factors of growth’ (Easterly 
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and Levine, 2001). Evidence shows that the focus of economic growth determinants has 
largely been on natural, physical and human capital, and has paid little attention to social 
capital (Qizi and Hung-gay, 2006). However, focusing only on the conventional types of 
capital neglects a major component in the growth process, particularly because the way 
economic factors interact is not explained (Hjerppe & Kajanova, 2000). 
  
On the supply side, although many developing countries depend on external flows (foreign 
aid, foreign direct investment, export earnings) to support their countries’ developmental 
initiatives, tax revenues and savings mobilization are also other important sources worth 
considering. First, while the various sources of external flows may ideally complement each 
other, they also compete for attention and policy space (Aryeetey, 2009). Second, the 2007 
global financial crises resulted into a drop of up to 36% of external flows, which negatively 
affected investment levels (Africa Economic Outlook, 2010). Finally, export earnings, among 
other factors, depend on quantity and quality of production as well as availability of markets 
outside the country, none of which can always be guaranteed. In the long run, domestic 
resource mobilization for Africa emerges as critical for building more resilient economies, 
implementation of own development agendas as well as fighting poverty (Africa Economic 
outlook, 2010). Despite tax revenues standing out as the major contributor to domestic 
resource mobilization, it is difficult for a number of developing countries to raise tax 
revenues due to the shallowness of the economic base, and presence of a large informal sector 
(Stotsky and Woldemariam, 1997; Ghura, 1998). Domestic savings are therefore an 
‘investable resource’ compared to available alternatives, because the effect on growth 
operates through productivity (Aghion et al., 2009). Therefore, savings mobilization is a 
worthy sustainable source of domestically mobilized resources, and this thesis presents 
empirical evidence to that effect. 
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives  
 
The thesis aims to develop an evidence backed understanding of how the domestic banking 
sector in developing countries can resolve the problem of low access and utilization of credit 
for SMEs. This is done by considering social capital and domestic savings mobilization as 
key demand and supply factors. To do this, using Malawi as a case study, five objectives are 
formulated and are addressed in separate respective chapters as follows: 
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1. To contribute to knowledge on role of social capital in improving access to credit from 
commercial banks in developing countries (Chapter 5); 
2. To examine and compare knowledge of factors hindering access to credit for SMEs among 
lenders and borrowers in Malawi (Chapter 6); 
3. To explore factors affecting perception of small and medium enterprises regarding effect of 
social capital on access to credit from commercial banks (Chapter 7); 
4. To analyse whether social capital affects access to formal credit for small and medium 
enterprises in Malawi (Chapter 8); 
5. To examine whether savings mobilized domestically by the banking sector affect private 
credit in Malawi (Chapter 9).   
 
The stated objectives are addressed using different methods and analytical techniques to suit 
the different tasks at hand (see Section 1.3 for details). 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
The thesis adopts a mixed methods approach which combines both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in a study (Creswell, 2009: p.5). Since both approaches are used in 
tandem, the overall strength of the study is greater than using either qualitative or quantitative 
research approach alone (Creswell & Clark, 2007). There are several designs of mixed 
methods to choose from which are categorized according to timing, mixing, weighting and 
theorizing (Creswell, 2009: p.204). Taking this into consideration and the deductive 
epistemology of the study design, a concurrent embedded strategy of data collection is 
employed, where both qualitative and quantitative data are collected simultaneously, with the 
quantitative data given priority. This is because associations and causality between variables 
require testing. 
 
The analysis uses both micro-level and macro-level data to answer the stated objectives. This 
is done in order to capture both small scale individual-specific interactions, that can affect 
credit access behaviour, and large scale broader patterns and trends that can have an effect on 
credit access. To capture the extent of interrelationships among small and medium businesses 
and finance providers, a semi-structured and a structured questionnaire, is used to interview 
business owners or managers. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 describe in detail the analytical procedures 
and results from the surveys. 
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In Chapter 5 a literature review focusing on credit risk evaluation methodologies explores the 
hypothesis that social capital plays a role in facilitating access to formal credit. Chapter 6 
uses descriptive statistics and analysis of variance to examine factors hindering access to 
credit. In Chapter 7 a probit principal component analysis is utilized to explore the factors 
affecting perceptions of SMEs regarding effect of social connections on access to formal 
credit.  To document empirical evidence, in Chapter 8 a simple probit, a Heckman selection 
and multinomial models are used to test the hypothesis that social capital affects access to 
formal credit.  In Chapter 9 secondary time series annual data of macroeconomic variables 
are used in a vector-autoregressive model estimation, to test for Granger causality between 
savings mobilized domestically, by banks, and private credit.  
 
1.4 Significance of the Study.  
 
This thesis fills the gaps in literature on access to finance in various ways. First, despite a 
growing body of research on determinants of access to finance, literature suggests that 
theories developed to explain SMEs financing decisions in developing economies are not 
always applicable in developing economies. This is because of institutional and cultural 
differences (Abor and Biekpe, 2007; Fan et al., 2010; Klapper et al., 2006; Nguyen and 
Ramachandran, 2006). Second, the few studies that have examined social capital and access 
to credit have either used macro level data for the analysis or analysed cases for emerging 
economies in other continents. However, evidence to date indicates that social capital is more 
valuable for developing countries (Wallis et al., 2004). Third, most research in this area has 
also concentrated on the role of social capital in reducing default risk in microfinance (Besley 
and Coate, 1995; Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Serageldin and Grootaert, 2000; Karlan, 2007; 
Feigenberg et al., 2010). Therefore, this thesis is a first attempt to explore the role of social 
capital in credit access from commercial banks and microfinance institutions, using micro 
level data for Malawi. The case study approach is used because country level analyses are 
recommended, and because case studies present a good starting point for the development of 
viable solutions to development problems (Hausmann et al., 2005; Filipe and Usui, 2011). 
 
Fourth, it is widely being accepted that foreign aid will be insufficient to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals and sustain progress beyond the 2015 target date (Culpeper 
and Bushan, 2010). While there is an extensive literature on financial sector development and 
savings in developing countries, there is unsatisfactory research on the subject for Sub 
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Saharan African countries (Mavrotas, 2008). Specifically, studies on domestic resource 
mobilization have concentrated on analysing tax revenues and foreign direct investments, 
with far less focus on domestic savings mobilization (Mavrotas, 2005). However, it is costly 
to collect taxes from the majority of the population who have low taxable capacity. 
Additionally, a public perception of misuse of funds by state also creates unwillingness and 
mistrust to paying taxes (Fjeldstad and Rakner, 2003; Fjeldstad, 2006).  
 
This thesis not only proposes evidence backed view points for consideration in development 
finance policy-making,  but also academic insights, which contribute to the body of 
knowledge by providing  evidence for  Granovetter (1985) ‘embeddedness’ theory. This 
evidence is advanced through analysing how social connections enhance access to formal 
credit by the SME sector, in a developing economy. Increased levels of social capital improve 
conditions under which financial constraints are fulfilled. Granovetter (1985) argued that 
economic action is strongly embedded in social structure hence advocated for the study of 
social networks in the context of economic action. However, he did not go into details to 
provide evidence on the specific mechanism of how social capital affects economic action. 
This thesis provides evidence for such arguments by indicating that the positive impact of 
social capital on economic phenomena can happen through enhanced access to formal credit 
for SMEs. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
 
In this thesis, each chapter addresses a specific issue and hence employs the most appropriate 
methodology for the task. Therefore, chapters have been written to a greater extent as 
independent pieces of work, which are interlinked but have a practical focus and a clear 
message for practitioners, policy makers and the wider audience. Despite an individual 
approach to chapters, all discussions are centred on understanding of factors affecting credit 
access hence some repetitions are not avoidable. A diagram representing how the chapters are 
interconnected is displayed in Figure 1.1 
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Demand factor: social capital Supply factor: savings mobilisation 
Aim: Enhance understanding on how domestic banking sector in developing countries can help resolve problem of low access and 
utilisation of credit for SMEs 
Objectives 1. Contribute to knowledge on role of social capital in improving access to credit in developing countries – C5 
2. Examine and compare knowledge of factors hindering access to credit among lenders and borrowers – C6 
3. Explore factors affecting perception of SMEs regarding effect of social capital on access to formal credit – C7 
4. Analyse whether social capital affects access to formal credit for SMEs – C8 
5. Examine whether savings mobilised domestically by banking sector affect private credit – C9 
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Following this introduction, Chapter Two provides a literature review on demand factors 
affecting access to credit and the role of social capital in economic transactions. Chapter 
Three presents a macro-level literature review focusing on domestic resource mobilization, 
finance and development. These two literature review chapters reveal the gap in literature on 
use of social capital and domestic savings mobilization to improve credit flow for SMEs, 
which this thesis fills.  
 
Chapter Four sets the scene by discussing the economic environment of the case country, 
Malawi. This is followed by Chapter Five which reviews literature and makes a case for 
considering social capital as a key factor in formal credit access especially for developing 
countries. It further compares effectiveness of the subjective nature of using social capital in 
credit risk assessment versus the objective approach. Chapter Six reveals further details on 
the problem of information asymmetry in Malawi. It also discusses the methodology 
followed in collecting data, which is used in the analyses for Chapters Six and Seven. 
Chapter Seven explores factors affecting perception of borrowers about effect of social 
capital on credit access. Chapter 8 uses data collected as part of a Business Registration 
Impact Evaluation (BRIE) project survey conducted by the World Bank, to provide evidence 
on the effect of social capital on access to credit for SMEs. Chapter Nine uses time series data 
to conduct a macro level analysis on effect of domestic savings on credit flow to the private 
sector in Malawi. Chapter Ten summarizes the thesis and provides recommendations and 
areas for further research. All tables and graphs in the chapters are own computations, except 
where reference is made to the source. The Appendices include questionnaires and further 
supporting documentation referred to throughout the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2 MICRO LEVEL ANALYSIS: A LITERATURE REVIEW OF SOCIAL 
CAPITAL AND THE ECONOMY 
 
There is a renewed interest in research on economic growth and its determinants. However,   
attention is shifting from the narrow definition of factors identified as ‘economic’, which 
include human and physical, to incorporate social capital. The basis for this inclusion is that 
societies are endowed with social, human and physical capital, hence the need to consider all 
forms of capital as predictors of long-run economic performance.  This chapter discusses the 
literature on how social capital affects economic growth, and highlights gaps in research to 
consider it as a factor affecting access to credit for SMEs. 
 
2.1 Why Focus on Social Capital? 
 
Social capital matters for personal, society and economy’s well-being (Halpern, 2005: p.324). 
Therefore, research focus on social capital is worth undertaking simply because entrepreneurs 
are social beings. However, to gain a better understanding, a question of interest that arises is 
how such relationships affect wider developing economies’ national goals of economic 
growth and poverty reduction. Social capital is increasingly becoming a key discussion topic 
among politicians and academics, even though the term remains unfamiliar to the general 
public, and often there is confusion about what it is and how it is measured, even among 
those who use it (Halpern, 2005: p.1). Nevertheless, definitions, although needed, do not 
offer solutions. Uphoff (2000: p.216) argued that to understand social capital there is need to 
focus on components, relationships, and results, which are evaluated in a real world 
development experience. Growing interest is therefore accorded to the role that social norms, 
the diffusion of trust and logics of reciprocity play in shaping different transactions (Berg et 
al., 1995; Fehr et al., 1997; Frey, 1997; Fehr and Gatcher, 2000; Bruni and Sugden, 2000).  
Studies have now built on this literature to address the relationship between economic 
development and social capital, and institutional patterns in an economy (Bénabou, 1996; 
Barro, 1996; Collier and Gunning, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000; Zak and 
Knack, 2001; Gradstein and Justman, 2002). Successful firms and regional economies show 
balanced investment between bonding (within firm), bridging (between firm), and linking 
(i.e. firms and regulators) social capital (Halpern, 2005: p.59). This confirms the need to 
study economic factors as well as social factors if development is to materialise.  
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2.2 Measuring Social Capital 
  
The term social capital was recently coined, but it is an old concept (Bankston and Zhou, 
2002; Lazega and Pattison, 2001; Putnam, 1995). Social capital is associated with concepts 
such as civil society and social connectedness (Adam and Roncevic, 2003). Since the 
introduction of social capital into social science research by Loury (1977), the works of 
Robert Putnam (specifically Putnam, 1993) launched social capital as a popular focus for 
research and policy discussion. Since then a number of research studies that span across 
disciplines have explored its implications, but have not reached a consensus on the definition
2
 
of social capital (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005). Despite lack of unified agreement on a 
definition, most contributors to this literature agree that social capital is network-based 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 2001; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995; Dzanja et al., 2013). Criticisms 
on the elusiveness of the social capital concept are captured in Dasgupta (2000) and Durlauf 
(1999), with Arrow (2000) taking the extreme position of suggesting that the term ‘social 
capital’ should be abandoned. 
 
The lack of consensus in defining social capital has resulted in researchers using different 
approaches to measure it. The debates and numerous clarifications have led to the suggestion 
that the concept of social capital is rooted in social networks and social relations, and hence it 
should be measured as such (Lin, 1999). A major characteristic of social capital is that it is 
relational, hence to have it a person must be related to others. The source of the person’s 
advantage lies in the social links they have with others, because social capital is in the 
structure of their relationships (Portes, 1998). Social capital can therefore be viewed in terms 
of the structural components (embeddedness), opportunity (accessibility) and action-oriented 
aspects (Lin, 1981; Burt, 1992; Portes, 1998, Lin, 1999). This is what enhances access to and 
use of social resources. These attributes ultimately contribute to a better socioeconomic status 
(Lin, 1981; Portes 1998), and hence advocating that social relations and networks should be 
the centre of analysis when analysing social capital. This is because certain network positions 
increase the chances of individuals getting better positions in an organization (Burt, 1992). 
 
Empirically, evidence of impacts of social capital on socioeconomic welfare has also been 
studied across disciplines, for example, credit arrangements, irrigation management systems 
                                                 
2
 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the various definitions. 
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and rotating savings and credit associations. Case studies on how local communities manage 
communal resources like forests, ponds etc. have also been used by other researchers (Ostrom 
1990; Dasgupta and Maler, 1991; Bromley et al, 1992; Baland and Platteau, 1996). Other 
studies, emphasized in this chapter, have addressed the relationship between economic 
development, social, and institutional patterns in an economy (Barro, 1996; Collier and 
Gunning, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001; Gradstein 
and Justman, 2002). Using the World Values Survey data Knack and Keefer (1997) 
concluded that trust and civic cooperation have significant impacts on aggregate economic 
activity. A strong association between human capital and rate of growth was found by 
Whiteley (2000) using the same data as in Knack and Keefer (1997). In a study of rural 
Tanzania, Narayan and Pritchett (1999: p.274) concluded that variations in social capital at 
the level of the village influenced income levels more than equivalent changes in human or 
physical capital. In a study conducted in Malawi, it was also found that rural people have 
different social capital endowments which affect their economic welfare (Dzanja, 2010). 
Regardless of location and proxy measures, social capital generally affects economic 
outcomes in three ways; through flow and quality of information, as a source of reward, and 
punishment, and trust (Granovetter, 2005). However these outcomes can only be manifested 
when there is a connection between two or more individuals, which can be categorized as 
strong or weak ties.  
 
2.3 Dimensions of Social Capital 
 
Regardless of the availability of resources and opportunities, it is important for people to 
have diversified and supportive social connections if they are to be aware of the existence of 
the resources and opportunities within a society. Throughout an individual’s social and career 
life, they make different kinds of relationships with different people, such as friends and 
relatives (strong ties), that reinforce their beliefs; and colleagues or acquaintances (weak ties), 
that help address a variety of specific needs. Strong ties are intensive and repeated, and weak 
ties are temporary and contingent (Heffron, 2001). Granovetter (1973), in his famous paper 
‘The strength of weak ties,’ concluded that weak ties are more efficient and effective channels 
of information than strong ties. An emphasis on the importance of weak ties is also well 
captured by Ronald Burt, the author of a book titled ‘Neighbour networks: Competitive 
advantage local and personal’;  
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‘The benefits of social capital created by social processes do not result from network 
structure directly but rather from the kind of person ego becomes by dint of the networks in 
which she or he operates. A person rich in social capital would be known as wise.’ (Burt, 
2000: p.53)  
 
Increasing use of social media for business is also a further indication of importance of weak 
ties. In the 21
st
 century, social media has grown rapidly in its use for both business and 
leisure. Social media websites like LinkedIn, Twitter and Facebook provide an opportunity to 
take advantage of the word of mouth communication channel. In this setup people are 
connected globally, which presents a huge influence on businesses in various ways. 
 
Other dimensions of social capital captured in literature are bridging (vertical) between 
communities or organizations and bonding (horizontal) within communities or organizations 
(Woolcock, 1998, 2001; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Narayan, 2002; Dolfsma and 
Dannreuther, 2003). Bridging social capital emerges from weak ties and bonding social 
capital emerges from strong ties. However, both types are needed in an economy because a 
minimum level of bonding capital is required for bridging capital to emerge (Staveren and 
Knorringa, 2007). Too much bonding capital increases chances of exclusion for those that are 
not members of a grouping. This creates inequality in benefiting from social capital. Bridging 
social capital allows for economic transactions between two strangers to take place, which 
helps in reducing transaction costs arising due to incomplete contracts and uncertainty 
(Staveren and Knorringa, 2007). Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) further distinguish social 
capital into structural and cognitive. In structural social capital, mutually beneficial collective 
action is facilitated through recognized roles and social networks supplemented by rules, 
procedures and precedents (Hitt et al., 2002). Cognitive social capital influences people 
towards equally beneficial collective action, which includes shared norms, values, attitudes, 
and beliefs (Krishna and Uphoff, 2002). Despite the wider dimensions of social capital, the 
key principle of social linkages remains the same. The focus of interest for this thesis is not 
how different these linkages are termed, but how social linkages amongst individual market 
actors affect economic outcomes.  
 
2.4 Social Capital and the Economy 
 
Infrastructure which includes government culture and climate of a country is the underlying 
determinant of differences in output per worker across countries (Hall and Jones, 1996). One 
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infrastructure is social institutions, which are soft elements of individual productive units, and 
they protect individuals from diversion (acting contrary to expectation).  An example of 
diversion prevention is depicted in how negative social capital attributes are used in thievery 
and mafia type of protection. In such cases members of the group rely on social capital to 
control diversion, and the individuals have no need to invest in other types of resources, 
because social control is cheaper. Hall and Jones (1996) discussed the example of a situation 
in a community where burglary is not socially controlled and property owners invest their 
resources in guards, building high fences around their houses or resort to mob justice to 
protect them. Ideally, to control burglary in this scenario, the community needs to be taught 
that stealing is wrong and that there is a real threat of punishment if one is caught stealing. 
The effective implementation of the regulatory framework and law enforcement in an 
economy should ideally strive to achieve this, all things being equal. However, when 
regulatory infrastructure fails to perform as expected, social infrastructure fills in the gaps. 
The same argument can therefore be applied to the market dynamics, which facilitate 
generation of profits and return to capital. If the market does not operate efficiently, due to 
market failures, institutional effectiveness and societal norms take on the challenge of 
facilitating transactions (Wallis et al., 2004). Social capital, therefore, affects economic 
outcomes, especially where there are market failures. Social relations can result in potential 
economic benefits for actors, who are engaged in relevant social relations (Baron et al., 2000; 
Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2002; Flap, 2004). These benefits are summarised as reduction in 
transaction costs, enhancing learning spill overs and enabling collective action. Social 
cohesion and government effectiveness facilitate coordination in complex production 
processes (Dayton-Johnson, 1999; 2003). However, to better understand the benefits, the key 
issue requiring careful analysis is when, where and how these benefits or costs arise for small 
groups at the expense or benefit of others in the wider economy. 
  
Social capital is also recognized to have an indirect effect on increased human capital 
accumulation (Coleman, 1988; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Goldin and Katz, 1998: p.26; 
Narayan and Pritchett, 2000). Narayan and Pritchett (2000) noted that in Tanzania, villages 
with higher levels of social capital were more likely to adopt modern agricultural practices as 
well as undertake community road building projects. In USA social homogeneity and 
community stability enhanced human capital formulation because they formed the basis for 
high levels of social capital (Goldin and Katz, 1998; Wallis et al., 2004). Greater community 
participation in managing schools and greater access to informal credit for the poor are 
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facilitated through social capital’s effect on human capital accumulation (Knack and Keefer, 
1997). If human capital is not linked to social capital, it is both weakened as an analytical tool 
and as an asset because it is harder to acquire and its value is harder to realize. (Schuller, 
2007; Unwin et al., 2005). Schuller et al. (2000) suggested that properly used social capital 
offers much for analysis in a range of fields for policy prescription. A literature analysis by 
Woolcock and Narayan (2000) concluded that social capital is viewed in four perspectives, 
which guides in how policy strategies are crafted. The major difference among the 
perspectives lies in the unit of analysis. Table 2.1 summarises the four views. Although a 
large body of literature has emerged from the network and institutional views, recent research 
is using the synergy view (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), because it offers more 
opportunities to generate new ways of addressing issues from different disciplinary 
perspectives. This thesis contributes to literature on the synergy view. 
 
Table 2.1 Perspectives on Social Capital and Policy Perspectives. 
 
Perspective Actors Policy prescription 
Communitarian (Local groups) Community groups, voluntary 
sector 
‘Small is beautiful’ – 
acknowledging social assets of the 
poor 
Networks view (Bonding and 
bridging community ties) 
Entrepreneurs, business groups, 
information brokers 
Decentralisation, bridging social 
divides 
Institutional view ( political/legal 
institutions) 
Private and public sector Transparency, accountability, civil 
and political liberties 
Synergy view (community 
networks, state and society 
relations) 
Community groups, firms, state 
and civil society 
Complementarity, participation, 
linkages, scaling up local 
organisations. 
Adapted from Woolcock and Narayan (2000) 
 
Although social capital cannot be reduced to a single independent variable, it is more 
appropriately theorised as a factor that influences both access to and productivity of other 
economic resources (Staveren and Knorringa, 2007).  Because social capital affects the wider 
economy through various mechanisms, it could also influence access to formal finance for 
SMEs.  
 
2.4.1 Social Beings Shaping Social Capital 
 
The concept of social capital can be assessed at both individual and institutional level. 
However, regardless of the level at which it is being assessed at, the individual social being is 
at the centre of this concept. Social capital is built through accumulated networks. Therefore, 
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because the social bonds are formed through individual interactions, actions done by 
individuals can help define how social capital is utilised in economic transactions. Social 
capital enhances flow of information among market actors (Uzzi, 1990). In agreement, Lin 
(2007) also argued that the use of social capital in transactions works because it enhances 
flow of information. Generally, when there is trust between the parties to the exchange, flow 
of information is enhanced regardless of how such trust was built.  
 
Social trust makes all kinds of social interaction run smoother (Uslaner, 2002). Trust is a 
source of social capital that sustains economic drive and government performance (Putnam, 
1993). It is vital in the relational dimension of social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). 
Future expectations may be based on mutual trust, which is a form of social capital 
(Coleman, 1988). This association between trust and social capital is a product of the 
relationship between sources of trust and sources of social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2000). 
Networks are a source of trust and social capital.  Social capital is created by a network, 
where people facilitate connections between otherwise disconnected segments (Lin et al., 
2001). Trust oils the wheels in such interactions, implying that social connections and trust 
are positively correlated (Glaeser et al., 2000). Social networks therefore, modify economic 
regulation because of the principle of solidarity that links the members (Granovetter, 1973; 
1985). Unfortunately, the principle of solidarity can also create opportunities for rent seeking 
behaviours. 
 
For example when parties to an exchange associate giving gifts or bribes, to the other party, 
with a positive outcome, it is an indication of destructive use of social capital. Bribery or 
giving gifts with an intention for favours usually happens amongst exclusive networks, and 
hence trust becomes of paramount importance. This observation is supported by Coleman 
(2000), who acknowledged that social capital can facilitate some actions which might not be 
useful, or can be unfavourable for others outside it. Social capital can also promote 
inequality, because access to different types of networks is unequally distributed (Field, 
2003). The multifaceted quality of social capital therefore justifies the need to reflect on it 
closely, especially in its application in formal economic transactions. 
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2.5 Demand Factors Affecting Access to Credit 
 
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2010) reveal that in low-income countries, on average 
43% of businesses with 20 to 99 employees rate access to finance or cost of finance as a 
major constraint to current operations growth, compared to 11% in high income countries 
(World Business Environment Survey, 2000). SMEs are highly restricted in accessing capital 
which they require to grow, and banks on the other hand are hampered with lack of lender 
information and regulatory support to engage in SME lending (Hansen et al., 2012). This 
results in absence of a well-functioning SME lending market and negative consequences for 
SME innovation, economic growth and macroeconomic resilience for developing nations. 
 
Research conducted around the developing world provides evidence that SMEs face greater 
financing hindrances than large firms (Beck et al., 2005, 2006; Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt, 
2006), and yet they are a fundamental part of a dynamic and healthy economy (Kuntchev et 
al., 2012). Further research focused on SME at micro level has revealed firm characteristics 
(These include attributes such as firm’s location, firm industry, firm size, firm age, firm’s 
legal status and the availability of collateral and business information ) as major determinants 
of access to credit for SMEs. A positive relationship is suggested between firms’ location 
(Burger and Udell, 2002; Fatoki and Asah, 2011), firms’ operating industry (Abor, 2007; Hall 
et al., 2000), firm size (Fatoki and Asah, 2011) and access to credit by SMEs. Other studies 
suggest that limited publicly available information about SMEs is a specific reason why such 
businesses face insufficient access to credit (Hartarska and Gonzalez-Vega, 2006). 
Surprisingly, given the importance of social capital (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), few 
studies have considered social capital as a potential determinant of access to credit for SMEs.  
 
A few recent studies have addressed the relationship between social capital and access to 
formal bank credit, although such an effect has been widely covered in microfinance 
(Bastelaer and Leathers, 2006; Karlan, 2007). Using a regional level variable, Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2004) concluded that social capital plays a role in determining 
financial development. Calderon, Chong and Galindo (2002) using World Values survey 
data, found that trust is positively correlated with financial development. Using the Finscope 
survey Uganda 2006 data, Heikkila et al. (2009) concluded that individual level social capital 
is positively associated with access to credit from financial institutions, while general trust 
did not significantly affect institutional credit. Another similar study conducted in 
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Uzbekistan, a post-communist economy, concluded that SMEs with a government connection 
are more than twice likely than those without to receive formal credit (Ruziev and Midmore, 
2015). In a case of cassava growers in Nigeria, Iyanda et al. (2014) concluded that investment 
in social capital development increases the relative probability of having unconstrained 
access to credit. Dhufues, Buchenrieder and Munkung (2012)  researched on  individual 
social capital and access to formal credit in Thailand,  and they concluded that  the greater the 
number of socially higher ranking personal network members to whom one is connected 
through a strong tie, the fewer  access constraints one is likely to face. Therefore, it could be 
concluded that informal relationships between a lender and a borrower provide a window of 
opportunity to enhance access to credit, through reduced transaction costs in private 
information gathering. Uzzi (1999) suggested that such solutions, which are prompted by 
exchange of private knowledge, are valuable because they are distinct and hard for 
competitors without private information, to imitate. Therefore in circumstances where many 
borrowers lack sufficient physical collateral, what would matter to have access to loans, is 
how trustworthy the institutions perceive potential borrowers to be (Heikkila et al., 2009).  
 
2.6 Chapter Synthesis 
 
This chapter has reviewed literature to expose the links between social capital and economic 
development. The egocentric view – connections that people have with one another in a 
network, and the social-centric view – person’s position in a network, indicate how social 
capital is determined. This also implies that social capital is influenced by network theorists 
(Lin et al., 2001). The web of interpersonal networks which forms social capital results in 
human capital accumulation, innovation, enhanced flow of information and technology, skills 
acquisition and reduced transaction costs (Hall and Jones, 1999). 
 
While this Chapter has concluded that social capital affects the economy, the question of 
where and how, still remains to be explored. Does this effect also happen through enhanced 
access to formal credit for SMEs? Is it worthwhile to explore its effect using SMEs? It is 
rather simple to answer yes to the second question, because SMEs significantly contribute to 
economic growth. However, further analysis to complement the literature review, is required 
to answer the first question. Since social capital is more valuable for developing countries 
(Wallis et al., 2004), it is therefore interesting and worthy exploring whether a lack of access 
to finance for SMEs, especially in developing countries, can be enhanced through use of 
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social capital. Social capital seems to matter the most when education levels are low and law 
enforcement is weak (Guiso et al., 2004), which is mostly the case with developing countries.   
The following Chapters, therefore, provide both theoretical and empirical evidence on how 
social capital can facilitate improved access to formal credit for SMEs. However, before that, 
Chapter 3 follows with a review of macroeconomic literature focusing on the factors 
affecting supply of formal credit. 
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CHAPTER 3 MACRO LEVEL ANALYSIS: SUPPLY FACTORS LITERATURE 
REVIEW  
 
Finance is one of the key sectors for modern economies because its policies affect the 
wellbeing of all the productive industries (Beim and Calomiris, 2001: p.56). Small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) are one such industry, whose performance is affected by supply 
and demand factors of access to finance. Financial sector development therefore affects 
economic growth through its effect on the SME sector growth and performance. Financial 
sector development in this case is broadly defined as a process of strengthening and 
diversifying provision of financial services to effectively and efficiently support requirements 
of economic agents, hence stimulating economic growth (Fleming et al., 2005: p.4). This 
chapter presents a review of literature on the relations between finance, savings and economic 
growth. It therefore, highlights the knowledge gap on the role of domestic savings 
mobilization in economic growth.  The discussion begins with a review of theory on 
economic growth process. 
  
3.1 Theories of Economic Growth 
 
Growth theories consider how models offer different but related explanations to the process 
of economic growth. It has been established that economic growth reduces poverty 
(Ravallion and Chen, 1997; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Bourguignon, 2004). However, a key 
question that arises is the extent to which the economic growth-poverty linkage is affected by 
other factors in an economy. Theoretical debate on how growth is achieved originated in the 
17
th
 century with Smith (1776) and later Ricardo (1817). They argued that specialization and 
division of labour leads to increased productivity and growth, although Ricardo pointed out 
that this is subject to diminishing returns, which results in a station state in the long run.  
 
Twentieth century growth theories were to a large extent an extension of these theories. 
Particularly, in the 1930s to 1940s, the Harrod-Domar model prevailed with its prediction 
that national growth rates are directly proportional to level of savings and the capital-output 
ratio. In the model a closed economy is assumed with one homogeneous good (Y) produced, 
which can either be consumed (C) or invested (I)/ saved (S). Therefore, since labour and 
capital are fixed, there are constant returns to capital. The assumption was that labour and 
capital are the only factors of production, there are constant returns to scale, savings (S) is a 
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fixed proportion of income (sY), and that potential level of income is proportional to quantity 
of capital and labour. Therefore, mathematically,  
 
S = sY ……………………………………………………………………………………. (3.1) 
Level of capital to produce output(Y) is K = vY ………………………………………… (3.2) 
 
Where v is the capital output ratio. Investment, (I) plays a dual role in that it represents a 
component of demand as well as an increase in capital stock. 
Therefore, K = vY ……………………………………………………………………….. (3.3) 
However, for equilibrium, supply has to equal demand 
  
Hence I = S ……………………………………………………………………………… (3.4) 
And I = K = vY ………………………………………………………………………….. (3.5) 
Therefore vY = sY ………………………………………………………………………. (3.6) 
Equilibrium growth rate = CY/Y = s/v. …………………………………………………. (3.7) 
 
The economy therefore grows when growth in capacity of economy to produce is matched by 
demand for the economy’s output. Unfortunately, savings, capital-output ratio and growth 
rate are all constants in the model. The view that any discrepancies between the rate of 
growth in output and rate at which labour force grows is corrected by a change in the capital-
output ratio, which was the basis for the neo classical growth model (Hardwick et al., 1999: 
p.509). Solow’s (1956) Neoclassical Growth Theory built on the Harrod-Domar model by 
assuming diminishing returns to capital, hence leaving technological progress, an exogenous 
factor, as the only determinant for raising productivity and growth in the long run. This 
implied that policy makers were powerless to influence the rate of technological progress in 
an economy, on which growth was modelled to depend on. An alternative to this approach, 
termed the New Growth Theory, was launched by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) who 
proposed that growth is a function of level of knowledge which is sourced from research and 
development (R & D) and spill-over effects. However, Lucas (1988) emphasized the 
importance of human capital accumulation as a key driver to long run economic growth. 
Although, according to this theory, technological progress was an endogenous factor, this 
approach was not suited for developing countries whose target was to achieve economic 
growth in the short term (Pritchett, 2006).  
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Regardless of this criticism, the New Growth Theory stimulated researchers to investigate 
other endogenous factors that can be influenced by policy, to have an effect on growth 
(Spratt, 2008: p.49). One such factor is financial sector development. The important role 
played by financial sector development in economic growth can be traced back to 
Schumpeter (1911) who documented the important role banks play in facilitating the 
allocation of finance towards the most productive use, hence promoting economic growth 
rates. The existence of an efficient financial system, as an important ingredient of economic 
growth through research and development, is also taken into consideration by the endogenous 
growth models (Shah and Shah, 2011). 
 
3.2 Financial Sector Development and Economic Growth. 
 
The link between financial sector development and economic growth has remained an 
important issue of debate among policy-makers and academics since the early studies on the 
relationship by Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). All these studies 
developed the Schumpeter (1911) line of thinking. Their findings, which were all based on 
cross country analysis, suggested that the level of financial development helps to predict 
growth. The poor economic performance registered in less developed countries was therefore 
a result of the repressive economic policies which were in place (McKinnon, 1973). Financial 
repression in this case referred to  
 
‘the phenomenon where bank credit remains an appendage of certain enclaves, where 
ordinary government deficit on current account frequently pre-empts the limited lending 
resources of the deposit bank, and financing of the rest of the economy must be met from the 
meagre resources of money lenders, pawn brokers, and cooperatives’ (McKinnon 1973: 
p.69).  
 
Governments repress their economies in six ways: imposing ceilings on interest rates; high 
reserve requirements; directing bank credit; micromanaging banks; restricting entry into 
banking industry; and restricting international capital inflows and outflows (Beim and 
Calomiris, 2001: p.47).  McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) demonstrated the dangers of 
financial repression, which included limiting the efficient allocation of resources, hence 
argued the case for maximum liberalization. The findings by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) emphasized the importance of formulating policies targeted at developing the 
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financial sector in order to foster economic growth (Ang, 2008),  referred to as the ‘ financial 
structuralist view’. This, termed financial liberalization, was to be achieved through removal 
of the restrictions and promoting real rates on deposits and loans. Unfortunately this view did 
not yield much impact on policy formulation in the post-world war decades. This was due to 
the Keynesian ‘financial expressionist’ views, which postulated that there is no need to 
concentrate on interest rate incentives to boost savings, rather, incentives for investment 
which requires lower interest rates (Ang, 2008). Although Cho & Khatkhate (1989) 
concluded that the relationship between savings and interest rates is at best ambiguous, 
empirical evidence is documented which supports the need for investments to induce 
development, as opposed to the savings first approach to development (Giovanini, 1983; 
Gupta 1987; Greene and Villanueva, 1991; Demetriades and Devereux, 1992; Warman and 
Thirlwall, 1994; Bandiera et al., 2000).  
 
The situation in developing countries, where per capita incomes are very low, speaks 
volumes on the challenges of relying on interest rates for the savings first approach. In case 
of Africa, even when the interest rates on deposits increase, the impact on the savings is 
minimal. This is because  poverty levels, unemployment rates and the dependency ratios in 
most African economies are very high, compared to developed countries or emerging 
economies, where the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis may be applicable (Misati & 
Nyamongo, 2011). Given issues of low income and high skewed consumption patterns, and 
structural deficiencies, which constrain government’s ability to raise revenue for financing 
development expenditure, interest rates can hardly be expected to play a significant role in 
savings mobilization (Adedeji, 1989). What is needed to initiate additional real investment is 
finance provided by an increase in bank loans. If financial liberalization does not increase 
aggregate savings, its positive impact on development must come through a more efficient 
allocation of resources, which raises the productivity of investment (Thirlwall, 2011: p.409). 
Therefore, it is of paramount importance to understand operations of the financial system as a 
crucial piece in the puzzle of linking financial sector development and economic growth.  
 
3.2.1 Channels of Influence 
 
Research on how financial development influences economic growth has identified two 
different and yet complementary channels through which financial sector development affects 
economic growth. The first is the total factor productivity (TFP) channel, which focuses on 
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role of innovative financial technologies in improving information asymmetries that hinder 
efficient allocation of funds, and monitoring of investment projects (Greenwood & 
Jovanovic, 1990; King & Levine, 1993b). The TFP channel is based on the  Solow and Swan 
Neoclassical Growth model, which assumes that long-term growth is a result of innovation, 
human capital and physical capital accumulation, giving little attention to the financial sector 
(Ang, 2008).The other channel is through capital accumulation, based on the debt 
accumulation hypothesis of Gurley and Shaw (1955). This channel focuses on the financial 
sectors’ ability to overcome indivisibility and mobilize savings which are transferred to 
productive sectors for investments, leading to accumulation of capital and hence economic 
growth. 
  
The two channels are complementary because funds are efficiently allocated to investments 
through the financial system, ceteris paribus, and the financial system mobilizes savings for 
investment. However, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that banks suffer from the problem 
of adverse selection and moral hazard because of asymmetric information on the part of 
borrowers and lenders. The extent to which financial markets and institutions reduce these 
anomalies can lead to more efficient allocation of resources (Williamson, 1986; King and 
Levine, 1993b). Innovative financial products, therefore, help to deal with the information 
asymmetry problems and hence allow the financial system to mobilize and efficiently allocate 
resources for investment to achieve economic growth. 
  
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Finance and Economic Growth 
 
Poor rates of growth and development in developing countries may be caused by a multitude 
of factors, hence the need for a focused approach to policy making.  One way of achieving 
this is by conducting growth diagnostics which help to clarify which strategies are most likely 
to be effective for a given economy (Thirlwall, 2011: p.171). Since financial sector 
development is positively correlated with economic growth (Gurley and Shaw, 1955; 
Goldsmith, 1969; Hicks, 1969), an answer to the fundamental question on the direction of 
causality would be a reasonable starting point for growth diagnostic. The ‘causality’ 
investigations used for such diagnostic studies follow the widely used causality test, 
developed by Granger in 1969.  
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Despite vast literature on  direction of causality between financial sector development and 
economic growth, the debate on this nexus  still remains unresolved (Lee, 2012). A number 
of empirical studies have been conducted with both varying methodologies and conclusions. 
On one hand, results by McKinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993a), and Christopoulos and 
Tsionos (2004) support the argument that the Granger causality (statistical test of causality 
based on prediction) runs from financial development to economic growth. The other 
argument is that economic growth Granger causes financial development, because of the high 
demand for financial services, which result from economic growth (Gurley and Shaw, 1955; 
Goldsmith, 1969; Jung, 1986). Even so Patrick (1966) reported that early-stage causality runs 
from finance to growth, which supports McKinnon (1973), but in later stages causality runs 
from growth to finance, which agrees with Gurley and Shaw (1955). Patrick (1966) 
concluded that during the early stages, growth is achieved through creation of financial 
institutions, which channel resources from traditional sources to modern sources (supply-
leading hypothesis). Later higher growth creates needs for more financial services, and hence 
a demand-leading development (demand-leading hypothesis). However there is no clear 
guideline to indicate the actual years after which this switch is supposed to take place. 
 
In a study of 109 developing countries between 1960 and 1994, Calderon and Liu (2003) 
concluded that although there are causal links running both ways between financial sector 
development and economic growth, financial sector development has a stronger effect on 
growth than economic growth on financial sector development. Yet another set of studies 
support the notion that there is bi-directional causality between finance and growth in all 
regions except sub Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific, where causality only runs from 
growth to finance (Shan et al., 2001; Hassan et al., 2011). Although there is a strong 
agreement about the interrelationship between economic growth and financial sector 
development, the empirical evidence shows a lack of consensus regarding the direction of 
causality. Possible explanation is varying methodologies and analytical techniques employed, 
and how country specific factors are captured during the analysis.  
 
3.2.3 Methodological Inconsistencies in Empirical Causality Studies 
 
Empirical studies on direction of causality between financial sector development and 
economic growth use different types of data, study area, as well as a variety of proxy 
indicators. Depending on the type of data used, existing empirical studies can be put into 
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three categories namely; pure cross-country, time series and panel studies. Purely cross-
country and panel analyses mostly use growth equations, and time series usually adopt a 
vector auto-regressive (VAR) framework or a single equation error-correction framework  
(Ang, 2008). Pure cross country studies, mostly using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates, have been conducted with varying conclusions on the direction of causality 
(Goldsmith, 1969; Atje and Jovanovic, 1993; King and Levine 1993a; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Makismovic, 2002; Levine, 2002).  King and Levine (1993a) found that various indicators of 
financial development were positively correlated with real per capita GDP, the rate of 
physical capital accumulation and total factor productivity. Atje and Jovanovic (1993) 
concluded that stock markets have growth effects on economic activity. Contrary to this 
finding, Harris (1995) used two-stage least squares analysis to find that the stock market 
effect is weak in developing countries but has some effect on growth in developed countries. 
The level of financial development is therefore one variable that needs consideration in such 
analyses as revealed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Makismovic (1998). They concluded that a 
larger banking sector, active stock market and well-developed legal system enable firms to 
obtain external funds easily, which facilitates their growth.  
 
The impact of the stock market and banking sector development on firms’ growth is related 
to the level of development of a country’s legal environment (Demirgüç-Kunt  and 
Makismovic, 2002; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Arestis et al., 2002). Results for these 
researchers’ assessment of causal links showed variations across countries’, even when same 
variables and estimation methods are used. This indicates shortfalls in cross-section studies, 
where countries are treated as homogeneous entities. The cross-sectional method of analysis 
has also proven problematic because by grouping countries that are at different stages of 
economic development, it fails to address the country-specific effects of savings on economic 
growth, and vice versa (Caselli et al., 1996; Ghirmay, 2004; Odhiambo, 2008). Furthermore, 
the implicit assumption adopted by cross country studies reflects a one period static 
framework, and hence conclusions on long term behaviour are ungrounded (Ang, 2008). 
Economic development is a gradual process, and static analyses might not represent a fair 
long term picture of its dynamics. Ericsson et al., (2001) further emphasizes that cross-
country analyses disregard levels relationship in the specification and hence estimate the 
short-run rather than long-run relationship. Therefore this aggregate level analysis fails to 
capture the complexities of financial environments, in each country, to reliably inform policy. 
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Research has therefore argued for country-specific time series in-depth studies (see Edwards, 
1996; Ericsson et al., 2001, Kenny and Williams, 2001; Ang, 2007). 
 
The first time series analysis on causality studies was conducted by Gupta (1984) who used 
industrial output as a proxy for economic development. He found causality to run from 
finance to development, using a VAR.  However the proxy used does not capture a true 
picture of economic development, especially for developing countries where industrial output 
is minimal.  Using Granger causality and VAR analysis, Jung (1986), reported a causality 
direction from financial development to economic development for developing countries and 
the reverse for developed countries.   Contrary to this finding Choe and Moosa (1999), using 
annual data for South Korea, reported causality from finance to economic growth. 
Furthermore they reported that financial intermediaries are more important than capital 
markets in the causal relationship.  Using the same framework of analysis but for Australian 
quarterly data, Thangavelu and Ang (2004) concluded that economic growth causes banking 
development when indicators related to financial intermediaries are used. However when 
financial market indicators are used, the study concluded that stock market is essential in 
fuelling economic growth. Similar observations are noted from Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn 
(2005) and Ang and McKibbin (2007), whose studies used annual data to conduct Johansen 
cointegration and vector error correction model (VECM) analysis, but with contrary results. 
The former study used data for 10 Asian economies while the latter was a case for Malaysia. 
Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn’s (2005) conclusions supported the factor accumulation 
channel through which financial sector influenced economic growth. Ang and McKibbin’s 
(2007) results supported the Robinson (1952) view that output growth leads to financial 
development, but not that a bank-based system induces growth in the real sector. Demetriades 
and Hussein (1996), in a study of 16 countries using VAR modelling of Engle-Granger and 
Johansen cointegration, found that financial development and economic growth showed a bi-
direction causality implying that they are complementary.  Bi-directional causality was also 
found using a VAR and VECM analysis for 10 developing countries (Luintel and Khan, 
1999) and for Kenya (Wolde-Rufael, 2009). However, cointegration and error correction 
techniques applied to Kenya (Odhiambo, 2008a) revealed a unidirectional causal flow from 
economic growth to the financial sector, and further warned that any arguments that financial 
development  explicitly leads to economic growth needs to be treated with extreme caution.  
 
 27 
In recent years researchers have tried to work around the challenges posed by use of pure 
cross-section analysis with the use of panel estimation techniques. However, when 
unobserved country specific differences are included in the error term, the problems of 
limited data points and spurious regressions due to omitted variables still exist (Ang, 2008). 
The drive on use of panel data is towards analysing micro level data to gain more insights 
into how financial development and economic growth are related beyond the country level. 
Rioja and Valev (2004), using panel data from 74 countries, concluded that finance has a 
strong positive impact on economic growth mainly in countries with more developed 
financial systems, while in financially less developed countries the effect is less recognizable. 
Calderón & Liu  (2003) found a bi-directional causality, but financial development 
contributed more to the causal relationship in developing rather than developed countries. 
The analysis used the Geweke decomposition test on pooled data of 109 developed and 
developing countries from 1960 to 1994. Rajan & Zingales (2003) found that financial 
development may play a crucial role in firms’ growth by easing flow of external finance and 
their results have stimulated use of micro level data for such type of research. 
 
Table 3.1  Finance and Growth Empirical Studies 
 
Author(s) Region/country & Type 
of data used 
Analytical Technique 
Employed 
Direction of Causality 
FD-Financial 
development 
EG- Economic growth 
Demetriades and James 
(2011) 
18 developing countries, 
panel  (1975 – 2006) 
Cointegration FD to EG, no 
cointegration between 
bank credit and growth 
Ahmed (2010) 16 Sub Saharan 
countries*, panel (1976 – 
2005) 
Cointegration and 
country specific using 
Granger causality and 
Johansen cointegration 
Bi-directional on panel 
and unidirectional on 
country specific 
Akinlo and Egbetunde 
(2010) 
10 Sub Saharan countries, 
panel ( 1980 – 2005) 
Vector error correction 
model (VECM) 
cointegration and 
Granger causality 
FD to EG and bi-
directional 
Kar et al. ( 2011) Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, 
panel (1969 – 2005) 
Seemingly unrelated 
regression and  panel 
Granger causality 
No clear consensus but 
FD to EG for Morocco 
only 
Odhiambo (2008a) Kenya ( 1969 – 2005) VECM , Johansen 
cointegration 
EG to FD 
Odhiambo (2008b) Kenya (1968 – 2002) VECM FD to EG 
Simwaka et al. ( 2012) Malawi Vector auto regression 
(VAR) 
EG to FD 
Jung (1986) 56 countries( 37 
developing), time series 
 VAR and Granger 
causality 
FD to EG 
King and Levine (1993a) 80 countries, cross 
country  
Ordinary Least 
Squares(OLS) 
FD to EG 
Rajan and Zingales 41 developing and OLS and panel data fixed FD to EG 
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Author(s) Region/country & Type 
of data used 
Analytical Technique 
Employed 
Direction of Causality 
FD-Financial 
development 
EG- Economic growth 
(1998) developed countries, 
panel data 
effects 
Ghali (1999) Tunisia VAR, time series FD to EG 
Jalilian and Kirkpatrick 
(2002) 
Low income countries OLS, panel and two-stage 
least squares 
FD to EG 
Calderon and Lin (2003) 109 developing and 
industrial countries* 
Panel VAR, Geweke 
decomposition and 
Granger causality 
Bi-direction but stronger 
from FD to EG  
Abu-Bader and Abu-
Quan (2005) 
Egypt Trivariate VAR, 
(VECM),  Granger 
causality 
FD to EG 
Odhiambo (2009) South Africa Trivariate, cointegration 
based error correction 
mechanism, time series 
Bi-directional 
Christopoulos and 
Tsionas (2004) 
Annual data for 10 
developing countries 
Panel VECM, panel 
cointegration, threshold 
cointegration and fully 
modified OLS 
FD to EG 
Houssem (2011) 6 from the OECD 
region and 4 from the 
MENA region 
Panel data cointegration 
and GMM 
FD to EG 
Luintel and Khan (1999) 10 developing countries, 
time series 
VARs, vector error 
correction model 
(VECM),  Granger 
causality 
Bi-directional 
Demetriades and Hussein 
(1996) 
 
16 Less Developed 
countries, time series 
VARs, vector error 
correction 
model(VECM), Johansen 
cointegration, Granger 
causality 
Bi-directional 
Goldsmith (1969) 35 countries, cross 
country 
OLS  FD to EG 
Levine (1998) 42 countries, cross 
country 
OLS and Generalised 
method of moment 
(GMM) 
FD to EG 
*Malawi included on list of countries 
 
Interestingly, different conclusions from the empirical results not only arise due to 
differences in data types, country and analytical techniques employed (see Table 3.1), but 
also stem from variations in type of proxy indicators utilized to describe financial sector 
development or economic growth. Notably, when countries  are grouped, the empirical 
results tend to be different from those obtained for specific countries (Rioja, 2004). 
Furthermore, results for countries within the same development level group still have 
different results, largely due to institutional factors and other structural characteristics in each 
country. For example Odhiambo (2008b), Ahmed (2010) and Akinlo and Egbetunde (2010), 
using  multivariate and bivariate ECMs, found a bi-directional relationship between finance 
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and growth in Kenya, whereas, using a similar methodology, Odhiambo (2008a) found a 
distinct uni-directional causality running from economic growth to financial development.  
 
The summary of research papers in Table 3.1 also indicates the gap in literature for empirical 
case studies for some countries in Africa. There is a concentration on studies in emerging 
economies, with fewer studies on low-income countries like Malawi. Previously such 
analyses were impeded due to data unavailability, but currently the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, African Development Bank and various other such institutions routinely 
collect data, which is now readily available for investigators. Due to improved availability of 
data, a proliferation of financial development and causality studies are bound to occur. 
Policies change periodically, hence research, which informs policy, need to continually take 
place to provide up to date information. Most research documented in Table 3.1 has used data 
capturing events up to 2005, although the analyses were conducted much recently. 
  
The studies completed so far have made significant contributions to knowledge and policy 
formulation, hence development (Ang, 2008). However the issue of causality cannot be 
satisfactorily addressed in a simple broad comparative framework (Ahmed, 1998).  Such a 
causal link is mostly determined by operations of financial institutions and policies being 
pursued by individual countries (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Demetriades and 
Andrinova, 2004). Therefore with the varying conclusions, a blanket statement that financial 
development contributes to output growth may be far from being qualified unless its validity 
is tested within specific cases. Hence more empirical case studies are required to shed more 
light on this issue (Ghirmay, 2004; Odhiambo, 2008; Ang, 2008).  
 
3.2.4 Empirical evidence on credit supply factors 
 
To understand how financial sector development affects economic growth at macro level, the 
focus of research turned to exploring determinants of credit access. Previous research on this 
topic focused on the role of financial liberalization, institutional quality, foreign bank 
penetration and financial development in alleviating small firms’ obstacles to credit access 
(Beck et al., 2006; Laeven, 2002; Love, 2003; Clarke et al., 2001; Kabango and Paloni, 
2010). Using data from 10,000 firms across 80 countries Beck et al. (2006) concluded that 
institutional development is a key factor in explaining country variation of firms’ financing 
obstacles. Financial liberalization was found to affect small and large firms differently, using 
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panel data from 13 developing countries (Laeven, 2002). After controlling for institutional 
quality, fiscal imbalances and inflation, Ahmed (2013) found that financial liberalization 
positively affects financial deepening and resource mobilization in sub Saharan Africa (SSA) 
region.  However, using data for Malawi, Kabango and Paloni (2010) showed that although 
financial liberalization results in an increased supply of credit, it does not remove financing 
constraints for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs).  Love (2003) concluded that 
financial development affects a firm’s investment through their ability to obtain external 
financing.  
 
Compared with the major research focus of financial development and economic growth 
nexus, research on savings mobilisation, as an additional factor affecting access to credit, has 
been neglected (Murinde, 2012). The urgent need for investment for development, especially 
during the 1990s in developing countries, has previously been addressed through structural 
adjustment programmes. However, these programmes generally failed due to poor policy 
environments of the recipient countries at time of intervention (Burnside and Dollar, 1997; 
Dollar and Svensson, 2000). Other strategies employed included use of development finance 
institutions, which mainly provided subsidized credit programmes for targeted sectors. 
Unfortunately, this strategy undermines the financial viability of the institution, because it 
cannot afford to source additional supply of funds at market rate. Overall, the documented 
efforts have also neglected small savers as a potential source for domestically generated 
funds (Mavrotas, 2005). 
  
3.3 Economic Growth and the Financial System 
 
Knowledge of the direction of causality is an important objective, but the ultimate goal in 
development is to achieve poverty reduction. One approach to achieving this is through 
economic growth driven by a financial sector development approach. An efficient financial 
sector reduces the cost and risk of producing and trading goods and services hence a 
significant contribution to raising standards of living (Herring et al., 1995). This is the 
rationale for devoting attention to understanding operational efficiency of the financial 
system, which is the heart of the financial sector.  There are three prerequisites to enable 
financial sector development to lead to the virtuous circle of increased economic activity, 
sustainable job creation and poverty reduction. These prerequisites are efficiency in (1) 
mobilization of maximum domestic savings (2) channelling of the savings to the private 
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sector and (3)  investment of the funds by the private sector as productively as possible 
(Spratt, 2008: p.366). The section proceeds with a discussion focusing on the first two 
prerequisites. 
 
3.4 Financial Sector Efficiency  
 
3.4.1 Domestic Resource Mobilisation 
 
Financial development influences growth though better allocation of savings for 
improvements in technology, or by increasing domestic savings rates and attracting foreign 
capital for capital accumulation (Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 2000). Domestic resource 
mobilization is the generation of domestic resources, from public (taxation and other forms of 
public revenue), and private sectors (household and business savings) through financial sector 
intermediaries and the allocation to productive investment (Culpeper, 2008). Many 
developing countries depend on external flows (foreign aid, foreign direct investment, export 
earnings) to support their developmental initiatives. Unfortunately, the 2007 global financial 
crisis reduced donor and private external flows into African economies and worsened efforts 
to attract private capital (Aryeetey, 2009). During the global financial crisis years, it is 
estimated that the weighted average growth in the sub Saharan Africa region dropped from 
6.5% between 2002 and 2007, the highest in more than 30 years, to only 1 per cent in 2009, 
after almost a decade of strong performance (Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011). Although 
concerted efforts are being made to attract foreign resources in order to achieve planned 
development goals, unfortunately these efforts can divert effort from mobilising domestic 
resources (Adam and O’Connell, 1999).  African economies, therefore, need to make 
deliberate policy moves to mobilize additional domestic resources to offset the reduced 
external flows and hence promote sustainable development (Aryeetey, 2009). Developing 
countries that have achieved and sustained high rates of growth have done so, to a larger 
extent, through the mobilization of their domestic resources. This also strengthens ownership 
of development strategies and accountability between governments and its citizens (Culpeper 
and Bushan, 2010). 
 
In recent years extensive research has documented the relationship between finance and 
economic growth (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Caprio et al., 2001; Green et al., 2005; 
Guha-Khasnobis and Mavrotas, 2008). However the relationship between finance and 
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domestic resource mobilization has not been given much attention (Mavrotas, 2008). This 
neglected area of research has the potential to accelerate achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) if successfully implemented. 
 
3.4.2 Financial System Functions 
 
Facilitation of the linkage between financial sector development and economic growth is 
understood through the five functions of the financial system as categorized by Levine 
(1997). Notably all functions of the system are directly or indirectly related to resource 
allocation. These functions are:  
(1) Allocating resources - when financial intermediation is effective firms compete for 
savings. This not only benefits savers but also causes capital to be channelled to 
investment opportunities offering greatest returns (Beim and Calorimis, 2001: p.44).  
(2) Mobilizing savings – financial systems induce mobilization of savings through pooling 
together individual household savings for on lending (Ang, 2008).  
(3) Reducing risks – Since there are a large number of borrowers, financial intermediaries are 
able to offer services to suit varying liquidity preferences (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  
(4) Facilitating exchange of goods and services.  
(5) Exercising corporate control.  
  
All financial institutions perform some of the related functions but only commercial banks 
perform all of the functions, and hence are responsible for evolution of all the functions. 
Since banks consist of the largest share of the financial sector in developing countries, 
measures of efficiency of the financial sector have mostly used the banking system proxies. 
 
3.4.3 Measuring Efficiency 
 
The financial system can be measured using four separate concepts, which are information 
arbitrage, fundamental valuation, full insurance and functional efficiency (Tobin, 1984). 
Information arbitrage measures the extent to which it is possible to gain from trading on the 
basis of available information.  Fundamental valuation focuses on the extent to which asset 
market values accurately reflect the present value of future payments associated with 
investing in them. Full insurance measures the degree to which the financial system offers 
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ways of hedging against future risks (Fry, 1995: p.296). Functional efficiency makes an 
assessment of risk pooling, resource mobilization, general insurance, administration of the 
payment mechanism and mobilizing savings for investment. Bloor and Hunt (2011) described 
measurement of efficiency as analysing whether the financial system is helping to allocate 
resources to their best use (allocative efficiency); doing so in a cost-effective manner 
(technical efficiency); and whether it responds to both changing demand and uncertainty over 
time through the development of new financial processes, services and products (dynamic 
efficiency).  
 
The allocative efficiency approach is the focus of discussion in this thesis. Other studies 
analysing financial system efficiency have used the institutional or sector lens approach 
where performance of institutions is compared within the country or with other countries 
(Bloor and Hunt, 2011).  This research will take a functional approach analysis, because 
functions are less dynamic over time and across borders, as opposed to institutions which are 
also structured according to functions (Merton, 1995). The research community is 
increasingly accepting Stiglitz’s (1993) suggestion that financial markets are the ‘brain’ of 
the entire economic system – if they work, economic performance will be enhanced, but if 
they fail, the performance of the entire economic system may be hampered. Many analysts 
accept the importance of the ‘brain’, but do not fully understand how it works (Tennant, 
Kirton, & Abdulkadri, 2011). 
 
3.5 Chapter Synthesis 
 
This chapter has reviewed macroeconomic literature to highlight evidence on the role of 
financial sector development in economic growth, and to highlight the research gaps in this 
discourse, which this thesis fills. The financial sector generates a significant impact on 
economic growth by mobilizing savings and ensuring efficiency in resource allocation. The 
need to focus attention on how efficiently a system performs this function can, therefore, not 
be overemphasized. Evidence to inform policy of the extent to which the financial systems in 
developing countries can effectively mobilize domestic resources for investments, which is  
of paramount importance, is lacking. 
 
Empirical studies on how the financial sector reform policies have impacted on improving 
savings mobilization in African countries have been limited, despite the need for evidence to 
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inform policy. This kind of investigation has mostly been conducted in South Asian and Latin 
American countries, leaving some of the poor countries in Sub -Saharan Africa with little or 
no attention (Odhiambo, 2009). To contribute to this strand of literature, on determinants of 
the supply side of formal credit, Chapter 9 uses time series data for Malawi (1985 – 2011) to 
estimate the direction of causality between domestic savings mobilization and private credit. 
The thesis proceeds, with a description of the economic environment for Malawi, to set the 
scene for the analysis in subsequent Chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4 MALAWI SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTREPRISE CREDIT 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
This chapter sets the scene for the case study country, to appreciate the volatile economic 
environment in which small and medium enterprises (SMEs) operate. The economic 
environment presents both opportunities and challenges necessitating the use of innovative, 
or unconventional, approaches to enhance access to credit for SMEs. The chapters, that 
follow hereafter, complements the content discussed in this chapter, by providing a more 
detailed and focused analysis, to document evidence, on social capital and domestic savings 
mobilization as potential supply and demand factors affecting flow of formal credit to SMEs.  
 
4.1 The Recent History of the Financial Sector   
Until the 1980s, the financial system in Malawi was characterized by heavy regulation 
through credit and interest rate controls.  In 1981, the Malawi Government embarked on 
financial liberalization under the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank 
supported structural adjustment programmes, which saw the removal of restrictions on 
interest rates charged by banks (Chirwa, 2001).  The effective start of the reforms were in 
1989, when the Reserve Bank Act and Banking Act were revised (Chirwa & Mlachila, 2004). 
Since 1990, a number of policies were implemented including deregulation of deposit rates, 
removal of credit ceilings and rationing, liberalization of lending rates, and devaluations 
(Chirwa, 2001).  
 
Prior to liberalization, the financial sector consisted of a central bank, two commercial banks, 
two finance institutions, and one savings bank. Over 15 years on, the financial sector in 
Malawi, comprises of a central bank, thirteen depository corporations designated into 
commercial banks, merchant banks, a leasing and finance company and savings banks, two 
discount houses, one stock exchange with fourteen companies listed, various microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), and insurance companies (Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2011). Despite the 
notable increase in the number of financial institutions, the non-bank financial institutions 
make up a bigger proportion, in terms of service provider numbers and geographical 
coverage, than the banks. The non-bank financial intuitions are categorised into 
Microfinance
3
, capital markets
4
, insurance and pensions
5
. Microfinance comprises of 
                                                 
3
 Includes deposit taking, non deposit taking and commercial banks with a microfinance window. 
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microfinance providers, totalling 40, and savings and credit cooperatives totalling 49 
(Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2013). Among the thirteen registered banks, only two are 
government owned, and five banks have foreign majority ownership. Presence of foreign 
owned banks can enhance operating efficiency because foreign participation improves the 
efficiency of domestic banking (Claessens and Lee, 2003; Clarke et al., 2001). However, 
differences of such an effect exists between developing and developed countries,  due to 
differences in the customer base, bank procedures and tax regimes (Claessens et al., 2001).  
 
Financial sector development helps predict economic growth (Goldsmith, 1969 ; McKinnon, 
1973; Shaw, 1973). The level of financial sector development in Malawi is still low as 
measured by liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP (2007), and domestic credit as a 
percentage of GDP (2008). According to the World Bank development indicators online 
database, these indicators are 21.97% and 26.19% respectively for Malawi, compared with 
Kenya (43.29% and 40.09%) and Japan (203.55% and 293.00%). However, despite the low 
level of development of the sector, the country experienced high and increasing economic 
growth rates in the years between 2004 and 2009. This increase is mainly attributed to 
macroeconomic stability, effective input subsidy programme, improved policy coherence and 
strengthened national ownership of development policy (Overseas Development Institute, 
2011). In 2008, Malawi experienced a growth rate of 7%, which was higher than several 
other Sub-Saharan Africa countries, including South Africa, Namibia and Botswana (African 
Economic Outlook, 2011). Two years later, growth declined sharply in 2010 to 6.7% from 
8.9% in 2009, because of a poor agricultural season. Growth fell further in 2011 to 5.8% in 
2011 as a result of a suspension of the International Monetary Fund Extended Credit facility 
programme. This resulted into reduced inflows from other major donors, foreign exchange 
difficulties, and shortages of essential commodities like fuel and inputs for manufacturing.  
The slowdown continued in 2012, when the country registered a growth of 1.2% with a 
rebound of 5% growth in 2013. Growth projections for 2014 and 2015 are 6.1% and 6.2% 
respectively (African Economic Outlook, 2014). Malawi’s financial system is considered one 
of the less developed by developing country standards, however it is also one of the relatively 
small number of developing countries where financial liberalization has not been followed at 
some point by a banking or financial crises (Kabango and Paloni, 2011). This could be 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
 Comprises of one stock market, eight investment/portifolio managers, four brokers and one investment trust. 
5
 Comprises of general insurance, life insurance, reinsurance, funeral assistance benefit companies, and several 
brokers and agents. 
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because of the fairly stable financial sector, and limited bank exposure to credit risk resulting 
from low credit provision due to information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers.  
 
In September 2013, a revelation of robbing public funds through the Integrated Financial 
Management System (IFMIS), known as ‘cash-gate’, worsened the macroeconomic 
challenges. This disclosure resulted in suspension of budgetary support with adverse effects. 
Malawi’s aid per capita is US$ 68.6, which is much higher than other countries in Africa 
(US$42.1) or Southern Africa (US$44.5) (ADB, 2012). This implies that the country is 
vulnerable to fluctuations in donor inflows. The withholding of budgetary support  however 
forced the Malawi government to focus on domestic resource mobilisation to implement a 
zero aid budget. The financial sector, which is mostly composed of commercial banks, relies 
on deposits from surplus sectors of the economy, to provide credit to deficit sectors. Figure 
4.1 and Figure 4.2 indicates the sources and uses of funds for commercial banks in Malawi. 
Deposits mobilised from the private sector (includes households) contributed 68 % to the 
total available funds in 2013. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Sources of Funds for Commercial Banks in 2013 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi (2013) 
 
 
 
68% 2% 
3% 
16% 
11% 
Sources of funds 
Private sector
Foreign borrowing
Official sector deposits
Capital Accounts
All other liabilities
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Figure 4.2 Use of Funds by Commercial Banks in 2013 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi (2013) 
 
A similar picture is observed in the uses of funds which indicate that the largest proportion 
(39%) of the available funds was invested as credit extended to the private sector in 2013. 
This was probably because donor inflows supported part of government expenditures, and 
hence reduced borrowing from commercial banks. Lending interest rates in that year 
averaged 20%, compared to 32% in 2012, which encouraged investors to borrow. 
Unfortunately revelations of the ‘cash-gate’ scandal resulted in suspension of donor flows 
and hence a tough macroeconomic environment. However, despite the challenges, Malawi is 
among the  few countries whose economic growth grew in the midst of the global financial 
crises (Aryeetey, 2009). Malawi recorded a good performance in 2011 with total stock 
liabilities jumping from US$1,319.5 million to  US$2,887.0 million indicating that the 
economy was not affected much by the first round of the global financial crisis (Reserve 
Bank of Malawi, 2011). This was largely due to negligible participation on global financial 
markets. The negative effect was however experienced later in the form of reduced aid, 
commodity exports and remittances. 
 
4.2 The Economy  
 
Malawi is one of the least developed countries in the world with a nominal GDP per capita 
(current US$) of $226, according to the World banks’ 2013 World Development Indicators 
database.  In 2014 it was ranked 178 out of 187 on the Human Development Index. However, 
39% 
10% 
3% 
12% 
17% 
19% 
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Central government
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bank & currency in banks
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Malawi is a new and recognised example of progress in economic conditions (ODI, 2011). 
For example, the country ranked among top 20 performers in absolute and relative progress, 
in terms of human development Millennium Development Goals (MDG) indicators (ODI, 
2010). Geographically, it is bordered by Zambia to the northwest, Tanzania to the northeast, 
and Mozambique on the east, south and western side (see map of southern Africa in Figure 
4.3).  
  
 
Figure 4.3 Map of Southern Africa 
Source: http://teacherlink.ed.usu.edu/tlresources/units/byrnes-africa/susbuc/image.gif 
 
The country has an estimated population of 16 million, out of which 39% live below $2 a day 
(National Statistics Office, 2008).  
 
4.2.1 Sources of Income 
 
Since independence Malawi has largely been dependent on aid, which is not sustainable. 
Figure 4.4 indicates that the gross capital formulation has consistently been greater than gross 
domestic savings since 1960s, indicating a reliance on external flows to finance investments.  
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Figure 4.4 Selected Economic Indicators for Malawi, 1960 - 2011 
Source: World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/country/malawi  
 
A stable macroeconomic environment is essential for an economy’s growth. According to the 
Reserve Bank of Malawi, lending interest rates have averaged 36.7% between July 2012 and 
April, 2015. This is considerably high compared to rates prevailing in other African 
countries. Although, businesses have different cost structures which affect profit margin 
levels, on average lending interest rates of greater than 20% is considered high. High interest 
rates adversely affect a borrower’s ability to service loans, and hence put pressure on the 
stability of the financial system. While most central banks in developed and emerging 
economies are cutting or holding interest rates, it is a different story in the rest of the world. 
Malawi is in the top 5 group of countries with the highest interest rates in the world
6
. 
Additionally, according to the World Bank, Malawi was ranked 164 out of 189 economies on 
the ease of doing business index in 2015. This indicates a poor regulatory environment for 
doing business.  
 
A majority (85%) of the population live in rural areas. Agriculture is the dominant sector 
contributing to the economy. It contributes 38% of GDP, accounting for 90% of the 
country’s’ exports, and employing 85% of the labour force (Finscope, 2012). Despite the high 
contribution to the economy, total lending, from the financial sector to agriculture, is 
estimated at only 8.5% (Darroll, 2012). The need to support this sector is also pointed out by 
                                                 
6
www.tradeeconomics.com. 
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Wiggins and Keats (2013) who suggested that in most low income countries of Africa, 
development needs to include the majority smallholder farmers, who farm at low 
productivity, in yields per hectare or returns to labour, yet often the technology already exists 
to greatly increase productivity. This technology is often unused because these smallholders 
lack effective links to markets for produce, inputs and credit (Wiggins and Keats, 2013).  The 
other key sectors of the economy are listed in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 Gross Domestic Product by Sector  
 
Sector                    Percentage 
contribution 
 2008 2012 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing  33.1 30.7 
Mining  0.9 5.3 
Manufacturing  11.3 9.9 
Electricity, gas and water  1.5 1.4 
Construction 3.0  3.0 
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants 19.5  18.7 
Transport, storage and communication 6.0  6.0 
Finance, real estate and business services 12.7  13.2 
Public administration, education, health and social work, community, social and 
personal services  
3.6 3.4 
Other services  8.4 8.4 
Gross domestic product at basic prices / factor cost 100 100 
Adapted from Malawi- Africa Economic Outlook (2014) 
 
An estimated 22 percent of GDP contributed by trading and retailing activities, is mostly 
linked to the rural economy. Estimates indicate that rural based micro and small scale 
economic activities generate nearly two-thirds of overall business turnover (Darroll, 2012). 
However, it is also the same businesses that are poorly served by formal financial services. 
Despite the low access to formal financial services, the national statistics office  Welfare 
Monitoring Survey of 2008 reported that out of 6,100,000 of the labour force, only 440,000 
(8%) work in the formal sector. This leaves out 92% either employed in subsistence farming, 
informal sector, under-employed or unemployed. These statistics demonstrate the importance 
of entrepreneurship to the development and growth of Malawi. Further evidence is also 
observed in the way business networking groups have mushroomed. The number of 
registered business associations has doubled since 2005 to date. Most of these associations 
are group specific, to ensure that common issues of concern are raised with one voice. For 
example national association of small and medium businesses in Malawi, national association 
of business women (NABW), Malawi union for the informal sector, National association of 
smallholder farmers in Malawi (NASFAM), poultry industry association of Malawi, 
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Kasinthula cane growers association, minibus owners association of Malawi etc. Although 
such networks present an opportunity to enhance business members’ access to various 
services, little evidence is documented on how effective such capital is utilised. 
 
4.3 Regulatory framework 
 
The regulatory framework for financial services in Malawi  has recently been extended by the 
following legislations; Banking Act (2010), Financial Services Act (2010), Pensions Act 
(2010), Financial Cooperatives Act (2009), Microfinance Act (2009), Payment Systems Act 
and the Credit Reference Bureaux Act (2009) among others. In April 2011 the Pensions Act 
(2010), which makes pensions mandatory in Malawi, was assented into law. It is envisaged 
that eventual contribution rates of 10 percent of earnings by the employer and 5 percent by 
the employee (with administration fees and the costs of compulsory life insurance separately 
covered by the employer) will result in a significant increase in current levels of household 
saving. It is further expected that the enactment of these laws will pave the way for greater 
legitimacy within the sector, which is in the interest of better performing institutions that are 
not necessarily willing or able to transform themselves into commercial banks. The 
legislation further allows for non-bank forms of financial institution, including microfinance, 
to be regulated as deposit taking, non-deposit taking or purely credit granting institutions. 
This creates more room for regulated deposit mobilization, especially from the unbanked 
sectors of the economy (Malawi Microfinance Network, 2012). 
 
4.4 Small and Medium Enterprises and Banking  
 
Malawi’s private sector is characterized by a ‘missing middle’ with very few SMEs accessing 
credit, in contrast with the numerous micro and few large enterprises (African Development 
Bank, 2011). There is a gap between booming microfinance activities, which serve the micro 
level, and formal institutions which serve mostly large enterprises. One reason for such a gap 
is limited publicly available credit information about SMEs, which results in businesses 
facing insufficient access to credit (Hartarska and Gonzalez-Vega, 2006). Most businesses in 
Malawi are small and informal (Finscope, 2012), largely due to an unfavourable business 
environment, which makes it difficult for them to access formal credit, among other factors. 
Notably, a major challenge of access to finance affects SMEs more than large enterprises in 
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developing countries, largely because the SMEs are less exposed to banks and hence are 
charged higher interest rates and fees (Beck et al., 2008b). 
According to the 2012 Malawi Finscope survey, there are 760 000 small business owners, 
which generate annual revenue of US$2 billion. However, 60 per cent of these businesses do 
not use formal financial services. Close to seventy five percent of small business owners in 
Malawi do not borrow from formal sources, because they are wary of their ability to repay 
the loan. The largest source of credit for small businesses is friends and family, followed by 
village bank or cooperatives, with only 2.6 per cent relying on informal mechanisms (money 
lenders), and another two per cent having loans offered by a bank (Finscope, 2012). A 2012 
survey, conducted by Bankable Frontier Associates, documented that only 19% of the 
population in Malawi, mostly residing in urban areas, has access to formal banking services. 
A further 19% is served by the informal credit providers. Further indicators of access to 
financial services are presented in Table 4.2. Overall access to formal financial services is 
low, with a large proportion of the population aged 15 years and over relying more on family 
and friends for credit than from formal institutions.  
 
Table 4.2 Selected Financial Inclusion Indicators 
 
Financial Inclusion indicators for year 2011 Percentage 
Loan from a financial institution in the past year (% age 15+) 9.19 
Loan from family or friends in the past year (% age 15+) 43.97 
Loan through store credit in the past year (% age 15+) 3.20 
Account at a formal financial institution (% age 15+) 16.54 
Account at a formal financial institution, older adults (% age 25+) 20.15 
Account at a formal financial institution, young adults (% ages 15-24) 10.27 
 
Source: Global Financial Inclusion Index Database, World Bank 
 
The World Bank 2014 Global Financial Development report also documented that two thirds 
of regulatory and supervisory institutions are now charged with enhancing financial 
inclusion. This is also in accordance with the Maya Declaration, to which Malawi is a 
signatory. The Maya Declaration is the first global and assessable set of commitments made 
by emerging and developing countries to unlock the economic and social potential of the 
‘unbanked’ population through increased financial inclusion. The declaration has been 
endorsed by 80 institutions from developing and emerging economies, which represent 75% 
of the world’s unbanked population (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2006). It aims to create 
an enabling environment that increases access and lowers costs of financial services; 
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implement a proportionate regulatory framework that balances financial inclusion, integrity, 
and stability; integrate consumer protection and empowerment as a pillar of financial 
inclusion; and use data to inform policies and track results. In line with the global initiatives 
to enhance financial inclusion, Malawi has developed policies and regulations to support 
scaling up of innovative products (Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2012). Two major policy 
frameworks that guide implementation are the National Payment System vision 2009 – 2013 
Strategy Framework and the National Strategy for Financial Inclusion in Malawi.  
  
A number of measures have also been instituted by the Government of Malawi (GoM), 
Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM), a member of the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), and 
other stakeholders. The measures aim to strengthen the financial sector, and create an 
enabling environment for financial services provision. Some of the notable developments 
include variations in service points operations. Banks operate a range of full service branches, 
sub branches, kiosks, agencies, mobile branches and automated teller machines (ATM). Since 
2008, when one bank rolled out mobile branch banking services, three commercial banks 
have introduced mobile banking services, where a van makes visits to trading centres on 
strategically chosen days of the week, to offer banking services. As of December, 2010 the 
total number of operating branches for all banks was seventy two, with agencies/kiosks 
totalling 146 (Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2010). In addition to an increase in operating centres, 
there has been a proliferation of technology driven products which are expected to drive the 
banks transaction costs down, and hence improve financial inclusion. A number of products 
have so far been introduced including smart cards, ATMs, cell phone banking, internet 
banking and point-of-sale (POS) devices. These products have the potential to simplify 
financial transaction as well as improve accessibility for both providers and users of the 
services. However, the uptake and effectiveness in enhancing financial inclusion are yet to be 
documented. The World Bank, in collaboration with Department for International 
Development (DFID) and United States Aid (USAID) are in the process of designing the 
Malawi Financial Sector deepening trust to increase access to financial services in Malawi, 
according to the International development reports submitted, for the 2012-2013 session, to 
the United Kingdom parliament
7
. 
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 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/writev/malawi/mal22a.htm  
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4.5 Chapter Synthesis 
 
The credit environment for Malawi is not very different from that in other developing 
countries in the region. The financial and economic environment for SMEs in Malawi poses 
both challenges, for business operators to easily access the credit that they need for business 
growth, and opportunities for credit providers to be innovative in developing products, which 
can enhance access to credit for entrepreneurs. A number of regulatory reforms have been 
implemented, and the provision of differentiated financial products, which indicates positive 
developments to stimulate use of available financial services. Despite the positive 
developments in the financial sector, there is still need for continued efforts to support the 
financial sector through detailed exploration of factors that affect business growth. As 
summarised in Chapter 3, the financial sector plays a significant role of facilitating economic 
growth through mobilizing savings, facilitating payment of goods and services, and efficient 
allocation of resources (Levine, 2005). Efficient allocation is shown when banking 
institutions supply credit to productive sectors of the economy, for example SMEs. An 
understanding of specific factors that can affect supply and demand for credit is therefore a 
requirement to formulation of strategic development programmes. A contribution to this 
understanding is made in the following chapters, by exploring the role of social capital in 
enhancing access to formal credit in developing countries.   
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CHAPTER 5 THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN ENHANCING ACCESS TO 
CREDIT FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTREPRISES IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
This Chapter reviews literature and demonstrates for the need to formally acknowledge use of 
social capital in credit risk evaluation conducted by banks and other formal lenders. This is a 
proposed way of reducing the problem of information asymmetry between bankers and small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries. The Chapter context analyses the 
information asymmetry problem and how this affects SMEs. This is followed by a 
comparison of the lending environments in different economies, which are at three different 
levels of development. A review of some innovative approaches including microfinance, 
small quick loans (SQL) and commitment savings, pioneered by various stakeholders, to 
enhance access to financial services for the unbanked, is also provided. While other problems 
that hinder access to capital are structural, and hence difficult to easily overcome, the chapter 
advocates the idea that weaknesses in objective formal credit risk evaluation techniques can 
be resolved by strategic social connections between lenders and borrowers. 
 
5.1 SMEs and Access to Credit 
 
Difficulties in accessing financing for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) still remains the 
major constraint to SME development in Sub-Saharan Africa, surpassing problems of 
taxation, corruption and poor infrastructure (IMF, 2004; Honohan and Beck, 2007). In most 
developing countries stock and bond markets are not vibrant, and there is limited availability 
of pension funds and insurance companies, leaving bank lending as the largest source of 
financial intermediation (Freedman and Click, 2006). However, banks extend credit only 
when they are satisfied about the borrower’s future capacity to honour the debt repayments. 
A critical issue to guarantee this satisfaction is the availability of information about the 
borrower, which in developing countries is especially difficult to access. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) showed that in an exchange relationship, there is an information asymmetry 
between the borrower and the banker, which the banker tries to reduce through the credit risk 
evaluation process. This relationship between a banker and a borrower is therefore a critical 
component requiring maintenance in the development process because it facilitates 
investments and economic growth when the borrower is a business. Unfortunately, the 
relationship between a lender and a borrower is influenced by uncertainty about the viability 
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of the project (adverse selection) and the reliability of the borrower (moral hazard) (Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984). Using SMEs as ultimate borrowers, this chapter argues that to reduce this 
uncertainty, banks cannot only rely on instruments, and rigid procedures to conduct a 
satisfactory credit risk assessment but to embrace social capital as complementary to the 
credit evaluation process in developing countries. This is because social capital is ‘a resource 
in neither individuals nor in physical elements of production, but intrinsic in the structure of 
relations between persons and among persons’ (Coleman, 1990: p.302). 
  
The focus of the chapters’ discussion is on SMEs because they contribute to economies 
through innovations, job creation, and revenue creation; and as a catalyst for urban and rural 
areas growth (OECD, 2004; Williams, 2006; Fatoki & Asah, 2011). However, their notable 
potential to contribute to economic growth, especially in Africa, is hampered by the severity 
of information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, which cannot be offset by loan 
securitisation (Lefilleur, 2009). To worsen the situation further, most theories explaining 
factors behind financing decisions of SMEs have been based on research undertaken in high 
income countries (Booth et al., 2001; Fan et al., 2010), which have more developed 
institutions and different cultures than those found in the developing countries. 
  
Firms with limited or no access to external capital may be seriously constrained in the ability 
to pursue an optimal investment policy, which may ultimately hinder the firm’s growth 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Levine, 2005; Knyazeva et al., 2009). Since the 
primary cause of SME failure is the inability to secure adequate resources of external finance, 
continued investigations aimed at finding possible avenues, which can help ease problems of 
financing SMEs, are of particular research interest. 
 
5.2 Manifestations of the Information Asymmetry Problem 
 
Information asymmetry refers to a situation in a transaction where one party has more or 
better information than the other party. Binks and Ennew (1996) likened the information 
asymmetry to a principal-agent relationship and suggested considering the bank as the 
principal because bank finance is the major source of external finance for small firms. One of 
the major problems for bank decision to supply credit is the unavailability of inadequate and 
sometimes inaccurate information (Bris and Welch, 2005). Banks are able to establish the 
quality of projects which firms want to invest in using information relating to conduct of the 
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business. When this information is not known, the lenders become hesitant to supply credit to 
the firms. 
 
In order to understand the extent of the problem, an illustration about the information 
possessed and decisions made by borrowers and lenders is presented in Figure 5.1, which is 
adapted from Altman (1968). Information asymmetry, between a borrower and a lender, 
results into two erroneous decisions, which includes, good projects being rejected, and poor 
projects being accepted, by lenders. Altman (1968) categorised these errors as Type I and 
Type II errors, respectively. 
 
 
 
Bankers decision based on the information 
possessed 
Borrowers information about project  Good project Bad project 
Good project   Type I error 
Bad project Type II error   
 
Figure 5.1 Credit Risk Decision 
Source: Adapted from Altman (1968) 
 
The decisions presented in Figure 5.1 are made based on the information possessed by the 
lender which might result into less financing provided to some borrowers, for example SMEs, 
due to limited information, possessed by lenders, about their business. The major concern for 
SMEs access to credit is represented as Type I error in the illustration. Type I error results in 
good projects being denied credit by the banks, while Type II error results in bad projects being 
provided with credit hence high credit risk for credit providers. These two illustrated situations 
were also identified as adverse selection by Simtowe and Zeller (2006). Theoretically, lenders 
can reduce the risk of lending to ‘bad projects’ through better screening of the borrowers, and 
monitoring throughout the project life. However, in reality this would be very costly resulting 
into highly priced credit products, use of collateral to cover additional risk or complete 
rejection of a credit application. In the case where interest rates are raised, a borrower with a 
high risk project may succeed in getting credit because the return of the project is high (Risk 
return trade off), while a less risky project may not be viable at a higher interest rate hence would 
be denied credit. Lenders are, therefore, driven to make such decisions not only because of lack 
of information about the borrowers, but also due to the broader macroeconomic environment in 
which they are operating in. Research has demonstrated that access to external financing is 
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shaped by the country’s legal and financial environment (Carlin and Meyer, 2003). Therefore, if 
the supporting infrastructure is critical for bank operations in any economy, the question worth 
answering first is, ‘What are the characteristics of the lending environment in which banks in 
developing countries operate in?’ 
 
5.2.1 Lending Environment in Developing Countries 
 
Research conducted around the developing world gives evidence that SMEs indeed face 
greater financing hindrances than large firms (Beck et al., 2005, 2008a; Beck & Demirgüç-
Kunt, 2006) and yet they are a fundamental part of a dynamic and healthy economy 
(Kuntchev et al., 2012). This situation is worsened due to other conditions that render the 
lending environment difficult compared to that in emerging and high-income economies. In a 
recent cross-country study of 91 banks in 45 countries, Beck et al. (2008b) concluded that 
there are differences in extent, type and pricing of SME lending between developed and 
developing countries, due to the economic, legal and institutional environments in which 
banks operate in. Therefore making policy recommendations for developing countries using 
conclusions obtained from research conducted in developed countries may result into 
erroneous recommendations.  
  
To illustrate differences in lending environments, which necessitates variations in lending 
techniques, Figure 5.2 to Figure 5.4 compares indicators about the lending environments for 
low income (Malawi, Kenya), lower middle income (Zambia, Ghana), upper middle income 
(South Africa) and high income (United Kingdom) economies, for the year 2012.  
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Figure 5.2 Private Credit Bureau 
Source: World Bank doing business survey database 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Ease of Doing Business Index 
Source: World Bank doing business survey database 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Credit Information Index 
Source: World Bank doing business survey database 
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Availability of credit information in low-income countries is much lower than in high-income 
countries (Figure 5.4). The depth of credit information index
8
 is low for low-income 
countries compared to medium and high-income countries. Limited publicly available 
information about SMEs is a specific reason why businesses, especially in low-income 
countries, face insufficient access to credit (Hartarska and Gonzalez-Vega, 2006). Evidence 
also suggests that in countries where access to credit information by lenders is better, SMEs 
account for a higher share of loans which are devoted for investments, extended at lower fees, 
and interest charges (Beck et al., 2008b). 
 
5.2.2 Credit Information Flow and Banking 
 
The problems of asymmetry of information lead to credit rationing and higher collateral 
requirements through formal sources (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1992). However, in the informal 
sector, lenders have access to local information, allowing them to write down contracts that 
are less risky for borrowers (Boucher and Guirkinger, 2007). The simplicity and availability 
of borrowers’ personal information, including character, and flexibility in the lending 
procedures employed by informal lenders, drives down transaction costs. These attributes are 
what is missing within the formal sector. The simplicity in such transactions is a result of 
trust and local information possessed between the lenders and the borrowers. To mirror this 
connection, in the formal sector, as financial advisors are engaged in informal social 
networks, they are also able to establish bonds of trust and accumulate social capital. This, 
although sometimes unplanned, helps them obtain the information needed for a financial risk 
assessment, which reduces information asymmetry between bankers and borrowers (Ferrary, 
2003). The greater the density of interpersonal relationships, the greater the access to 
information, which is inaccessible in the framework of formal professional relationships 
(Ferrary, 2003). Social capital can, therefore, be a tool for the spreading of information on the 
sources of credit hence also consequently influencing the different choices of which sources 
the clients can use (Okten and Osili, 2004). Although this may be happening, there is no 
formal acknowledgement of use of informally gathered information in formal credit risk 
assessment.  
 
                                                 
8
 This is a measure of  rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information available through 
either public or private credit registries http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/GettingCredit  
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Another important issue worth noting is that, for low-income countries, problems of 
information asymmetry are not simple, but rather complex due to a number of other factors. 
Firstly, most of the SMEs are informal
9
 and hence cannot afford to use the expertise of 
independent credible accounting firms to adhere to accounting reporting standards. This 
contributes to the poor quality of information which can be given to the banks (Kauffmann, 
2005). Secondly, operating in the informal sector puts the businesses in a position where they 
cannot provide standard required documentation, for example legal registration documents 
and standard accounting records. The situation worsens since it would be in the interest of the 
entrepreneur to sometimes provide erroneous information in order to avoid taxes. Finally, 
there is a general lack of channels through which banks could learn about the credit history of 
the potential clients, except if they have been the lenders’ clients for some time. In such 
scenarios, informal communication will need to make up for deficiencies in classic 
communication channels. In such cases, the reputation of the entrepreneur and their proximity 
to the bank are just as important as the quality of financial statements transmitted to the bank 
(Lefilleur, 2010). Before discussing how current lending techniques measure up, when used 
in such difficult operating environments (analysed in section 5.2.1), the chapter proceeds with 
a discussion on the various meanings of social capital. 
 
5.3 Understanding Social Capital 
 
The major thrust in ‘social capital’ theory is that relationships matter, hence implying that 
social networks are a valuable asset (Field, 2003: p.1). Less adverse selection and moral 
hazard in the market for credit could result from a better flow of information between 
creditors and borrowers, where a higher level of social capital exists (Narayan and Pritchett, 
1999). The principle behind social capital is simply ‘investment in social relations with 
expected returns in the market place’ (Lin, 2007: p.33). Although the term social capital 
became fashionable relatively recently, the concept behind it has been known for decades. 
The word social capital is said to have first appeared in Lyda Judson Hanifan’s discussions of 
rural school community, where he used it to describe ‘those tangible substances that count for 
most in the daily lives of people’ (Hanifan, 1916: p.130). Social capital is understood to 
include a wide range of things connected to social embeddedness ranging from neighbourly 
help to civil morality in a global society. The works of Robert Putnam (1993) launched social 
                                                 
9
 Businesses falling in this category are those that are not being taxed, not registered and not monitored by any 
form of government regulations. 
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capital as a popular focus for research and policy discussion. Putnam, who is the most 
influential advocate of social capital, defined it broadly, and his definition has provided a 
basis for many other definitions. He defined social capital as ‘Connections among individuals 
–social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’ 
(Putnam, 2000: p.19). Since then a number of research studies that span across disciplines 
have explored its implications, but have not reached a consensus on the definition of social 
capital (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005). As Fukuyama (2001) appropriately observed that, 
‘there are multiple alternative understandings of this intellectually fashionable but elusive 
concept’. 
 
Coleman defined social capital as a network of relations between agents. It is a resource 
‘lodged in neither individuals nor in physical elements of production, but inherent in the 
structure of relations between persons and among persons’, (Coleman, 1990: p.302). Lin 
(2001) also defined social capital as ‘resources, embedded in one’s social networks, which 
can be accessed and mobilised through ties in the networks’. The World Bank, a promoter of 
knowledge generation on social capital, defines it in the interest of the impact it has on 
development, as ‘Institutions, relationships, attitudes and values that govern interactions 
among people and contribute to economic and social development’ (Grootaert and Bastelaer, 
2000: p.4). Social capital can be thought of as the links, shared values and understandings 
that enable individuals and groups in a society to trust each other hence work together. 
Bourdieu (1986: p.248) defines social capital as ‘the aggregate of the actual potential 
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more, of less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’. Other various authors 
have resorted to defining it to suit their enquiries, due to a lack of consensus on a single 
definition. However, whereas there are various definitions of social capital, most scholars 
who have contributed to the discussion agree that social capital is networking based 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 2001; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995; Dzanja et al., 2013). Literature 
has also documented that the quality of the economic agent’s social connections with 
members of his socio-economic environment has an impact on his success (Coleman, 1988; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The key interest in discussing the meaning of social capital for 
this chapter is not to engage in the debate on definitions, but to highlight the link between 
social capital and business transactions, which is discussed in the next section. 
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5.3.1 Social Capital and Transactions 
  
The discussion of how social capital has been defined by various writers leads to a conclusion 
that it promises to resolve a number of issues in social science. One of the issues, as claimed 
by Coleman (1988), is the relation between ‘under’ and ‘super’ socialised views of human 
beings. A number of impacts of social capital have been documented, both good and bad. The 
aim of this discussion is not to elaborate impacts of social capital, but rather to expose 
possible impacts that have been captured in literature, and highlight the potential contribution 
that social capital makes in business transactions. Social capital can help to remove the 
causes of market failure to allow transactions which would not take place otherwise. This 
basis of the argument is supported by the theory of transaction costs and incomplete 
contracts, which states that a contract involves costs (Williamson, 1981) and all contracts are 
generally incomplete.  
 
Personalised relationships, social networks and trust are manifestations of social capital. The 
‘embeddedness’ concept of Granovetter (1973; 1974; 1985) argues that social networks 
modify economic regulation because of the principle of solidarity that links members. These 
social networks can also be identified at individual level (Bourdieu, 1980). An individual’s 
social relations can give them a competitive advantage because they hold information about 
other network members, which reduces moral hazard when trading with them (Ferrary, 
2003). All these connections are however glued together due to trust, which Williamson 
(1993) refers to as calculative trust (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the other dimensions of 
social capital).  
 
Theoretical and empirical investigations have concluded that personalised relationships can 
facilitate the dissemination of information on new technologies (Barr, 2000), market 
opportunities (Kranton, 1996), the sharing of risk (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), screening of 
jobs and credit applicants (Cornell and Welch, 1996), and the punishment of cheaters 
(Fafchamps, 2002). If trust is absent the only types of economic exchange that could be 
hoped for are flea markets and garage or car boot sales (Fafchamps, 2004), although even 
such simple markets still need property rights of traders to be protected. Social capital has 
further been demonstrated to matter for firms’ profitability (Fernandez et al., 2000), 
individual wellbeing (Coleman, 1990; Lin, 2001), institutional performance (Knack and 
Keefer, 1997) and for household income (Maluccio et al., 2000). Other examples documented 
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in the literature include economic development, economic growth or sustainable development 
(Woolcock, 2001; Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2009), poverty alleviation (Woolcock and 
Narayan, 2000), adoption of corporate social responsibility (Sacconi and Degli, 2011), and 
technical progress and economic growth (Fukuyama, 2001; Antoci et al., 2009). Recently 
online social networks have also attracted researchers’ attention to investigate how such 
networks are shaping interactions amongst individuals. So far a number of positive results 
have been documented (see Antoci et al., 2011a and 2011b for examples), although questions 
arise about measurement. This, however, implies the positive response of economic 
development to higher social capital.  
 
Although most research has concentrated on promoting the positive externalities that social 
capital has in the economies, an awareness of its negative externalities is also necessary. 
When dealing with the term capital, the general assumption is that its quantity and existence 
can be defined, and that its use can have both negative and positive outcomes. These 
assumptions are the same when dealing with social capital. Social relations and their 
economic impacts are not always positive. Social capital can have a contrary characteristic 
such as undemocratic tendencies, and major economic costs, such as rent seeking and 
unfairness (Fine, 2001; Molyneux, 2002; Taylor and Leonard, 2002; Field, 2003).  Organised 
crimes and drug cartels are other examples of negative social capital because they operate 
with a high degree of trust amongst gang members (Curry and Decker, 1998).  
 
Coleman (2000) acknowledged that, because social capital is inherent in the structure of 
relations, it facilitates some actions which might not be useful or could even be unfavourable 
for others outside it.  The same beneficial relationships can be detrimental to those excluded 
from the network of relationships, contributing to increased social inequalities. ‘Social capital 
can promote inequality because access to different types of networks is very unequally 
distributed’ (Field, 2003: p.74). At the far extreme, social capital can generate ‘self-
reinforcing systems of negative externalities’ (Warren, 2008) and it can also create 
opportunities for rent-seeking behaviours. Field (2003: p.74) outlines how the negative 
externalities arise in a list of four ways in which social capital is interrelated with inequality; 
 
 access to different types of networks is unequally distributed; 
 social capital in networks can be used to disadvantage others; 
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 social capital in groups can benefit members but  generate unintended consequences 
for others; 
 Social capital can have a diminishing impact on people’s aspirations, through 
providing disincentives for individuals in a group to save and invest. 
 
Arguably, for the low income communities or SMEs, who are already facing difficulties in 
accessing certain resources, high social capital could enhance their access to the resources. 
This view corresponds with that taken by the World Bank regarding use of social capital for 
poverty alleviation (Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2000). Although the use of social capital in 
lending seems promising, credit providers need to be aware that not all clients would have 
similar levels of social capital. To minimise financial exclusion problems, other innovative 
information gathering techniques need to be used for robust credit risk analysis processes.  
 
In an effort to minimise risks for the lender, technological advancements have contributed to 
a proliferation of credit risk evaluation techniques that are used by banks. However, the 
extent to which these innovations are able to capture most of the information needed by the 
banks, to make an informed decision, on whether to extend credit or not, is not known. The 
following section provides a brief review of some notable innovative lending techniques 
used, mostly in developing countries, to enhance access to financial services including formal 
credit. The review focuses on short comings of currently used methods of credit risk 
assessment and also gives examples of some innovative techniques, which are using some 
concepts of social capital in the credit assessment process.  
 
5.4 Information Gathering and Credit Risk Assessment  
 
Banks consider risk of a borrower not honouring their debt when making a decision to extend 
credit to a borrower. In order to reduce uncertainty, a number of instrumental evaluation 
methods are employed. An instrumental evaluation method entails use of formal rules to 
assess a client’s solvency using available objective information (Ferrary, 2003).  Firstly, two 
approaches, namely income and capital gearing are utilized, where future earnings potential 
of the investment, and the quality of assets are used in the assessment (Berry et al., 2003). 
Existence of information asymmetry, as the case with developing countries (see section 
4.2.1), motivates formal lenders to prefer the capital gearing approach (use of collateral) 
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rather than the income gearing approach. The former approach diminishes the moral hazard 
and adverse selection risks (Nott, 2003). The basis for this action is that, fear of losing valued 
possessions by the borrower will motivate the borrower to repay the loan. Therefore reliance 
on collateral in SME lending is believed to ease consequences of information asymmetry 
(Triantis, 2003). Unfortunately this argument still makes provision of credit to SMEs in 
developing countries much harder to achieve, because they do not have registered property or 
land, which conforms to the conventional requirements for use as collateral. Similar criticism 
has been noted by Burns (2001), Lean and Tucker (2001) and Mason and Stark (2004) when 
they pointed out that financial and managerial strengths of the firm, and viability of project to 
be financed in a given sector, should be the prime factors on which to base assessment on. 
When such information about the borrower cannot be obtained by the bank, then the 
assessment would be deemed unreliable.  Collateral is also only effective when its value can 
be monitored (Rajan and Winton, 1995), which, in absence of operationally efficient formal 
institutions in place, would depend on closeness between bank and borrower that manifests in 
long-term interactions. 
 
Recent developments have seen a shift from the traditional 5Cs
10
 credit assessment to use of 
credit scoring
11
 methods to support lending decisions in banks. Developments in computer 
technology have improved the predictive power of this methodology although in low-income 
countries a number of borrowers would still be rationed. This is because they may likely not 
be included on the credit scoring system due to difficulties in accessing credit in the first 
place (Ferrary, 2003). The methodology does not take any subjective elements into account. 
Therefore, this approach may not be very suitable for credit application assessments in 
situations where the information asymmetry problem is high. In such situations a network of 
local contacts is ideal (Cressy, 2002). The bank – SME relationship would potentially soften 
penalties of information asymmetry on the flow of credit to SMEs (Madill et al., 2002). He 
further pointed out that among the SMEs a strong correlation exists between the banks’ 
lending products and satisfaction of the services offered by banks, if there is a personal 
contact between the loan officer and the SME borrower.  
 
                                                 
10
 It is an approach for evaluating credit worthiness of an applicant based on five factors namely capital, 
capacity, collateral, conditions and character. 
11
 Modern method used by banks, credit bureaus to evaluate credit worthiness of a borrower to receive credit. It 
is based on statistical characteristics of an applicant’s credit payment patterns which assesses the probability of 
default.  
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Additionally, small businesses usually keep simplified accounting information or none. In 
developing countries where a large proportion of the business sector comprises of small 
businesses, using sophisticated tools of statistical analysis would prove difficult. The 
problems discussed above, with using the instrumental methods, have resulted in deployment 
of other initiatives, mainly in developing countries, to improve access to financial services. 
 
 5.4.1 Innovative Approaches Pioneered to Enhance Access  
 
A number of initiatives are being employed by various institutions in an effort to enhance 
extension of credit to those lacking access. Notable innovative ideas and products currently 
being pioneered in the sector include Islamic finance, warehouse receipts, use of 
psychometric tests, matching grants, microfinance and commitment savings. The discussion 
will concentrate on the latter two because they employ some social capital concepts in the 
methodology.  
 
Micro-finance: This is one of the successful initiatives that is yielding positive results 
(Serageldin and Grootaert, 2000), and has been cited as a prime example of the effective use 
of social capital, where both the state and the market has failed (Dasgupta, 2005). According 
to Serageldin and Grootaert (2000: p.48) ‘these schemes – from tontines (informal savings 
circles) in West Africa, to Grameen bank in Bangladesh, work because members have better 
information on each other than the bank do’. Despite microfinance’s contribution to 
improved information sharing within the credit sector, the loan sizes that are disbursed 
through microfinance are generally too small to finance meaningful investments undertaken 
by SMEs. Microfinance products are mostly designed to meet the financial needs of the 
micro business sector; unfortunately, it does not fulfil the same for SMEs in developing 
countries, which are deemed too big for microfinance.  
 
Additionally, further characteristics, as discussed in chapter 4 render SMEs challenging to be 
served by formal credit providers. However, continued efforts to increase credit access to 
SMEs are needed now more than ever. Chironga et al. (2012) documented that the time is 
right for banks to increase their engagement in micro small and medium enterprises (MSME) 
lending in developing countries because of the following reasons: 1. More banks are finding 
ways to overcome difficulties, 2. An estimated 60% of global banking revenue growth will 
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come from emerging markets, and 3. Innovations in risk assessment technology and business 
models are facilitating the efforts (Chironga et al., 2012).  
 
Commitment savings: Use of commitment savings is another innovative idea which has been 
tried successfully. Commitment savings entails a commitment to forgo current consumption 
by setting aside some funds until a specific date in the future. This can be done formally or 
informally. Commitment savings come in various products in both developing and developed 
countries. Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) are popular in developing 
countries because they provide ‘spouse control’ devices, which allow funds to be removed 
from the household economy (Anderson and Baland, 2002). Social pressure to save also 
works in the same way as ROSCAs. Just as social capital and group liability help reinforce 
credit contracts (Karlan, 2007), peers can join savings circles to preserve their reputation. 
Evidence suggests that use of commitment savings by entrepreneurs in developing countries 
increases investments (Beck and Cull, 2013; Dupas and Robinson, 2013). Although 
commitment savings may not directly mean having access to credit, it provides evidence of 
how locally-adapted innovative products enhance efficient utilization of excess funds.  In a 
randomised control trial, Dupas and Robinson (2013) revealed that female shopkeepers 
preferred to take up a non-interest bearing savings account with high withdrawal fees, and 
investment for this group more than doubled than the control group. Brune et al. (2013), 
using the case of Malawi, documented changes in production methods for farmers who opted 
for a commitment savings account to allow the farmers to freeze their funds until a specified 
date. 
 
Although commitment savings guarantees availability of saved funds at a specified period, 
there is no evidence to suggest that this service opens up opportunity for the client to access 
extra funds in the form of credit from banks, in addition to the saved funds. In effect it simply 
provides a safe place for savings to be kept, and hence boosting savings mobilization efforts 
by the banks.  
 
Matching grants and warehouse receipt system: Warehouse receipts are negotiable 
instruments backed by the underlying commodity, which enables the holder to access credit. 
This system is widely used in developing countries but is now being promoted in various 
developing countries including Malawi. The system is mostly used for farm produce and its 
wide use in developing countries will mostly depend on how supportive the regulatory and 
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economic environment is, and awareness of its use by bankers, among other factors. 
Matching grants, although gaining much popularity in developing countries, are also hindered 
by a lack of business records to secure the matching funds from banks by the SMEs. A 
matching grant is a one-off, non-reimbursable provision of funds for a specific purpose, on 
condition that the recipient (i.e. SME) makes a specified contribution for the same project. 
The contribution can be in kind, cash or a combination. Just like the bank , which requires a 
business to be registered and have an active account to demonstrate its performance, 
matching grants programmes, targeting SMEs growth, also require similar information. 
Therefore, information asymmetry problems would also hinder access to such services. 
 
5.4.2 Innovative Ways to Extend Credit: Cases from Malawi 
 
Recognizing the difficulties that traditional commercial banks face in lending to potential 
SME clients, innovative credit delivery systems are being trialled out by financiers. Standard 
bank
12
, which operates in 17 African countries, has pioneered an innovative risk assessment 
solution to improving unsecured lending to Africa’s SMEs, which is termed Small Quick 
Loans (SQL) facility. The SQL facility employs a 30 to 40 minute psychometric test which 
helps assess the potential clients’ credit worthiness. The tool was developed by a Harvard 
University research lab. Reports indicate that, during the initial piloting stages up to $30 
million worth of loans were given out to 4,800 firms
13
 (Hansen et al., 2012). After piloting 
the scheme in 2010 in Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania, Standard Bank extended the 
psychometric solution into a further 10 countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.  
 
In Malawi, the SQL facility was initially implemented in 2012, and subsequently suspended 
in early 2013 for reassessment. At the time when this study was conducted, plans were 
underway to restart in October, 2013. The targeted clients for the facility were traders, both 
wholesalers and retailers, and within the short time of implementation it was proved that 
traders selling on a daily basis are better suited for SQL than any other businesses. The 
facility has some unique features, which make it stand out in the developing countrys’ 
                                                 
12
 Information obtained from publicly available information and confirmed through discussions with bank 
personnel in Malawi.  
13
 Lending and borrower volumes from the East African, ‘Psychometrics tests for loan product’, 2011. 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Psychometric+tests+for+loan+product/-/2560/1280110/-/p0texg/-
/index.html  
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financing environment. These features include: unsecured nature, bank visits clients at their 
business premises to assess, it takes less than 7 days from loan application to disbursement, 
and a simplified application process is employed. The unique features of this facility respond 
directly to the key problems cited previously as hindering access to financing for SME, which 
were lack of collateral, and poor financial records. As a testimony to the potential of the 
facility, the bank was able to advance up to MK1.6 billion within 8 months of its operation. 
However, this  research was not able to estimate the recovery rate to confirm effectiveness. 
Social capital is  utilised  within the risk analysis  process  through working in partnership 
with business associations, which would help with information on business conduct. Face-to-
face interviews with business owners, who had accessed funds through the facility, confirmed 
the perceived positive impact the facility has had. The entrepreneurs reported that they were 
being encouraged to introduce  their trusted colleagues and friends to the credit facility 
through the loan officers. This is a clear example of utilisation of ties in a network as 
described by Granovetter (1973). 
 
Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM), which started its operations in 2003, 
pioneered use of biometrics to extend banking facilities to those excluded due to lack of a 
national identity, which in Malawi’s case was mostly a driver’s license or a passport. OIBM 
also led the way in use of mobile banking services which was launched in 2008 in partnership 
with Telecom Networks Malawi (TNM). The facility termed ‘banki m’manja’ (banking in 
your palm) promoted competition in the sector and contributed to extended opening times for 
banks.  Enhancing access to bank facilities opens up opportunities for clients to access credit 
as well. The banks’ mission is to target economically active but marginalized clients with 
services which are designed to potentially enable them to improve their lives, through steady 
incomes, expanding businesses, provide for families and create jobs. The innovative ways 
being employed address, in one way or another, the key challenges that make MSMEs 
difficult for financial institutions to serve profitably. These understand target clients, 
managing risk innovatively, empowering clients, engaging with Governments, and lowering 
operation costs radically (Chironga et al., 2012). Although the problem of access to finance 
for SMEs is the same worldwide, dealing with it requires use of varying techniques tailor-
made to specific socio-economic environments. 
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5.5 Considering Social Capital in Risk Evaluation  
 
The discussion so far has revealed potential issues within the lending environment in which 
SMEs operate in developing countries. This is what necessitates use of varying 
methodologies, if access to finance is to be enhanced. Both modern lending techniques and 
relationship-based techniques have the potential to enhance access to credit for SMEs when 
implemented on their own. However, employing such a strategy still leaves a gap in the credit 
risk assessment, rendering lenders at a risk of default. This results in lenders rationing credit 
depending on how well they can assess a borrower’s risk level. While poor supporting 
infrastructure reduces the effective use of technologically advanced techniques, use of a 
social connections strategy cannot also be employed on its own due to a number of issues. To 
illustrate this point, in a survey of SMEs, bankers and accountants in Canada, Wynant et al. 
(1991) established that social relationships are characterised by conflicting views. This is due 
to SME misunderstanding of the banks’ role and lending criteria, and perceptions between 
bankers and SMEs. Closeness of the relationship between the loan officer and the borrower 
could create potential problems for the bank especially where remuneration for the loan 
officer is based on the size of their portfolio (Cressy, 2002). Loan officers and SME 
borrowers may also use such informality to avoid strict bank loan appraisal procedures, and 
hence exposing the bank to credit risk through fraudulent activities. The low transferability of 
social relationships poses a problem because social bonds are formed through individual 
interactions, and hence are specific to individuals. Transferring an individual loan officer 
with a wide social network to a different location means removing the social capital 
possessed by the individual, and this would take a longer time to rebuild. This social capital 
power, possessed by the loan officer, may also result in a shift of bargaining power relations 
between the loan officer and the employer (Ferrary, 2003)  
 
The using of formal objective credit risk methodologies, without considering informal 
contacts, poses problem in how the borrowers can be identified. Although having collateral 
and existence of credit registry can ease the problem of access, their functionality still 
depends on the borrower being able to be identified. The key problem in promoting extension 
of credit to SMEs in Africa is the lack of a nationally acceptable personal identification (Beck 
and Cull, 2013). Biometric identification has been successfully used in enhancing credit 
repayment (Brune et al., 2013); however in the short run, the poor infrastructure and high 
investment cost still poses a problem in out-scaling the system for most developing countries. 
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The annual cost of addressing physical infrastructure problems alone for Africa has been 
estimated at US$93 billion, corresponding to 15% of Africa’s GDP (Foster and Briceno-
Garmendia, 2010). Therefore, in the short run, social connections, although deemed informal, 
could help in identifying the borrowers locally. The use of social capital can work because it: 
 Enhances flow of information, 
 Enforces influence,  
 Provides social credentials, control and enforcement, which are not accounted for in 
economic and human capital (Lin, 2007). 
 However, limited research on how they work in financial transactions hampers usage of 
social capital.  
 
5.5.1 Objective and Subjective Assessment 
 
Two opposing approaches to credit risk evaluation have been explored in the above sections. 
These include the objective approach, which is based on data for evidence, and the social 
approach, which uses subjective information gathered through social networks or 
connections. Table 5.1 indicates how the credit risk assessment techniques are able to capture 
information to analyze the 5 Cs of credit. Regardless of the assessment techniques employed, 
the basis of the credit decisions still hinges on how a potential borrower measures on the 5Cs. 
Effectiveness of a chosen technique in providing the necessary information is presented using 
the color codes where green indicates good, yellow indicates fair and red indicates bad. Brief 
explanations of the chosen effectiveness level are presented within Table 5.1. The 
comparison is based on the assumption that the operating environment is a developing 
country. 
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Table 5.1 Objective and Subjective Assessment Comparison 
 
Type of 
analysis 
Credit Risk Assessment Criterion 
Capacity Capital Collateral Conditions Character 
Subjective  Established 
through visual 
and interaction 
with officer to 
estimate cash 
flow  
 
No contribution 
because 
valuation 
conducted by 
third party 
 
In addition to 
conventional, 
social collateral 
 
Better verified 
with social 
connections 
because of  
relying on 
trusted 
borrower and 
lender own 
assessment 
Good mostly 
when data is not 
readily 
available 
Objective  Evidence 
captured 
through well 
captured 
records   
No contribution 
because 
valuation 
conducted by 
third party 
 
Conventional 
security 
required due to 
limited capture 
of all 
information 
required. 
Rely on trusted 
borrower and 
lenders own 
assessment 
Bad especially 
where data is 
not available  
Note: Capacity  – cash flow, timing and probability of repayment ; Capital – how much at risk for borrower if 
business fails; Collateral – pledging asset owned in case of non-repayment; Conditions – intended purpose and 
general operating environment; Character – subjective assessment of trustworthiness. 
 
 
Neither of the analysed two approaches, in Table 5.1, performs exceptionally on its own. 
Despite the overall objectivity with standardized risk assessment techniques, usually first-
time borrowers will be categorized as very risky due to information asymmetry, as is the case 
in developing countries. Using unconventional techniques like social connections, first-time 
borrowers would have the chance of being attracted into using formal financial services, and 
hence inclusions on the credit risk register. Incorporating the use of social capital within 
formal credit approval processes could provide a resolution to this problem. 
 
5.6 Chapter Synthesis 
 
This chapter has argued that social capital is ideal for use in environments where formal 
credit information channels are still under developed. The use of such connections can be 
beneficial, especially for small and medium businesses that are seeking formal credit for the 
first time. In the long run, banks, using such an approach for first-time borrowers, would also 
provide an opportunity for registries to build credit histories on such clients. Thereafter, they 
would able to use more formal methodologies for subsequent assessments. The bank would 
also be able to use this opportunity to share with the clients the requirements that banks 
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would need if they are to get access to bigger subsequent loan amount, and hence pave the 
way for relationship banking.
14
 
 
Financial inclusion has dominated the recent research and policy agenda with little on 
impacts of such policies on SME financing and long term investment (Beck et. al., 2013). 
Locally adapted lending methodologies have the potential for greater impact, however well 
designed methodologies are required to respond to the specific issues identified within the 
operating environment. To investigate this issue further, the extent of the information 
asymmetry problem for Malawi is explored in Chapter 6.  
  
                                                 
14
 Boot (2000) defines relationship banking as the provision of financial services by a financial intermediary 
that enables it to obtain proprietary firm-specific information, which is used to establish a long-term relationship 
with a firm based on multiple interactions through different products. This relationship becomes more profitable 
for the lender in the long run. 
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CHAPTER 6 EXTENT OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN THE COMMERCIAL 
BANKING SECTOR FOR MALAWI. 
  
As discussed in Chapter 5, one of the major obstacles to the flow of credit to small and 
medium enterprises in developing countries relates to information asymmetries among 
borrowers and lenders. The Chapter uses descriptive analysis to reveal information gaps 
between borrowers’ (SMEs) and lenders’ (commercial banks) views and experiences 
regarding factors affecting credit access for SMEs. It further explores views on the role 
played by social interactions, between lenders and borrowers in the formal credit granting 
process. This chapter also describes the methodology that was followed to collect data that is 
used in the analyses for this chapter and Chapter 7.   
 
6.1 Banking Sector and Access to Credit for SMEs in Malawi. 
 
Social interactions that bank officers have with entrepreneurs can give the lender access to 
private information (Uzzi, 1999). This information can be used to convince fellow bankers of 
the creditworthiness of a firm, in addition to the traditional ways of assessing 
creditworthiness of borrowers. However, for the information to flow, an element of trust 
between lenders and borrowers is needed for either party to freely engage in the relationship. 
In order to establish specifics about the lender-borrower relationship for Malawi, this 
chapter’s primary interest is two-fold (1) to establish perceptions of borrowers regarding 
factors affecting access to credit from commercial banks and (2) to examine the knowledge 
gap between lenders and borrowers regarding factors affecting SMEs access to credit. The 
chapter uses descriptive analysis, and concludes with a test of hypothesis that size of business 
does not affect perceptions of effect of social connections on accessing formal credit. 
 
Lack of trustworthy information on the risk profile of borrowers is the most important factor 
constraining lending to poorer households and small firms in developing countries (Lefilleur, 
2009). Unavailability of credit history information, which lenders can use, is among the 
factors contributing to the ‘missing middle’ situation in most developing countries, including 
Malawi. Malawi is the last remaining country in Southern Africa without a national identity 
system and currently the use of the established credit reference bureau is still not fully 
functional despite provisions of the Credit Reference Bureau Act (2009).  The situation is 
further complicated because of poor business record keeping by small and medium 
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entrepreneurs. The World Bank 2009 enterprise survey for Malawi listed the top five major 
obstacles for SME growth as; limited access to finance, transportation, informal practices, 
electricity, and tax rates.  
 
The Government of Malawi, through the Ministry of Industry and Trade, continues to 
recognize the important economic role played by micro, small and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs). The commitment is evidenced through development of the overarching policies, 
including the Malawi Vision 2020 (1998) and the Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategies (2012). These policies are aimed at transforming a consuming country into an 
exporting country through sustained economic growth and infrastructure development. In a 
2012 enabling environment for sustainable enterprises (EESE) perception survey report, 
commissioned by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in Malawi, fifty percent of the 
sample indicated that there is political will and support for the formation and growth of 
sustainable enterprises in Malawi.  
 
The concept of asymmetric information was first introduced in George Arkerlofs’ 1970 paper 
on ‘The Market for Lemons’. Using the example of market for used cars, the lemons model 
demonstrated that the buyer has information pertaining to the average of the whole market, 
while the seller has more specific information about the item being traded. The paper argues 
that this difference in information possessed gives the seller an incentive to sell goods of less 
than the average quality. This concept applies to various markets including the credit market, 
where sellers would be likened to borrowers and buyers would be likened to lenders. 
Asymmetry of information between lenders and borrowers contribute to rationing of credit by 
lenders. This is likened to the cost of dishonesty, as demonstrated by the lemons model. The 
cost of dishonesty is not only represented by the actual amount which the buyer is cheated by, 
but also includes the loss incurred by driving out legitimate business out of existence 
(Arkerlof, 1970). In the credit market, the cost of dishonesty is the high interest charged due 
to perceived risk, and rejection of funding for viable projects as a result of unavailability of 
credit information about potential borrowers. Malawi has had a credit depth information 
index of zero
15
 since 2009 to 2012 (Berg and Fuchs, 2013) indicating that there is low 
availability of credit information, from neither a public registry nor private bureau, to 
facilitate lending decisions.  In such an environment, it is expected that SMEs would face 
                                                 
15
 The index ranges from 0 for low to 6 for high. Although the index would be anticipated to be low, the figure 0 
in this case might also be due to unavailability of information to compute the index. 
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more hurdles to access credit from formal sources. Despite the challenges, the micro small 
and medium (MSME) sector for Malawi, when compared to South Africa and Zambia, is 
doing well in creating employment in relation to its size (Finscope, 2012). This report also 
estimated that in 2011 there were about 1 million MSME businesses, providing employment 
for 1.8 million people, with an estimated revenue of MK326 billion
16
. 
  
6.1.1 Lending Institutions 
  
Financial services are provided by a wide range of institutions in Malawi which, as noted 
earlier (see Chapter 5), include; 12 licensed commercial banks, with two major banks having 
the largest (45%) market share (Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2011); one leasing company; one 
discount house; Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) operating under various legal forms; 
member based organizations i.e. savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs); and informal 
financial providers including money lenders locally known as ‘katapila’. The banking sector 
provides a range of services including deposit products, credit facilities, foreign exchange 
services, payment facilities, bank assurance, etc., with loans and advances forming a major 
portion of the asset structure of the banks (Finscope, 2012). Microfinance services, which are 
now regulated by the Reserve Bank of Malawi, provide savings and credit services to those 
excluded from the formal financial sector. Registered MFIs have increased from 18 in March 
2012 to 40 in March 2013, with an overall asset base also growing from MK13, 900 million 
to MK16, 500 million in March 2013 (Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2013). The increased 
growths in loan assets indicate increased access to financial services, especially small loans 
or increased repeated bigger loans.  
 
To enhance access to and usage of the financial services, the public needs to have information 
about the financial products available from which they can choose. In Malawi, 59% of 
business owners use neither formal nor informal sources of finance; depend only on family 
and friends for borrowing; and save (if they save) at home for business purposes (Finscope, 
2012). Although other exogenous factors i.e. high fixed costs and tight entry regulations 
(Claessens and Perotti, 2007)  have a role to play in hindering access to financial services, 
poor information flows between lenders and borrowers also contribute to the situation 
(Lefilleur, 2009). Recognizing the need for the public to have accurate information regarding 
                                                 
16
 1 United States Dollar (USD) = Malawi Kwacha (MK) 422 
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how financial institutions work, the Reserve Bank of Malawi initiated a financial literacy 
week in December 2013, which was a first of its kind in Malawi.  
 
6.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
There are several sociological accounts of how social structure affects financial markets (see 
Chapter 2), one of which is social embeddedness approach (Granovetter, 1985). Social 
embeddedness, as defined in Marsden (1981), refers to the degree to which commercial 
transactions take place through social relations and networks of relations that use exchange 
protocols associated with social non-commercial attachments to govern business transactions. 
The concept of social embeddedness is rapidly becoming an important concern in business 
studies (Burt, 2000). Social capital is an asset whose value originates from the access to 
resources that it engenders through actors’ relationships (Granovetter, 1992). Embeddedness, 
social networks and social capital are therefore interrelated concepts. Embeddedness allows 
actors to integrate into social networks, where resources can be used to bring benefits which 
constitute social capital. These resources exist in the form of regulations such as trust and 
faith. Social networks therefore are formed and grow through the accumulation of social 
capital (Lin, 1999). A social connection is, therefore, a dimension of embeddedness. 
 
Financial theory argues that any firm with a positive economic net present value for its 
investments should obtain credit at competitive prices (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). In partial 
agreement, sociological theory proposes that banking transactions are embedded in social 
relations that uniquely shape credit access and costs in a way that such interactions are not 
well captured in financial theory (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994; 
Uzzi and Gillespie, 1999). For instance, formal lending decisions are made by social beings 
aided by financial models. However, the financial models do not adequately capture the value 
of bank – client relationships, while correspondingly sociological research has not had focus 
on availability of capital (Uzzi, 1999). This implies a need for research on social interactions 
and finance theory (Abolafi, 1997; Arrow, 2000). In Malawi, although some research has 
been done on measuring and understanding the manifestations of social capital (Dzanja et al., 
2010; Vajja and White, 2014), little is known about how social capital affects economic 
development through its effects on credit access for SMEs.  
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6.3 Methodology 
 
This section discusses the methods followed in collecting primary data which was used in the 
analysis for this Chapter and for Chapter 7. The analysis conducted in the two chapters used 
perceived views that were captured for both borrowers and lenders in the commercial 
banking sector. The use of perceptions for this thesis was preferred because according to 
social psychologists, while people are seeing and listening to the world around them, social 
knowledge that corresponds to perceived stimuli is impulsively and immediately activated in 
memory without people’s intention or awareness, and hence affects behaviour (Ferguson and 
Bargh, 2004). Studies using peoples’ perceptions have been widely used in a variety of 
empirical research across different disciplines. In England and Wales crime surveys are used 
to determine perceptual predictors of perceptions of worries about crime and crime levels 
(Nicholas and Walker, 2004). In United States of America, perceptions of food quality and 
safety determine food consumption habits (Rimal et al., 2001). Competitors’ perceptions are 
used in repeated interaction choice models to determine business actions in oligopoly markets 
(Marks, 1988). In psychology, influential theories of learning rely on perceptions as a key 
component.  
 
The analysis in this Chapter and in Chapter 7 uses perceptions on credit use following 
Aryeetey et al. (1994) and Zeller (1994), who pointed out that perception of business owners 
influence decisions for SMEs to seek credit, especially if the SMEs were denied credit from 
banks in the past. Chomsky (1988) emphasizes the impact of social interactions in the 
poverty stimulus argument that  
‘Fundamental aspects of our mental and social life, including language, are determined as 
part of our biological endowment, not acquired by learning, still less by training, in the 
course of our experience’. (Chomsky, 1988: p.161) 
 
This implies that we also learn much from observing the effects of other peoples’ 
experiences.  We can therefore learn more about social connections as a factor affecting 
access to finance for SMEs, from perceptions of the borrowers and lenders. Two surveys 
were therefore carried out to gather primary data on perceptions of both lenders and 
borrowers (entrepreneurs) regarding factors affecting access to credit, with an emphasis on 
the role of informal social connections. 
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Following Zhao et al. (2010), an entrepreneur is defined as founder, owner and (or) manager 
of a micro, small and medium firm. The entrepreneur is also referred to as the borrower while 
the bank is a lender.  Social connectedness refers to entrepreneurs informal relations with 
people having positions in formal institutions. The focus is on exploring social capital using 
personal connections as a point of analysis, because it not only facilitates an optimization 
framework (Glaeser et al., 2002), but also makes social capital analysis comparable to the 
economic idea of capital (Munasib, 2007).The focus on the personal connections is also 
consistent with the view that such ties are critical to development of small firms (Maurer and 
Ebers, 2006).  
 
6.3.1 Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Survey 
 
Primary data was collected through face to face administered questionnaires from 115, 
micro
17
, small and medium enterprises
18
 located in the commercial cities of Lilongwe and 
Blantyre. The survey was conducted in the months of July and August, 2013. The study 
sample comprised of 47% micro, 44% small and 9% medium enterprises, out of which 84 
percent indicated that they were registered
19
. The study locations were preferred because an 
estimated 85% of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) are located in the urban / 
semi urban areas in the central and southern regions (Finscope, 2012). In these urban 
locations economic activity is comparatively higher than other areas in the country.  Small 
firms were targeted for this study because they do not only have higher financing hindrances, 
but are also adversely affected by lack of it in comparison to large firms (Beck et al., 2005; 
Beck and Honohan, 2008; Hansen et al., 2012).  
 
An attempt to utilize the existing MSME business registry list proved insufficient due to the 
scanty nature of available information. The only comprehensive data available about SMEs in 
Malawi is the World Bank enterprise survey data for Malawi, which was last completed in 
2009. This database was not deemed relevant for this analysis because it does not include 
                                                 
17
 According to the Malawi Micro, Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Policy (2010), enterprises are 
categorized as Micro if they have 1 to 4 employees,  Small if they have between 5 – 20 employees and a 
turnover of between  MK120,000; Medium if they have between 21 to 100 employees, and above MK4million 
to MK10 million turnover 
18
 Micro and small businesses comprise 81% and 17%, respectively, of the MSME enterprises operating in 
Malawi (Finscope survey, 2012). 
19
  Businesses which have a registration certificate; however most of them were not licenced and were not 
paying any taxes. 
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social capital indicators. Primary data was therefore collected using a semi-structured 
questionnaire, which was administered during face to face interviews with business owners. 
A business had a chance of being sampled if the business had at least one person (apart from 
the business owner) employed permanently, and having a fixed location of operation during 
the time of the interview. Both Lilongwe and Blantyre cities have designated trading areas, 
where most of the businesses are located. Up to 10 popularly known trading areas in 
Lilongwe and 8 in Blantyre were chosen based on their proximity to where bank branches are 
located. Enterprises were selected randomly within the chosen designated areas in the two 
cities. The random selection was preferred due to insufficient available information of all 
small and medium business operators within the cities. 
 
The semi-structured data collection tool contained questions on firm characteristics, which 
were adapted from World Bank enterprise survey questionnaires. This was done to enable 
comparison of results with similar studies conducted within the study country or elsewhere. 
The questions were designed to capture information about business establishment, owner’s 
characteristics, business activity and growth, sources of funding, social networks and 
interpersonal social connections.  The questionnaire used in the study is presented in 
Appendix A1. To reduce measurement errors in the questionnaire, pilot interviews were 
conducted with 6 businesses at different levels of growth, prior to the main fieldwork, and 
these provided useful revisions pertaining to the flow and depth of the questions.  
 
 6.3.2 Commercial Banks Survey 
 
The MSME survey captured the borrowers’ perspectives but not the lenders’ point of view. 
Therefore, to get further understanding about the factors considered when making lending 
decisions in commercial banks, in depth interviews were conducted with 14 credit managers 
and officers from 6 out of 12 commercial banks, who agreed to be interviewed. One of the 
banks interviewed among the six banks is one of the two largest banks commanding 45% of 
the market. The sample also included all the commercial banks with a microfinance window, 
and a considerable presence in micro and small enterprise lending.  Information about the 
banks that is presented in this paper is aggregated to avoid disclosure of privileged 
information pertaining to specific banks. The interview guide used during the discussion is 
presented in Appendix A2. 
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6.4 Analysis of Survey Results  
 
Access to credit refers to current users of financial services, including those who voluntarily 
exclude themselves because they have no need for credit, or they perceive costs to be too 
high (Claessens, 2006). In other studies access and usage are treated synonymously 
(Honohan, 2008). This analysis adopts Claessens’ (2006) definition and identifies all 
respondents with a bank account to have access to credit. Access in this case implies a 
combination of potential use, and actual use of credit. In line with the adopted definition, 
discussions with bank officials revealed that all prospective credit clients are encouraged to 
have an account with the bank from which they are getting credit. Ninety eight percent of the 
sampled respondents indicated that they had at least a bank account, even though not all 
accounts held by the respondents were business accounts. Therefore, the hindrance to use of 
credit, in the sampled population, was not access but meeting conditions required to use the 
credit.  
 
Apart from social connections, size of the business was another unit of measurement used in 
the analysis. The size categorization of the businesses was based on the number of employees 
rather than sales volumes, because of the unstable inflation levels in the study economy, 
which contributes to changes in the value of the sales. Additionally, due to nonstandard 
definition of part-time and full-time employment information among the SMEs, total 
employment figures were used.  
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Table 6.1 Summary Statistics of Main Variables 
VVariable* Description N Mean σ 
Howlikely1 Perceptions of connections affecting credit application positively with 1 if most likely, 2 if very likely, 3 if likely, 4 if maybe, 5 if never 115 3.25 1.41 
Age Grouped age of SME owner or manager in 2013 with 1 if 18-35, 2 if 36-45, 3 if 46-55, 4 if 56 and over 115 2.00 0.79 
Gender 1 if SME head female, 0 otherwise 115 0.30 0.46 
Trade  1 if SME operates in the trade sector, 0 otherwise 115 0.43 0.50 
Registration 1 if SME registered, 0 otherwise 115 0.83 0.37 
Investment 1 if SME made additional investment since establishment, 0 otherwise 114 0.69 0.46 
Turnover Natural log of average monthly turnover for 2013 105 13.79 1.30 
Years with bank Natural log of number of years with same bank 102 1.43 0.73 
Business age Age of SME since start up 115 6.92 6.06 
Business age2 Age of SME since start up, squared divided by 100 115 0.84 1.56 
Activity involvement 1 if SME involved in activities enabling interaction with bank officials, 0 otherwise 113 0.36 0.48 
Network member 1 if SME head is a member of any networking group, 0 otherwise 114 0.41 0.49 
Family source 1 if source of initial capital was family , 0 otherwise 115 0.17 0.38 
Savings source 1 if source of initial capital was own savings, 0 otherwise 115 0.69 0.47 
Education Highest education attained by SME head 115 4.28 1.74 
*For dummy variables, the mean indicated represents, the proportion of respondents who selected 1, while for the other categorical variables the mean indicates the average category. 
+ 1 if primary, 2 if secondary (form 1and 2), 3 if secondary (form 3 and 4), 4 if vocational, 5 if other College, 6 if graduate (domestic), 7 if graduate (foreign), 8 if postgraduate. 
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Table 6.1 displays a summary of the key variables about the sampled population that will be 
discussed further in the chapter. The business owners had an average age of between 36 – 45 
with a gender distribution of 30% females and 70% males. The businesses had been in operation 
for an average of 7 years, an indication of considerable experience in the businesses. The mean 
number of years with a bank account was 5 years with a range of 1 – 20 years. Over 50% of the 
businesses had maintained an account with a bank for up to 4 years. The mean highest education 
attained by the owners was a post-secondary school education. This could indicate that a number 
of people, who go past secondary school education, become self-employed, due to high 
unemployment levels.  
 
6.4.1 Factors Affecting Access to Credit 
 
Access to credit still ranks as one of the major obstacles to enterprise growth especially in 
developing countries. This MSME survey established that major problems affecting business 
growth were high tax rates (60.8%), electricity and fuel shortage (66.1%) and obtaining external 
funding (49.6%) (Figure 6.1).  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1  Problems Affecting Business Growth 
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These results correspond with the World Bank 2009, enterprise survey results for Malawi that 
reported that inadequate electricity power, high tax rates and lack of funding were among the top 
five key obstacles for enterprise growth.  This confirms the earlier observations (see Chapter 5) 
that the key barriers to business growth in developing countries lie in the unfavourable operating 
environment and the lack of capital. The limited source of formal credit available on the market 
(see Chapter 6.1.1) worsens the situation further. While in the developed world, access to capital 
may be easier due to numerous sources from which SMEs could potentially obtain formal credit, 
if they meet conditions, the situation is opposite for developing countries, resulting in greater 
reliance on informal sources. However, informal sources are not sufficient to meet growing 
business investment financing needs. The Malawi Finscope (2012) survey established that most 
of the businesses in Malawi are in the growth stage (3 to 5 years of operation), which is the stage 
that requires the highest support for growth.  
 
6.4.2 Source and Ease of Access to Credit  
 
The business owners were asked to indicate the level of easiness in accessing credit from various 
available sources. Getting credit from family (46.49%), friends (48.25%), a microfinance 
institution (48.25%) and a credit union (42.48%) was easy (Figure 6.2). This is expected due to 
the large number of enterprises that operate informally in developing countries.  Accessing credit 
from commercial banks was mainly difficult (47.37%) or very difficult (35.96%). A similar 
response pattern was also observed across the MSME categories (Figure 6.3). Using a Chi 
squared test, there was no significant difference in level of ease in getting credit among micro, 
small and medium enterprises, χ2 (2, N = 114) p > 0.05. Although level of easiness from other 
sources, other than commercial banks, was reported to be easy, the effect of credit from such 
sources on growth of business would be minimal because of the lack of capacity to provide 
substantial amounts for long term investment.   It was therefore not surprising to note that 
although 69% of the businesses were established using own savings, 79% and 19% were 
planning to source business growth capital from commercial banks and / use retained profits 
respectively. 
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Figure 6.2 Source and Ease of Access to Credit 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Ease of Access to Credit by Business Category 
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character, and the type of investment among others.  From the lenders’ point of view, the key 
hindrance for MSME to obtaining formal credit is poor financial recording and lack of collateral. 
This corresponds to Beck et al.’ (2008a) findings that for both developing and developed 
countries financial assessment of a business is the most important criterion in small and medium 
business lending. Other hindrances include credit history, firm owners’ characteristics and 
collateral for developing countries.  It is difficult to convince a bank to lend money to a business 
if the business cannot provide reliable information about their current operations (Hansen et al., 
2012).  
 
Banks in developing economies have limited information, skills and regulatory support to engage 
in extensive SME lending (Hansen et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2008a). SMEs were not able to 
borrow from commercial banks due to lack of collateral (33.9%) and high interest rates (28.7%). 
In Malawi lending interest rate was on average 36%, between 2012 and 2015 (see Chapter 4.2.1 
for details). Only 5.2% cited poor records as a major hindrance (Figure 6.4). This indicates a 
mismatch in information between what lenders know as major problems affecting access and 
what borrowers know or have experienced. In a review of market dynamics to understand what 
SME borrowers expect from bankers in USA, Abbe et al. (2001) found that attitude of borrowers 
influences demand for credit. Conflicting information between lenders and borrowers 
complicates the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
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6.4.3. Social Connections and Formal Credit Perceptions 
 
A comparison between lenders’ and borrowers’ perceptions on the likelihood of getting credit, 
when one has social connections with bank personnel, showed that both borrowers and lenders 
believe that it is likely for a business to get credit when they are known personally by the credit 
officers or any high ranking officer within the bank. However, the reasons behind such 
perception differ. Lenders acknowledged that connections enhance collection of private 
information and easier monitoring. This makes sense, considering that where lenders have targets 
for loan portfolios, it is easier to deal with businesses whose owner one knows personally 
because it makes the credit analysis process quicker as well as easier to monitor. On the contrary, 
borrowers perceive that such processes occur due to corruption, hence it was not surprising to 
find that 70% of businesses perceived that it is likely for businesses to offer gifts to influence 
financiers, out of which 16% expressed willingness to offer gifts to obtain credit. It was further 
revealed that businesses often offer gifts in an expectation that it will influence outcome of loan 
application. However, no evidence was uncovered to indicate that the offers have an influence 
because it was a sensitive question for the respondents to answer.  This suggests a manifestation 
of rent-seeking behaviour as other people try to profit from the web of interpersonal relationships 
(Rose, 2001; Dasgupta, 2009). Using primary data of 502 SMEs in Uzbekistan, Ruziev and 
Midmore (2015) also reported that small fraction of formal credit channelled to SMEs is 
unequally distributed, favouring  those which can capitalize on interpersonal links with 
government and bank officers. However, whether one receives a gift or not might not necessarily 
influence the decision. The loan application goes through various stages and scrutiny, especially 
for large amounts, but availability of information about the businesses operations matters most in 
this process. A gift given in such cases could be associated with getting a positive response when 
the application was still going to have a favourable response either way, hence the rent-seeking 
behaviour. 
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Figures 6.5 and 6.6 display the ratings of the lenders, and business owners on effect of 
connections respectively. The bank officers interviewed had experience of working in the bank 
for an average of 9 years. Since one bank officer serves a lot of businesses, comparing their 
responses to business owner’s responses was therefore justified.  
 
 
 
Note: 1=Never, 2= Very unlikely, 3= unlikely, 4= No effect, 5=Likely, 6=very likely, 7= Always 
 
Figure 6.5 Informal Connections and Formal Credit (Borrowers) 
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Figure 6.6 Informal Connections and Formal credit (Lenders) 
 
On average, borrowers perceived that having social connections with lenders is likely to 
influence loan application outcomes. Both bank officers (35%) and businesses (70%) indicated 
that a Government official applicant is more likely to get credit from a bank. A government 
official will most likely have the necessary requirements to get the loan, for example having their 
pay deposited directly into an account, and tracking them is easier as they are public figures. 
Business owners further perceive that knowing an applicant personally (42%) influences a 
positive outcome because the bank personnel has more information about the business which is 
not available in any formal records for decision making. This corresponds with Putnam’s (2000) 
observation that networks that create social capital also serve as channels for the flow of 
information that facilitates achievement of goals.  
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6.4.4. Size of Business and Perceptions 
 
Access to formal credit is easier when a business is comparatively large. An analysis of 
perceptions by business size revealed that on average businesses perceive that social connections 
likely affect credit access, regardless of business size (Figure 6.7) 
 
 
Note: 1=most unlikely, 2 = very unlikely, 3 = unlikely, 4= no effect, 5= likely, 6= very likely, 7= most likely 
 
Figure 6.7 Average Perception by Business Size 
 
Since perceptions of effect of social connections on access to formal credit were not different, to 
check representativeness of the sample an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was conducted to 
explore if there were significant differences in the key variables among the MSMEs sampled. 
Table 6.2 shows the ANOVA results. 
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Table 6.2 Analysis of Variance 
 
Mean 
 Variable Micro Small Medium ANOVA
+
 
Howlikely 3.49 2.89 3.3 1.74 
Age 1.87 2.26 2.3 3.80** 
Gender 0.29 0.3 3.3 0.01 
Education 3.53 4.8 2.3 13.69*** 
Investment 0.65 0.69 0.3 1.19 
Network member 0.28 0.52 0.6 4.12** 
Trade 0.6 0.3 0.2 6.55*** 
Turnover 13.25 14.05 15.3 15.30*** 
Years with bank 1.41 1.38 1.8 1.3 
Business age2 0.8 0.92 0.64 0.16 
Business age 7 6.74 7.4 0.06 
Activity involvement 0.2 0.49 0.6 6.39*** 
Registration 0.71 0.94 0.1 6.70*** 
Savings source 0.73 0.64 0.7 0.46 
Family source 0.22 0.14 0.1 0.76 
Trust 0.31 0.49 0.8 4.87*** 
* refers to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 1% level of significance. 
+ is F statistic value for ANOVA test.   
Source: Survey data 
 
Firm characteristics affect access to financing (Beck et al., 2008a). In agreement with this 
finding, most of the firm characteristics variables indicated significant differences among the 
enterprise categories, with most differences being between micro and small; and micro and 
medium. There were significant differences for the proxy social capital variables trust and 
network member. The results indicated no significant differences in views, among the different 
size categories, regarding the effect of having social connections with banking officers 
(Howlikely), confirming the earlier descriptive statistics of positive perceptions among 
borrowers. The result provides evidence to not reject the null hypothesis, that size of business 
does not affect perceptions on effect of social connections on credit access.  
  
6.4.5 Trust in Business Transactions between Lenders and Borrowers  
 
Commercial banks in Africa traditionally lend more easily to the corporate and government 
compared to SMEs (Calice et al., 2012), because it requires innovativeness on their part to 
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effectively meet finance needs for this sector. In general, the demand for bank loans is high, 
compared to the number of available institutions offering credit to SMEs. This may put the 
lending institutions into a position where they can pick the easier to assess clients, for example, 
those with financial records, as a way of reducing transactions costs.  Pressures put on loan 
officers to reach desirable lending targets may encourage personnel to first seek clients who they 
have social connections with, as they have access to private knowledge about the client. In 
agreement with this finding, Mphuka et al. (2013) also found that banks depend on relationship 
lending when serving MSMEs. This may indicate that the interaction between many MSMEs 
and commercial banks is likely to be moulded by other non-quantifiable but critical aspects like 
trust and character, as perceived by commercial banks (Mphuka et al., 2014) 
 
According to the World Bank’s Microfinance Handbook, ‘more than any other economic 
transaction, financial intermediation depends on social capital because it depends on trust 
between the borrower and the lender' (Ledgerwood, 1999: p.76). Trust in business is a key 
component which enhances contract obligations between two parties. Social connections and 
trust are both components of social capital (Glaeser et al., 2000) and they are positively 
correlated. Banking in developing countries would require a lot of trust between lenders and 
borrowers, because borrowers have better information about their creditworthiness than the 
lenders do.  Uzzi (1999) concluded that solutions prompted by transfer of private knowledge are 
valuable because they are distinctive and hard for competitors without private information to 
imitate. Therefore in circumstances where many borrowers lack sufficient physical collateral, 
what counts for access to loans is how trustworthy the institutions perceive potential borrowers 
to be (Heikkila et al., 2009).  
 
This MSME survey established that 57 % of potential borrowers indicated that they did not trust 
banks to act in their businesses’ best interest as entrepreneurs. Generally the feeling was that 
banks do not make an effort to understand the businesses in order to serve better their interest. A 
manifestation of misinformation leading to mistrust was also observed with the responses that 
other entrepreneurs gave, when they were asked why they do not disclose all the businesses’ 
financial information to bankers. According to their perceptions, if the bankers have more 
information about them personally and their businesses, the bankers would not want to lend their 
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business money, especially when their business is profitable. Therefore if the business is already 
doing well, the banker could reject the requests for credit due to jealousy. This perception 
indicated a low level of trust for the banks amongst the entrepreneurs, and misinformation about 
why bankers might need to have more information about the business and the entrepreneur. Trust 
that others place in an actor is in itself capital and this is what helps in obtaining private 
information, although as indicated, the costs could be high due to risk of abuse of trust (Esser, 
2008). In a situation where borrowers do not trust the lenders, transfer of private information is 
hindered hence lenders cannot use it to make informed decisions on the loan applications. 
Borrowers expressed concern over either not knowing or not being convinced by the reasons for 
their credit applications being turned down. When the credit history of a borrower is not known, 
the relationship between borrower and lender becomes an important determinant of loan 
approval (Holmes et al., 2007), which requires careful cultivation. Efforts to extend credit, within  
an environment where credit rating agents are not utilized and businesses do not have good 
financial records, would not materialize up to the expected potential if there is a low level of trust 
between the borrower and the lender.  
 
To estimate the level of trust amongst business community the respondents were asked to rate 
whether they agree or do not agree with the statement ‘Most Malawian businesses can be trusted 
to work together with’. The question is similar to the standard survey question used for 
measuring trust: ‘Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted, or you 
cannot be too careful in dealing with people’ (Uslaner, 2008). The majority (57%) agreed that 
most business people can be trusted which is not very different from the 63% who indicated that 
they borrow money more easily from other people than from a bank. 
 
6.5 Chapter Synthesis  
 
This chapter explored information gaps about factors affecting lending decisions among 
borrowers and lenders in the commercial banking sector. The analysis indicates a mismatch of 
information between what lenders look for when making their assessments and what SMEs know 
to be the requirements for them to access credit from formal financial institutions. The 
information gap was also manifested in the negative perceptions on how bankers use the 
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informally gathered information. This gap is one of the contributing factors to low level of credit 
access by SMEs. The result confirms earlier observations that SMEs are highly restricted in 
accessing capital, which they require to grow, and banks are hindered with a lack of lender 
information and regulatory support to engage in SME lending. This results in absence of a well-
functioning SME lending market. 
 
On the effect of social connections, both entrepreneurs and bank officers perceived that when a 
person is known personally, the likelihood of getting a loan is improved. However the reasons 
behind such perceptions differed, indicating a gap in information which results in neither party 
achieving what they want as lenders and borrowers. As an extension to the social connections 
perceptions, an exploration of the level of trust that exists among the borrowers and lenders 
revealed that the level of trust that SME’s have for the banking sector was low. The rule-based 
trust, which develops following the rules and norms within a society, was found to be high as 
demonstrated by the 98% of borrowers who indicated that they had a bank account. Having a 
bank account indicates the trust that borrowers have in the banking system to handle their 
finances. However, knowledge-based trust, which develops following experience and behaviour’ 
was low. These negative experiences could be contributing factors to the low level of trust 
observed, and hence the observed perceptions. Trust and social capital matter the most when 
economic transactions are ruled by incomplete contracts (Cersosimo and Nistico, 2008). 
Therefore, if borrowers do not trust lenders, holding all other factors constant, demand for credit 
in the long run could be negatively affected. 
 
A comparison of the perceptions regarding effects of social connections on likelihood of 
obtaining credit from a commercial bank revealed no differences across the micro, small and 
medium business categories. This finding could be a reflection of adherence to standard 
procedures being employed for all businesses fitting into the SME categories. The value of social 
association and networking between borrowers and lenders is misunderstood at various levels 
because of lack of information amongst entrepreneurs about how lending decisions are made by 
bankers. Although networking is vital to improve information flows, sharing of private 
information is mainly achieved due to the exclusive nature of some networks. Trust between 
lenders and borrowers need to be enhanced through provision of adequate information regarding 
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services offered by banks and the associated requirements. If trust is built, available vibrant 
networks would support such services through information sharing on the conduct of members. 
Although such efforts are being tried (see Chapter 5), there is need for empirical research to 
provide evidence of their effectiveness.  
 
This chapter provided evidence on the extent of information asymmetry between the borrowers 
and lenders within the banking sector in Malawi, by presenting variations in information 
possessed by the two actors. Before recommending on which options to consider for enhancing 
access to formal credit for SMEs in Malawi, an empirical investigation into the factors that affect 
these perceptions among SMEs is explored in Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 7 FACTORS AFFECTING BORROWERS PERCEPTIONS ABOUT SOCIAL 
CONNECTIONS AND ACCESS TO FORMAL CREDIT: A CASE OF MALAWI.  
 
Due to information asymmetry problems, interactions between micro, small and medium 
enterprises, hereafter referred to as the borrower, and commercial bank, hereafter referred to as 
the lender, are shaped by trust and character of borrower, as perceived by the lender. Similarly, 
borrower’s perceptions are expected to be shaped by trust and experiences. Over time the type of 
relationship built between the borrower and lender is what would matter most to improve access 
to credit for first-time borrowers in developing countries. Therefore, if credit provision can be 
shaped by relationship lending, understanding perceptions held by borrowers and the factors that 
influence them is crucial to developing targeted solutions to the problem of lack of access to 
formal credit. This chapter uses a principal component probit model to investigate factors 
affecting perceptions that borrowers hold, regarding access to formal credit, when they possess 
social capital. In this chapter, social connection, a dimension of social capital, relates to any 
relationships outside the formal rules of engagement in economic and business transactions 
between entrepreneurs and bank officers. Primary data used in the analysis is from the micro, 
small and medium enterprises survey (see Chapter 6.3.1).  
 
7.1 Social Capital, Perceptions and Finance  
 
Although the informal credit market complements the formal sector in helping to ease credit 
constraints on economically active agents, faster firm growth is associated with enterprises’ 
ability to borrow from formal financial institutions (Ayyagari et al., 2010).  Research has shifted 
attention towards questions of financial access and financial inclusion, with a particular focus on 
how easily firms and households can take advantage of available formal financial services (Beck 
and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008; Spratt, 2008: p.383). Entrepreneurs and households perceptions about 
where and how to easily get access to credit is one of the issues attracting exploration in financial 
inclusion studies that are focusing on  demand side factors (Bauer et al., 2012; Kostov et al., 
2012; 2013). Using evidence from South Africa, Annim et al. (2012) concluded that perceptions 
about financial services affect the decision to access and use general accounts and services. 
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Perceptions about financial services can be formed by experience, available information and 
trust. This phenomenon is partly explained by the theory of ‘Discouraged Borrower’ as explained 
by Kon and Storey (2003). A good borrower (Discouraged Borrower) would not apply for a loan 
because of previous rejection experience. The negative experience results in the borrower 
perceiving that they would not be advanced credit even if they apply, leading to self-selected 
financial exclusion. This type of financial exclusion prevents targets for financial inclusion, 
including credit access, from being met. Levenson and Willard (2000) noted that the 
consequences of discouragement from accessing finance are considered more important than the 
credit rationing theory advanced by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Therefore understanding biases 
affecting perception and correcting for those biases may lead to more accurate perceptions and 
healthier relationships between borrowers and lenders, hence ultimately affecting formal credit 
access decisions. 
 
Several papers written on access to finance have used enterprise surveys
20
 data, which focuses on 
perception as a measure (see Beck et al., 2008a; Mulaga, 2013; Kuntchev et al., 2013). Academic 
research papers and policy documents by the World Bank group and other similar organisations 
have also used this data. Therefore using perceptions in this chapter is not a novel idea, but 
understanding factors affecting such perceptions represents a first step to exploring issues 
affecting access to formal credit for SMEs in Malawi in more detail. 
  
Perception describes the sensory experience of the environment around the unit of analysis, 
which in this case is the business owner or manager. Although perceptions shape behaviours, 
perception studies have a potential concern. The concern is that respondents might have different 
judgements on what constitutes ‘likely’ and very likely’, resulting in rating equivalent issues 
differently. This can introduce an error into the dependent variable. However, according to 
Greene (2000), this should not have a large effect as long as the error is not systematically 
correlated with the independent variable. The error term in the model absorbs the measurement 
errors (Greene, 2000).  
 
                                                 
20
 www.entreprisesurveys.org . The Enterprise Surveys (ES) are an ongoing World Bank project in collecting 
objective data based on firms’ experiences and enterprises’ perception of the environment in which they operate. 
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7.2 Social Capital Proxies and Firm Characteristics Variables 
 
It is argued that social embeddedness facilitates transfer of information between lenders and 
borrowers (Uzzi, 1999). This is because it is through informal connections that information 
sharing is achieved. Therefore, being socially networked should positively influence the holding 
of a positive perception. A lack of a single universally accepted definition of social capital in the 
literature leads to various ways in which social capital can be measured (see Chapter 6 for a 
discussion). Social capital can be captured as an attribute of individuals (Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 
2001), of families and communities (Coleman, 1990) and of even larger groups like regions or 
countries (Putnam, 1995, 2000; Serageldin and Grootaert, 2000; Narayan and Cassidy, 2001). 
Since most small and medium businesses in developing countries are owner managed, attributes 
of individual owners are used as proxies for how a business is networked, following Lin (2001) 
and Bourdieu (1986).  
 
A list of predictors used in the model, detailed descriptions and their summary statistics are 
presented and discussed in Chapter 6.4, Table 6.1.  The dependent variable, Howlikely, captures 
the business owners’ reported perceptions on how likely informal social connections with bank 
officers affect lending decisions made by banks. The variable has an underlying ordering having 
a value of 1 for very likely to 5 for never.  
 
Firm characteristics, human capital and social capital variables capture the environment which 
affects reported perceptions of the entrepreneur. In a relationship, time permits network partners 
to learn about and share private information, form bonds of trust and exploit opportunities 
(Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998; Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003).The longer the time a 
business stays with a bank, the better the prospects of accessing credit, as the bank is able to 
build up a credit history of the client. A higher degree of social connections makes it easier for 
both lenders and borrowers to reduce asymmetry of information problems, hence contributing to 
more transparent and quicker lending decisions. High levels of trust enable firms and banks to 
negotiate contingent loan agreements (Uzzi, 1999). Four social capital proxies are therefore used 
to capture the diverse attributes of social capital in the model, and they include activity 
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involvement, family source, years with bank and network member.  Positive signs are expected 
for all the proxies. 
 
Longer established businesses have better credit histories and reputations (Cavaluzzo and 
Cavaluzzo, 1998: p.779).  However as the business gains more experience and grows, the effect 
of private information diminishes as more formal records about the business are now available to 
the lender. Therefore two variables are included:  business age, which is expected to have a 
positive sign, and business age2, a squared term, with an expected negative sign.   
 
Entrepreneurial capability, in the model, is captured by education and age variables. An 
association between education and social capital has been discussed widely in the literature (see 
Buerkle and Guseva, 2002). If human capital is not linked to social capital, it is weakened both 
as an analytical tool and as an asset, because it is harder to acquire, and its value is harder to 
realize (Schuller, 2007). Educated entrepreneurs are likely to be more networked because of 
relationships built with friends and colleagues in school, and have a better understanding of the 
value of networking. A decision to go to school is considered as self-selection (Cameron and 
Heckman, 2001), and therefore the argument follows that staying longer in school may result in a 
lower cost of investment in social capital. Higher level education is expected to have a positive 
sign. Similarly, the older the entrepreneur the greater the amount of experience, and this is what 
affects perception. A positive sign is expected for education while age could have either a 
positive or a negative sign depending on type of experiences the entrepreneur has had.   
 
Firm characteristics such as size, growth, age, and industry in which the firm operates all affect 
financing of SMEs (Beck et al., 2008a; Abor and Biekpe, 2009; Mulaga, 2013). It is therefore 
appropriate to explore whether similar characteristics have an effect on business owners’ 
perceptions. It is expected that the effect would be similar because it is the same financing 
owners, whose perception is being investigated.  Firm size affects access to finance from 
commercial banks i.e. small enterprises are less favoured compared to large firms (Fatoki and 
Asah, 2011). This results in small firms’ low usage of external finance. Large firms are usually 
more diversified in their operations, hence they are more stable and less risky ventures compared 
to small firms. Size can therefore be substituted for insolvency (Honohan, 2008). The variable 
92 
 
measuring turnover, turnover, is a proxy for enterprise size. Large businesses are expected to 
have higher turnovers than small businesses and hence gain easier access to finance. Business 
size would therefore have both negative and positive expected signs. 
 
The industry in which a business is operating can influence access to finance, although the major 
determinant is through composition and nature of assets possessed by the firm (Hall et al., 2000).  
However, this effect also depends on other economic factors, and hence there is no priori 
expectation of the sign of coefficients. According to the Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy II (2011), deliberate efforts are being made at various levels to specifically direct credit 
to SMEs. In this case industry of operation would have an effect on access to external credit for 
businesses. An interaction factor of trade industry and size is therefore included and is expected 
to have a positive sign. 
  
In Malawi a business registration certificate is one of the requirements for a business to be able 
to open a business account and access credit as a business. However, there is less documented 
evidence on associated comparative advantages of registration
21
 for small businesses. 
Registration is less likely to affect a business owner’s perception of the effect of social 
connections and access to finance hence expected to have a negative sign. The other variables, 
which capture factors that can affect perceptions in the model, do not have a priori expectation. 
Perceptions could easily be built through experience or word of mouth. The expected sign for 
investment, savings source could be negative or positive depending on experiences borrowers 
have had with where the funds were sourced from. 
 
The final variable included is a gender dummy, because the key drivers of a gender gap observed 
in sub Saharan Africa are firm characteristics, especially size of business (Aterido et al., 2013). 
Females tend to own smaller sized businesses which have less access to external financing.  
Therefore, gender is expected to have a negative sign. 
 
                                                 
21
 A Business Registration Impact Evaluation study is being implemented by Impact for Poverty Action (IPA) in 
partnership with the World Bank and Government of Malawi. See Appendix C1 for more details about the study. 
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7.3 Empirical Analysis 
 
The relationship between the outcome variable, Howlikely, and sets of explanatory variables such 
as firm characteristics and social capital proxy variables, is estimated using an ordered probit 
model, first considered by Aitchison and Silvey (1957). The model was preferred because it uses 
a maximum likelihood probability, and hence gives the most efficient estimations when dealing 
with qualitative dependent variables (Long and Frees, 2006).  
 
The variable of interest, likelihood of connections having a positive effect has an underlying 
ordering taking the value from 1 if most likely to 5 if never. The model was chosen because it 
accounts for the ordinal nature of the five likelihood categories. Ordered models are suited to use 
when dependent variables are discrete and inherently ordered into categories because they 
closely resemble conventional linear models when analysing ordered categorical data (Snapinn 
and Small, 1986). The ordered probit was preferred over other suitable models like multinomial 
probit models which do not take into account the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, and 
linear regression, which would treat the rankings for their absolute values. The ordered logit 
model was also a possible fit; however, in practice logit and probit models give similar results. 
The ordered probit was chosen over logit because it uses a normal distribution function for the 
error term. 
 
The assumption in the ordered probit model is that
*Y , a latent index of how individual social 
connections affect lending decisions is a function of some factors that can be measured and a few 
other unobservable factors represented by ε. It is assumed that ε is normally distributed with an 
expected mean value of zero and variance of unity. The latent index measures the business 
owners’ perception of how likely it is to get a loan from a bank if the bank officer is personally 
known to the entrepreneur. Once the Yi
*
 crosses a certain value the business owner reports a 
perception level which is observed. To capture the observed values business owners were asked 
‘How likely is it for you to get a loan from a bank if you know the credit officer personally? The 
following options were offered Yi = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) for (most likely, very likely, likely, maybe and 
never). The model to be estimated follows Annim et al., (2012),  Kostov et al., (2012) and 
Aitchison and Silvey (1957) and takes the following form: 
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Yi* = α + Ziγ + Xi δ+ εi     ……………………………………………………………………….. (7.1) 
 
Where, Z is a vector of predictors that affect the probability of a firm i to belong to a certain 
category of perception. Z includes both continuous and categorical variables on firm 
characteristics, and X includes social capital proxies.  The parameters to be estimated are α, δ 
and γ; εi is the error term. The interval rule, therefore, follows that; 
 
yi=1     if     yi* ≤ u1 
yi=2     if     u1 < yi* ≤ u2 
yi=3     if     u2 < yi* ≤ u3               (7.2) 
yi=4     if     u3 < yi* ≤ u4 
yi=5     if     yi* > u4 
 
u1, u2, u3, u4, are unknown average threshold parameters to be estimated together with γ’s and 
δ’s. The value of the index necessary to push the respondent from choosing most likely to never 
is not known and the values, in theory, are different for everyone. Therefore calculating the 
probabilities of choosing any likelihood category given the above entails use of estimated 
threshold values. Given the cumulative normal distribution function φ (x′ β), the probabilities can 
be shown as below: 
 
Pr (yi=1) = 1- Φ [xi β – u1]  
Pr (yi=2) = Φ [xi β – u1] - Φ [xi β – u2] 
Pr (yi=3) = Φ [xi β – u2] - Φ [xi β – u3]                   (7.3) 
Pr (yi=4) = Φ [xi β – u3] - Φ [xi β – u4] 
Pr (yi=5) = Φ [xi β – u4] 
 
The estimated simple probit model used a large number of predictors hence potentially 
introduced a wider dimensionality and increased probability for redundancy in the data. To avoid 
95 
 
such redundancies, and also check consistency in the results, a principal component analysis
22
 
(PCA) ordered probit regression model is also estimated with Howlikely as the dependent 
variable. The PCA approach follows Sabatini (2005), and the components are used in an ordered 
probit model. 
 
7.4 Synthesis of Results  
7.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
The distribution of the micro, small and medium businesses interviewed is presented in  
Figure 7.1. According to the 2012 country wide Finscope MSME survey for Malawi, only 41% 
of businesses employ labour, out of which the large majority (81%) are categorised as micro, 
17% small and only 2% are medium. However, in total the small and medium scale businesses 
employ 66% of all of the paid labour force in Malawi. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Distribution of Enterprises by Size 
 
Table 7.1 shows a multivariate analysis of means for the dependent variable, Howlikely. There 
are significant differences in means among the 5 categories of perception based on network 
member, turnover and activity involvement variables. However to obtain more efficient results 
                                                 
22
 Principal component analysis is a statistical procedure which allows identification of the principal directions in 
which the data varies.  
47% 
44% 
9% 
Distribution of Entreprises 
Micro Small Medium
96 
 
from a multivariate analysis, the sample size needs to be large. Therefore to verify results from 
the multivariate analysis, regression on probability of the variables affecting perceptions 
provided further evidence on factors that affect perceptions.  
97 
 
Table 7.1 Summary Statistics of Main Variables by Likelihood Categories 
 
 
MOST LIKELY VERY LIKELY LIKELY MAYBE NEVER 
 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev Manova
+
 
Age 18 1.89 0.47 19 2.32 0.75 24 1.88 0.95 24 2.17 0.87 30 2.13 0.73 0.44 
Gender 18 0.50 0.51 19 0.16 0.37 24 0.25 0.44 24 0.29 0.46 30 0.30 0.47 0.44 
Education 18 4.72 1.32 19 4.26 1.94 24 4.42 1.56 24 4.50 1.87 30 3.73 1.84 1.69 
Investment 18 0.83 0.38 19 0.74 0.45 24 0.71 0.46 24 0.67 0.48 29 0.59 0.50 3.42* 
Network member 18 0.67 0.49 19 0.37 0.50 24 0.50 0.51 24 0.38 0.49 29 0.24 0.44 7.02*** 
Trade 18 0.33 0.49 19 0.42 0.51 24 0.42 0.50 24 0.38 0.49 30 0.57 0.50 1.93 
Turnover 17 13.93 1.50 17 14.41 0.93 22 13.98 1.27 22 13.64 1.33 27 13.29 1.23 6.21** 
Years with bank 17 1.29 0.63 17 1.53 0.75 20 1.34 0.87 22 1.29 0.74 26 1.64 0.63 1.12 
Business age 18 5.39 4.17 19 9 8.01 24 6.58 6.05 24 4.83 4.89 30 8.47 5.6 1.28 
Business age2 18 0.46 0.61 19 1.42 2.90 24 0.78 1.25 24 0.46 0.83 30 1.06 1.33 0.09 
Activity involvement 18 0.50 0.51 17 0.53 0.51 24 0.33 0.48 24 0.33 0.48 30 0.23 0.43 5.23** 
Registration 18 0.89 0.32 19 0.89 0.32 24 0.83 0.38 24 0.88 0.34 30 0.73 0.45 2.15 
Trust 18 0.61 0.50 19 0.63 0.50 24 0.71 0.46 24 0.71 0.46 30 0.73 0.45 1.01 
Savings source 18 0.39 0.50 19 0.47 0.51 24 0.46 0.51 24 0.5 0.51 28 0.36 0.49 0.12 
Family source 18 0.11 0.32 19 0.16 0.37 24 0.21 0.41 24 0.25 0.44 30 0.13 0.35 0.06 
Note: N is number of observations, * refers to 10%, ** to 5% and *** to 1% level of significance in a two tailed test. + Wilk’s λ F statistic value for a multivariate analysis of variance test.   
Std.Dev = standard deviation 
Source: Survey data 
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7.4.2 Model Estimation Results 
 
Two models are estimated to establish factors affecting perceptions of MSMEs regarding 
social capital and likelihood of accessing credit from commercial banks.  Table 7.2 reports 
estimation results of the ordered probit and principal components analysis models. The same 
independent variables are used in the two models for ease of comparison of the results.  
 
Table 7.2 Probit and Principal Components Estimations 
 
Predictors Expected sign      Model 1  Predictors Model 2 
Gender - -0.60* pc01 -0.164*   
  (0.31)   (-2.53)    
8.Education + 2.95** pc02 -0.216**  
  (1.18)   (-2.68)    
Investment + -0.97*** pc03 -0.141 
  (0.36)   (-1.58)    
Network member + -0.56* pc04 0.0455 
  (0.30)   -0.46 
Trade + 0.47* pc05 -0.0901 
  (0.28)   (-0.81)    
Savings source +/- 0.83**   
  (0.40)   
Family source +/- 1.13**   
  (0.53)   
Cutoff1  -2.63*   
  (1.60)   
Model evaluation     
Number of 
observations 
 88  88 
Log likelihood  -119.75  -132.33 
Likelihood ratio test , 
χ2(d.f.) 
 41.15(22)***  15.97(5)*** 
Link test (_hatsq)  0.05  0.46 
Pseudo R
2
  0.15  0.06 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** <0.01 
Model 1: Ordered probit estimation 
Model 2: Principal Component Analysis probit estimation 
pc01= Experience, network, education,  pc02= Years with bank, revenue, experience,  pc03= Capital source, 
years with bank,  pc04 = Age, additional investment, registration, pc05 = Gender, trade, revenue 
 
Ordered Probit Analysis 
 
Overall model fit for ordered probit analysis is confirmed using a Log likelihood ratio 
(p<0.01) and a link test (p >0.05), which indicated a good fit and well-specified model. A 
link test is utilised to test the hypothesis that residuals are normally distributed, and this is not 
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rejected, (p >0.05). The number of usable observations was reduced to 88 in the model 
because of missing values in some observations.  
 
In the ordered probit model results, a positive coefficient value of a variable indicates that an 
increase in a one unit of the explanatory variable increases the probability that a response will 
be of a positive perception.  The results indicate that education, trade and size interaction 
factor, source of initial capital and years a business has had a bank account are all more likely 
to influence the self-reported perception of informal connections affecting credit access. The 
explanation could be that education and length of relationship with bank enhances sharing of 
information through better understanding of requirements and procedures, building of trust 
between the lender and the borrower and building up records and credit history by the lender. 
Notably, only higher education category is found to be positive and significant, while the 
number of years with bank was positive but not significant. The number of years with a bank 
might not have an effect if the account was not active enough to provide a credit history to 
the lender. 
 
The source of initial capital is significant and has a positive sign. The survey revealed that 
79% of the businesses started operating by using their own savings or using funds from 
family members (20%), however as the business grows the need for external financing 
becomes unavoidable. Cassar and Holmes, (2003) showed that as the firm grows, demand for 
internal funds grows, and hence the need for external funds increases. In agreement, Mulaga 
(2013) found a positive significant relationship between firm growth and external financing 
for SMEs in Malawi. This provides evidence to explain why firms with limited or no access 
to external capital may, after all, not be able to pursue an optimal investment policy 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Knyazeva et al., 2009).  
 
Being a member of a social network increased the probability of having a negative perception 
level and it is significant at 5%. Social connections enhance sharing of information which is 
vital in business transactions. Availability of information enables providers of external 
financing to assess the quality of project finance applications (Mulaga, 2013). The negative 
sign in this case is evidence of non-availability or non-participation of networking initiatives 
between the lenders and the borrower, or networks do not provide expected services for 
business growth. A significant relationship between networks and access to resources from 
bankers by small firms was also reported by Katungi (2006) for Uganda. Despite the 
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usefulness of enhancing social capital amongst businesses through networking, this approach 
is not common in Malawi and businesses often lose out on opportunities gained through 
information sharing
23
. Low participation in business networks is not only because of poor 
infrastructure but also dormant networks, which might not present themselves to the 
enterprises as worthwhile paying for membership subscriptions. However, membership of 
social networks is of particular importance in developing countries because the business 
operating environment is weighed down with corruption, lack of human and material 
resources, poor management and inefficient judicial systems (Biggs and Shah, 2006)  
 
The indicator variable age, although not statistically significant, increases the probability of 
having a positive perception. Social capital proxy network member was significant but did not 
have the expected sign indicating the importance of social capital as a determinant of 
perception. The results indicate that social capital increases the probability of having a 
negative perception. This result could be because many businesses do not engage with other 
entrepreneurs by belonging to a business grouping or have not benefited from any such 
groups, and hence do not hold positive perceptions about benefits of such groupings.   
Activity involvement was not significant, confirming the limited social interactions between 
lenders and borrowers, neither directly nor indirectly through other groups. Lenders usually 
have formalised social interactions with larger businesses or through corporate social 
responsibility activities. However, such connections with SMEs are limited because SMEs 
are numerous, and hence not cost effective for the banks to engage in similar type of social 
connections. Holmes et al., (2007) noted that social capital is an important determinant for 
loan approval where the credit history of borrower is unknown.  Networks can therefore 
create symbiotic relationships between bank and borrower, leading to sustainable delivery of 
services including credit (Maxwell, 2004). 
 
Another proxy for social capital, years with bank indicated that an increase in years of being 
with the same bank influences positive perceptions of entrepreneurs, but was not significant. 
This could be because holding an account with a bank does not automatically result in easier 
access to credit but the account has to be active in order to give the lender an opportunity to 
estimate cash flows, as well as inform the borrower accurately about suitable products.  
 
                                                 
23
   http://businessinnovationfacility.org/profiles/blogs/key-issues-about-malawi-s-mSME-sector-development 
Accessed on 17
th
 February, 2014.  
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Principal Component Analysis 
 
Some of the variables used in the ordered probit analysis were proxies of similar factors in 
the model, which hence raises the possibility of multicollinearity. Formal tests to verify use 
of principal component analysis (PCA) to deal with multicollinearity were applied. The basic 
idea of a principal component analysis is to represent a set of predictors, in the model, by a 
smaller number of predictors termed components.  The Kaiser Meyer-Olkin measure verified 
the sampling adequacy, KMO = 0.60, with most variables being above the acceptable limit of 
0.5 (Field, 2009). Although according to Field (2009), the recorded KMO measure is 
categorised as mediocre, Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2 (105) = 474.53, p < 0.001, indicated 
that correlations between the variables were sufficiently large for PCA. A principal 
component analysis (PCA) was therefore conducted on the 14 variables, with oblique rotation 
(promax).  A screen plot of Eigen values against component number was done to visually aid 
determination of the appropriate number of principal components to use (Figure 7.2). Eigen 
values are the variances being accounted for by the principal components, and hence the 
components accounting for small proportion of variation (i.e. those with small Eigen values) 
are not used. The elbow shape in the scree plot is taken to be the point where remaining 
Eigen values are relatively small and about the same size, indicating the corresponding 
number of components to use. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Scree Plot of Eigen Values 
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Correlations between the original data for each principal component and variable were 
computed to aid with interpretation (Table 7.3). A subjective value of 0.5 and above was 
deemed to indicate a strong correlation and interpretation was based on such values.  Five 
components with Eigen values of over 1 were used in the analysis and in combination they 
explained 67.53% of the variation. Both Eigen values analysis and correlation analysis 
indicated similar variables that contributed more to the components that were used in the 
regression. 
 
Table 7.3 Variables for Principal Component Regression 
 
 
Principal component 1 (pc01) and principal component 2 (pc01) significantly affected 
perception. Pc01 was contributed to mostly by business experience, education, network 
membership and family as a source of initial capital. This component is positive with 
increasing business experience and if the source for start-up business was family. The 
component is positive with a decrease in education, and non-membership of a networking 
grouping. Since this component is contributed to mostly, by proxy indicators of social capital, 
its effect indicates social capital as a significant factor in the formation of perceptions by 
entrepreneurs, confirming the role of social connections for information transfer.  Principal 
component 2 (pc02) is significant and it captures mostly effects of sales revenue. The level of 
Variable 
0bserved loadings for components ( Blanks 
are loadings of <.3)  Correlations  
Component pc01 pc02 pc03 pc04 pc05 pc01 pc02 pc03 pc04 pc05 
Age       0.60   0.01 0.18 -0.35 0.68 0.02 
Gender         0.61 -0.09 -0.41 0.23 0.26 0.64 
Education -0.40         -0.71 0.41 -0.07 -0.11 0.14 
Investment       -0.57 0.30 -0.05 0.4 -0.01 -0.66 0.32 
Network member -0.34         -0.62 0.32 0.14 0.12 -0.06 
Trade          0.40 0.37 -0.32 0.35 0.25 0.41 
Turnover   0.36     0.49 -0.36 0.52 -0.02 0.02 0.6 
Years with bank   0.30 -0.36     0.47 0.44 -0.47 0 0.28 
business age 0.45 0.30       0.81 0.44 -0.21 0.02 0.03 
Business age2 0.42         0.75 0.43 -0.08 0.2 -0.07 
Activity involvement   0.3       -0.35 0.44 0.2 0.26 -0.24 
Registration       0.32   -0.39 0.41 0.31 0.37 -0.01 
Savings source     -0.52     -0.3 -0.41 -0.68 0.08 0.08 
Family source     0.55     0.51 0.15 0.71 -0.04 -0.03 
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sales revenue
24
, which indicates the size of the business, has an effect on the perception of 
entrepreneurs. This could be explained by the low social interaction between micro and small 
business, and the bankers as opposed to the medium and larger enterprises. Low education 
levels and membership of networks increase the probability of having a negative perception. 
The ordered probit model revealed that gender influenced perception levels but did not do so 
with the Principal Component Analysis. This could be because its effect is marginal hence its 
influence is overshadowed in the PCA by a combination of other factors, which influence 
perceptions more than gender. 
 
Ordered probit coefficients in the model are log-odds units, and hence they cannot be 
interpreted as regular OLS coefficients (Long and Frees, 2006). The assumption in the model 
is that ordered categories are different. A hypothesis test that cut off thresholds are the same, 
_b [/cut1] = _b [/cut2] = _b [/cut3] = _b [/cut4] = _b [/cut4] = 0 was rejected, χ2 (2, 79.86) = 
p(0.000), was rejected at 1% level of significance. Since the thresholds are different, marginal 
effects were calculated to illustrate the magnitude of associated effect.  
 
7.4.3 Marginal Effects  
 
Marginal effects estimations for ordered probit are presented in Table 7.4. The results 
indicate that females have a reduced probability of  15%  to report that such connections 
never have an effect and probability increases by 7% to report that it is very likely to have an 
effect. Having additional investment since start up indicates growth of an enterprise . As 
enterprises grow, they need  external finances for investment, the major source of which is 
commercial banks for the case country. Businesses that  made additional investments since 
start up have a 12% increased probability  to report most likely; 6% reduced probability to 
report less likely, and both are significant at 10%.  A member of a network has a  17% 
reduced probability  to report  that social connections can never affect lending decisions by 
bankers and 15% increased probability to perceive that  it is most likely to happen. Being a 
network member, with higher level education and more business experience increases the 
probability of reporting that social connections with bankers are most likely to influence 
access to credit. If the source for start up capital of the business was own savings, which is 
the case with most businesses in Malawi, there is a 9% reduced  probability to report that it is 
                                                 
24
 Banks categorise businesses into small, medium and large enterprises using reported estimated revenues.  
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very likely to access credit when one has social connections with bank officers and the 
probability increases by 19% to perceive that it never  happens, and  this result is significant 
at 10%.   
 
Table 7.4 Ordered Probit Marginal Effects 
 
 
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 
 Variables Most likely Very Likely Likely  Maybe  Never  
Gender 0.16 0.07* 0.01 -0.09 -0.15* 
 
(0.09) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) 
Education -0.05* -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.06* 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Investment 0.12* 0.08 0.05 -0.06* -0.19 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) 
Network member 0.15* 0.08* 0.02 -0.09 -0.17* 
 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) 
Savings source -0.21 -0.09* -0.01 0.11 0.19* 
 
(0.11) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) 
Family source -0.14* -0.12 -0.1 0.04 0.32 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.19) 
N 88 88 88 88 88 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
7.5 Chapter Synthesis 
 
The chapter explored the factors that affect perceptions of businesses on whether having 
social connections with bank officers are likely to affect their access to credit. The results 
from both the PCA and the ordered probit models indicated that social capital, education and 
gender affect perceptions about effect of social connections on credit access from banks; 
however the perceptions are not all positive. The value of social links in information flows is 
clearly confirmed; however lenders are not utilising such available opportunities to spread the 
word on how their various products are aimed at serving the SME sector. Similarly available 
business groupings are not offering business development services that are valued by 
businesses. While personal characteristics such as education, which contribute to individual 
perceptions has largely been considered in empirical research, the findings suggest more use 
of opinions, values and social connections of borrowers as potential determinants. The 
suggested factors can also affect level of perceptions in accessing and usage of financial 
products including credit.  Kostov et al. (2012) findings also concluded that perceptions about 
financial services have an impact on level of usage of the products; however the impact 
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reduces, or becomes negligible, when more sophisticated products are used with higher levels 
of access. The low levels of financial inclusion in Malawi can not only be explained by poor 
infrastructure, low financial education levels, poverty, among others, but can also be 
explained by low availability of accurate information about banking services which affects 
perceptions about financial services that users hold. 
 
Social networks and interrelationships can be used to convey positive messages about bank 
operations. Social networks help transfer of public information circulating in the market 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 2002). Education is still essential to better communication and 
understanding. Therefore to increase financial inclusion and hence improve access to formal 
credit for entrepreneurs, curative strategies should consider borrowers’ personal and known 
experiences to guide formation of information advocacy tools. 
 
Since the major financial service of interest for this thesis is access to formal credit for SMEs, 
Chapter 8 provides further evidence of the effect of social connections on access to formal 
credit. 
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CHAPTER 8  SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A DETERMINANT OF ACCESS TO FORMAL 
CREDIT BY SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTREPRISES IN MALAWI 
 
Societies and markets use a mix of informal interpersonal connections (social capital), 
amongst actors, to facilitate economic transactions. Social capital role in development has 
been given considerable attention in microfinance. Social capital is proven to positively affect 
access to credit for micro enterprises through group lending methodologies used in 
Microfinance. Considering the need for formal credit for small and medium enterprises 
(SME) growth, the question of interest is does social capital also have a positive effect on 
access to formal credit for small and medium enterprises? To explore most possible 
variations in modelling this relationship, this chapter uses probit, Heckman selection and 
multinomial statistical models to provide empirical evidence on whether social capital affects 
access to formal credit for SMEs in Malawi. 
 
8.1 Interpersonal Connections and Access to Finance  
 
Absence of reliable credit information is one of the major hindrances for formal lending to 
SMEs. Mechanisms for reliable information, enforcement of property rights and the quality 
of legal systems are crucially important for enhanced flow of formal credit to SMEs (Beck et 
al., 2004; Beck et al., 2005). Social capital – an asset embedded in relationships that facilitate 
action among people and sharing of resources (Coleman, 1988) improves credit information 
flow between lenders and borrowers through informal interpersonal connections (Uzzi, 1999; 
Ruziev and Midmore, 2015). Social capital has aspects of both individual (micro) (Bourdieu, 
1980; Lin, 2001) and collective (macro) (Coleman, 1990) attributes. It is equivalent to ‘access 
to resources’ (Lin, 2001) where by an individual can use parts of it when a need for such 
action arises. Therefore, interpersonal connections, which are a component of social capital, 
are individual-specific assets that can be put into creative or destructive use, or even be left 
unused. Because of these dimensions, the use of social capital in access to finance therefore 
has been, and still is, of research interest. This chapter follows the individual approach to test 
the null hypothesis that social capital is not a determinant of access to formal finance for 
SMEs. 
 
In contrast with developed countries, social interactions remain of particular importance in 
developing and emerging markets because business  operating environments are worsened by 
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corruption, lack of human and material resources, poor management, and inefficient judicial 
systems (Biggs and Shah, 2006; Conning and Udry, 2007). Furthermore, SMEs, who have a 
significant effect on economic growth, face big difficulties in accessing formal credit (Berger 
and Udell, 1998; Galindo and Schiantarelli, 2003). Although such is the case, limited studies 
on the effects of social capital on credit access have been conducted for sub Saharan Africa, 
where most of the least developed countries are located. Studies conducted elsewhere have 
concluded that access to social capital facilitates access to finance (Uzzi, 1999; Barr, 2000; 
Boot, 2000). However, definitions of what an SME is in the developed economies, where the 
studies were conducted, are different to that of developing countries. In a review of 
contemporary literature on relationship banking, Boot (2000) concluded that this facilitation 
role of social capital happens through creation of value for banks, through informal links. 
These links reduces transaction costs incurred in writing a contract and retaining clients. 
Using SME data for United States of America, Uzzi (1999) also concluded that social capital 
facilitates transfer of private information between lenders and borrowers. The analysis used 
years with bank, number of business services and personal bank services used by the 
entrepreneur as proxy indicators for social capital.  In a panel data analysis of SMEs in China, 
Du et al. (2013) measured social capital using entertainment expenditure. They concluded 
that social capital is important for firms who seek to establish initial social relationships with 
financiers.  Entrepreneurs who spend more on social activities are more likely to obtain a loan 
from commercial banks (Talavera et al., 2010). Further work conducted in China documented 
a positive relationship between social capital and firm performance (Zhang and Fung, 2006; 
Fung et al., 2007). In Vietnam, Nguyen and Ramachandran (2006) concluded that close 
social relationships that SMEs have with financial institutions enables them to get preferential 
access to credit as evidenced by more short term debt in their capital structure (see chapter 2 
for a further discussion of studies on social capital and finance). 
 
On the contrary microfinance has been the focus of studies of the effect of social capital in 
the formal credit market in developing countries. This is because that is where such services 
have mainly been implemented. The basic principle of microfinance is to replace physical 
collateral with social capital (peer pressure and monitoring) in acquiring a loan. Within the 
framework of informal and semi-formal credit schemes in microfinance, Serageldin and 
Groortaert (2000) pointed out that by tapping into the information that group members have 
about each other, the financial schemes rely on social capital to overcome information 
deficiencies and the associated risks to prospective lenders. Further studies in microfinance 
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have also concentrated on the effect of social capital on group lending repayments (Sharma 
and Zeller, 1997; Bastelaer and Leathers 2006; Cassar et al., 2007) where a positive effect is 
documented. 
 
In this chapter a contribution to this discussion is made by analysing the relationship between 
social capital and access to formal credit in the Malawi context. Four proxy variables are 
utilised in a simple probit, Heckman selection and multinomial models, to estimate the 
relationship. Conclusions from this analysis complement findings on financial inclusion 
studies, which have dominated the recent research and policy agenda, although with little on 
impacts of such policies on SME financing and long term investment (Beck et. al., 2013) 
 
8.2 Data Sources and Methodology 
 
The analysis is conducted using data collected as part of a Business Registration Impact 
evaluation (BRIE) study in Malawi (see appendix B1 for details). The study was 
implemented by Poverty for Action in partnership with the World Bank and Government of 
Malawi. Data was drawn from a sampled control group of 750 randomly selected small and 
medium enterprises operating in Lilongwe and Blantyre cities. This survey was a second 
follow-up survey to a baseline for a randomised control trial experiment. The number of 
returns was reduced to 685 due to missing data for respondents who could not be located for 
the follow-up survey. A further reduction to 587 in the number of usable responses was 
inevitable because some respondents were no longer operating the same businesses they had 
during the first round of the survey. This group of businesses were therefore asked questions 
on social capital only.  Details of the sampling design and technique used can be found in 
appendix B1. 
 
In empirical studies endogeneity and sample selection are among the major concerns when 
dealing with non-experimental data. The variable of interest  for this Chapter is access to 
credit, whereby respondents choose to allocate themselves to a group that best describes their 
circumstance, i.e. accessed credit or not; and the source from which credit is accessed. This 
scenario entails self-selection
25
  and sample selection
26
 biases (Wooldridge, 2003). The 
biasedness comes in because a subset of the data is excluded, systematically, because of a 
                                                 
25
 Distortion in selection of sample i.e. individuals selecting themselves into a group. 
26
 Sample with self-selection bias. 
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specific attribute i.e. in this case, not having accessed credit. This exclusion influences the 
statistical significance of the test or can produce distorted results (Heckman, 1979). However, 
commonly available techniques to address such issues include estimations using instrumental 
variables, and the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979; Davidson and Mackinnon, 
2004). In this case the Heckman selection estimator is employed to test whether social capital 
is a determinant of access to formal credit. This method is chosen because the alternative, 
instrumental variable, estimator only produces bounds rather than point estimates when 
analysing non-parametric models for causal effect (Angrist et al., 1993) as in this case. 
Simple probit and multinomial models are also estimated which also act as a robustness 
check for the results. 
 
8.3 Empirical Analysis 
 
The relationship among the chosen variables is modeled using a maximum likelihood 
probability because it gives the most efficient estimations when dealing with dichotomous 
dependent variables (Long and Freese, 2006). In such cases using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression would produce biased estimates because consideration will only be on those 
who have obtained credit.  Three probit models, simple probit, Heckman selection and 
multinomial, are used to estimate the effect of social capital on SMEs probability of 
accessing credit from formal credit providers. Access to credit, in broad terms, refers to the 
availability of a reasonable quantity of formal finance at reasonable cost (Claessens, 2006: 
p.210). This definition covers both existing users and those who excluded themselves, for one 
reason or the other, including assumed rejection, self-sufficiency of internal funds, and 
possibly even lack of awareness. Therefore,   use of formal credit is not the same as access to 
credit. A clear distinction of the two terms is explained through reference to a standard 
assumption in research that small to medium sized firms constantly need credit (Uzzi, 1999). 
Therefore absence of use of credit for SMEs would indicate that a firm was denied credit or 
was not offered a sufficiently attractive loan contract, hence making self-restricted 
consumption indistinguishable to denial of a loan (Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Munnell et 
al., 1992). It is therefore hard to differentiate whether the business did not access credit due to 
credit rationing by a bank or due to self-restricted consumption.  In this Chapter, an SME is 
defined as having access to formal credit if it ever obtained a loan from a bank or a 
microfinance institution, and hence the dependent variable is dichotomous, which is the 
reason for using probit models.  
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8.3.1 Probit Model 
 
Probit models are used widely in research on credit access because the dependent variable is 
usually a binary response variable categorising respondents =1 if they obtained credit and 0 
otherwise as in this case. The model takes the following form; 
 
𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖 ′𝛽𝑖  + 𝑍𝑖 ′𝛾𝑖  + ε …………………………………………………………… (8.1) 
 
Where  𝑌𝑖
∗ is the latent variable measuring probability of getting credit, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of 
exogenous explanatory variables comprising of both continuous and categorical control 
variables on socio economic attributes of the entrepreneur and the business ; 𝑍𝑖  is a vector of 
social capital proxy variables; 𝛼, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖   are the parameters to be estimated and 𝜀 is the 
stochastic error term. The individual observations are represented by i = 1…………N, the 
total number of observations. The binary outcome 𝑌𝑖 , = 1 if 𝑌𝑖
∗ > 0,  and 𝑌𝑖 = 0, and 
otherwise, where 1 if a firm accessed credit in the past 3 years and 0 otherwise. 
 
8.3.2 Heckman Selection Model 
 
There are a number of sources from which SMEs are able to access credit including both 
formal and informal sources. The dependent variable in the simple probit model does not take 
into account the source of a respondent’s credit, hence introducing biases if the interest is to 
estimate the effects of social capital on access to credit from the formal sector. Simple probit 
models, however, do not take into account selectivity problem. Therefore, in such situations 
estimates tend to be biased.  In order to deal with this problem, Heckman (1976) proposed 
use of the two-stage selection model. A Heckman two-stage model is a simplified alternative 
to the simple probit maximum likelihood approach (Gujarat, 2003). This model is used when 
one dependent variable depends on another dependent variable. For example, most small and 
medium businesses operating in Malawi do not have business accounts, but some might have 
personal savings account which they also use for their businesses. In formal credit, 
prospective clients are encouraged to open an account with the lender when they access 
credit, hence one cannot have credit from an institution without having an account with the 
lender. Therefore, the selection dependent variable takes the value of 1 if SME has a bank 
account and 0 otherwise. Therefore, to estimate the Heckman model, the first stage probit 
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regression estimates the probability of a firm operating a bank account. The second stage, 
which is also a probit regression, uses the estimated probability of having a bank account, 
from the first regression. This allows accounting for selection bias in the second regression, 
whose dependent variable has a value of 1 if SME accessed credit and 0 otherwise.  
 
To estimate the effect taking into account the selectivity problem, a Heckman selection model 
is estimated. This model is based on estimating two latent dependent variables as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝑋 
′𝛽 + 𝜀1  (Outcome model)……….……………………………………………… (8.2) 
𝑄𝑖
∗ = 𝑊 
′𝛼 + 𝜀2  (Selection model)……………………………………………………… (8.3) 
 
Where X and W are vectors of regressors and 𝜀1 and 𝜀2 are random error disturbances. The 
errors are correlated if the Heckman selection model is the correct estimator for the selection 
problem. Regressors for the selection equation are chosen randomly, however the rule of 
thumb is that at least one regressor in the selection model should not be in the outcome model 
(Baum, 2006). Estimation of this bivariate probit model requires identification of an 
instrumental variable which only affects the probability of having a bank account but does 
not belong to the main model of credit access. The two possible variables identified are 
revenue and trust in the banking system. Enterprises who do not trust banks to act in the best 
interest of their enterprises select themselves out from operating a bank account. The data 
used for this analysis was collected from SMEs located in Lilongwe and Blantyre cities, 
where banks are within reach, rendering not operating an account as a self-selected choice. 
Enterprises who have trust indicate confidence in the banking system. However, trusting the 
bank system does not guarantee access to credit, but merely a step towards being able to 
apply for credit. The pecking order theory suggests that firms order their financing choices in 
a hierarchical pecking order, starting with internal funds before seeking external funds 
through debt. Increasing revenue is an indicator of growth, and as the firm grows the need for 
funds for investment become greater and hence requires external funds to fulfill the need. As 
revenue increases firms will need more formal external finance. Operating a bank account 
indicates an attempt to get external credit because most businesses need to have an account to 
aid in getting formal credit.  
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8.3.3 Multinomial Model 
 
The multinomial model is also estimated using the same list of dependent variables used in 
the simple probit and Heckman selection models. Apart from checking sensitivity of the 
results to changes in the models, it also ensures robustness of the results. The Heckman 
sample selection model only considers respondents that obtained credit from a bank, an MFI 
or informally. The model does not take into account those that did not access credit from 
anywhere, for their business, up to the point the survey was carried out. Businesses require 
external finances to grow. Therefore not having obtained credit in the past does not indicate 
that the business will never have it in the future. This creates yet another bias which is 
corrected by estimating factors affecting probability of the entrepreneur’s choice using the 
multinomial probit model. The credit seeking behaviour is captured as a multiple choice 
problem which has three possible answers; formal, informal and no credit. The model takes 
the same form as in equation 8.1 but the dependent variable, 𝑌𝑖
∗ has three values which 
include no credit, formal credit and informal credit. The assumption that errors are extreme 
values closely approximates the normal distribution, and hence produces closed form 
solutions (Greene, 2003). Individuals who accessed both formal and informal credit are 
excluded from the analysis because they cannot be placed in two categories.  
 
8.3.4 Independent Variables 
 
The names of the variables used in this chapter are the same variable names as noted in 
Chapters 6 and 7, for ease of comparing results. Social capital is multidimensional hence 
difficult to measure using a single indicator. The independent variable of interest, social 
capital, is proxied by trust (trust
27
) and network membership (network member).  However, to 
capture a wider angle of social connections informal gifts (gift and invest), and involvement 
in activities with financiers (activity involvement) were also included as proxies in the 
analysis.  Misztal (1996: p.10) observed that ‘trust, by keeping our mind open to all evidence, 
secures communication and dialogue’, hence implied that trust may  open up access to people 
and the exchange of intellectual capital (Brata, 2009). High levels of trust enable firms and 
banks to negotiate loan agreements (Uzzi, 2009). The question asked to capture these 
attributes, which is the same question, noted in Chapter 6, is ‘Do you trust banks to act in the 
                                                 
27
 A description of all key variables is presented in Table 8.1 
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best interest of your enterprise? To capture network membership the following question was 
asked; ‘Are you or your business a member of a social networking gathering, group, or club, 
which helps you find business opportunities?’.  Chapter 6 showed that lenders and SME 
borrowers hold conflicting views about factors that hinder access to finance, and hence rent 
seeking behaviours tend to surface in such scenarios. Offering informal gifts (gift) was 
therefore used as an additional social capital proxy. To capture this variable the following 
Likert statements were evaluated: Business people offer gifts (including cash, merchandise or 
other goods) to influence the outcome of a loan application, and Business people offer 
investment opportunities as an incentive to the bank or lending officer to influence the 
outcome of a loan application. Another dichotomous variable of whether the SME owner or 
manager is involved in activities that enable them to interact with banking officials was also 
included as a proxy. All of these social capital proxies are expected to have a positive sign. 
 
From a lenders’ point of view, formal credit is granted depending on the creditworthiness of 
the firm; hence judging the associated risk and business reputation play a crucial role. 
Unfortunately these attributes are not directly measured in the data set, and therefore they are 
proxied by firm size, age, gender, location, education, business sector, marital status and 
revenue, which form the control variables. As noted earlier in Chapter 7, in a relationship, 
time permits network partners to learn about and share private information, form bonds of 
trust and exploit opportunities (Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). This is also in the way 
education affects social capital, and hence educated entrepreneurs are likely to be more 
networked than the less educated (Buerkle and Guseva, 2002).Higher level education is 
expected to have a positive effect and vice versa for lower level, because staying longer in 
school is associated with lower investment costs in social capital.  
 
Age of the enterprises has an effect on access to resources. Younger firms find it harder to 
access formal finance due to information asymmetries (Le and Nguyen, 2009; Coluzzi et al., 
2009). As the business grows and performs, it builds up a reputation and history which 
reduces the moral hazard dilemma and creates a path to access debt finance (Burger and 
Udell, 1995; Kira and He, 2012).  A lender would look at longer-established enterprises as 
having better reputations, credit histories, and possibly longer-term relationships with formal 
credit institutions (Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998: p.779). In a developing country context, 
Abor and Biekpe (2007) found a positive relationship between age and access to bank finance 
in Ghana, while Klapper et al., (2006), and Hall et al., (2000) demonstrated a negative 
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relationship for developed countries. To account for non-linearity in the relationship between 
age and access to credit, a squared age variable is included. The expectation is that there 
would be a positive sign for age and a negative sign for age squared variables.  
  
Firm size impacts on access to finance from commercial banks because small enterprises are 
favoured less than large firms (Fatoki and Asah, 2011). This results in small firms’ low usage 
of external finance, especially from banks (Beck et al., 2008a). Large firms are usually more 
diversified in their operations and have more stable revenues hence present less risky 
ventures compared with small firms. Young and small firms face significant financial 
constraints (Colluzi et al., 2009), therefore size can be substituted for insolvency (Honohan, 
2009). 
 
Geographical proximity of lenders to their clients could have an effect on access to finance. 
Lenders are capable of utilizing soft available information, of clients around them, to 
establish credibility of their customers for credit quality (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). This 
transfer of information is in most cases done through informal linkages. Geographical 
closeness between lenders and borrowers is associated with a firm’s access to credit (Berger 
and Udell, 2002). A specific positive relationship between location and access to resources, 
including capital, labor and land, exists (Gilbert, 2008; Fatoki and Asah, 2011). Regardless of 
research evidence, this relationship already makes sense for most developing countries. This 
is because financial service providers are concentrated in urban areas, due to poor 
infrastructure, and hence access to these services is limited for the potential clients who are 
located far away from urban areas. Location is expected to have a positive sign because the 
sample was collected in urban areas. 
 
The industry in which a business is operating can influence access to finance although the 
major determinant is through composition and nature of assets possessed by the firm (Hall et 
al, 2000).  However, this effect depends also on other economic factors. In Ghana, Abor and 
Biekep (2007) noted that SMEs operating in the agricultural sector have the strongest capital 
structures compared with the wholesale and retail industry, which also has a weak debt ratio. 
Michaelas (1999) argued that although particular firm’s features are sensitive to structural 
features of the industry, financial strategy variables have an important influence over 
industry-specific effects on firms operations. Countries sometimes intentionally direct credit 
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to specific sectors, and in such cases, the type of industry would have an effect on access to 
external credit for businesses. A positive effect is expected. 
 
Men and women may differ in terms of how they make and maintain social ties in a society, 
largely due to cultural factors. These differences affect economic aspects of interactions; 
hence gender is mostly controlled for in social capital studies (Lindstrom et al., 2002; 
Subramanian et al., 2002).  In sub Saharan Africa, key drivers of a gender gap are firm 
characteristics, especially size of business (Aterido et al., 2013). Muravyev et al. (2009) 
found that female-managed companies are less likely to get formal credit compared with their 
male counterparts. The expected sign is therefore negative.  
 
8.4 Analytical Results 
8.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
This analysis uses a sample of 684
28
 small and medium enterprises located in Lilongwe and 
Blantyre cities of Malawi. The number of female respondents was deliberately increased in 
the sample to ensure that estimation of gender differences was captured. The distribution of 
the data by location and gender is presented in Figure 8.1. There were 36.8 % of female 
entrepreneurs in the sample, with 47% located in Blantyre and 53% located in Lilongwe. 
 
                                                 
28
 The sample is reduced from the original 750 respondents due to SMEs that could not be located during the 
second round of interviews or had stopped operating the businesses they were operating a year before the 
interview. 
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Figure 8.1 Sample Distribution by Location and Gender 
 
Up to 80% of businesses in Malawi operate on a micro scale compared to the small and 
medium enterprises (Finscope, 2012). To compare representativeness of the sample to the 
wider population characteristics, Figure 8.3 displays the sample distribution by size
29
 of 
business and business activity (Figure 8.2). Although categorising size of business using 
number of workers indicates that 80% of the businesses are micro, the average annual 
revenue is over MK1, 000,000 which falls within the small sized category if revenue is used. 
Therefore, throughout the analysis the sample will be referred to as containing SMEs.  
 
 
Figure 8.2 Sample Distribution by Size 
                                                 
29
 Total number of workers employed by the business was used to categorise businesses by size, and hence 
defined as micro, small and medium enterprises.   
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Figure 8.3 Sample Distribution by Activity 
 
Although small businesses already face greater hindrances to accessing finance needed for 
growth (Beck et al., 2006; 2008a), failure to separate business and personal finances 
complicates the ability of small businesses to operate effectively. The problem of mixing 
business and personal finances is worsened due to a lack of business accounts held by small 
entrepreneurs. A baseline study for the BRIE project in Malawi established that 82% of the 
targeted enterprises reported that they take money from the business to finance household 
expenses anytime that it is required. This study further established that 63% of the businesses 
had access to a personal savings account with a bank, compared with only 4% who had 
business accounts. This implies that personal and businesses finances are not handled 
separately by SMEs. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated no significant differences in 
having an account at the bank, F (2, 0.84) p>.05 among the micro, small and medium 
enterprises. This result could be because the account considered was any bank account, and 
or because of biasedness towards micro enterprises compared to small and medium sized 
enterprises in the sample. The decision, by businesses, to have a bank account can be affected 
by a number of factors, one of which is perception. 
 
Perception affects a user’s decision to access and use general accounts and services offered 
by formal financial institutions (Kostov et al., 2012). To explore perceptions about social 
capital, the sampled enterprises were asked to indicate their level of perception regarding use 
of social connections when accessing credit from banks. The respondents were asked the 
following question; ‘How likely is it for you to obtain a loan from a bank or lending 
71% 
5% 
24% 
Sample Distribution by Activity 
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Manufacturing
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institution if you personally know the bank or lending officer?’ The possible answer had five 
choices, from which they chose one; very likely, likely, undecided, unlikely and very 
unlikely. The majority (59%) indicated likely or very likely followed by unlikely or very 
unlikely (31%). Only 10% were undecided of the effect. A similar trend was observed 
regardless of whether one got a loan from a bank (See Figure 8.4) or a microfinance 
institution (MFI) (Figure 8.5). Businesses which borrowed from bank (26%) and MFI (27%) 
indicated that it is very likely to get a loan if one has social links with bank personnel. To get 
more insights about their choices respondents were asked to indicate the reasons for their 
choices which are presented in Figure 8.6. 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Social Connections Perception among Bank Borrowers 
 
Figure 8.5 Social Connections Perception among MFI Borrowers 
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Figure 8.6 Reasons for Perception Categories 
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The reasons cited by those holding a positive perception towards social connections playing a 
role in accessing credit were mainly that they can easily be tracked if loan defaults (25% for 
likely, 39% for very likely); and that the loan officers have more knowledge about the 
business (23% for likely, 28% for very likely). This corresponds to observations that social 
capital enhances flow of information among actors (Lin, 2001; Uzzi, 1999). Interestingly, the 
reason least cited by the group holding positive perceptions (1%), is ‘friendship has no effect 
in business’ while this is the second most cited reason for those who hold a negative 
perception (45% for very unlikely, 24% for unlikely). This implies that both camps agree that 
mere friendship has no effect on the transaction between a lender and a borrower, but a flow 
of information is occurring due to the social connection. Both groups also stated that banks 
and lending institutions follow their individual lending policies as a reason for holding either 
a positive or negative perception. This indicates knowledge that banks have to follow their 
own policies and procedures in lending, regardless of any other secondary issues affecting 
lending. While this preliminary analysis contributes some insights into opinions on how 
social capital affects access to credit, an empirical model can provide further evidence on the 
need to consider social capital as a determinant of access to credit for small and medium 
enterprises.  Table 8.1 describes a list of all variables used in the empirical analysis. Table 8.2 
shows the same variables, grouped by access to a bank account. 
 
With reference to Table 8.1, on average the majority of SME heads had gone up to primary 
(46%) and secondary (47%) with only 6% having done some post-secondary or vocational 
education. The average age of SME heads in the sample is 37 years, with a range of 18 – 89 
years implying that the SMEs are mostly controlled by middle-aged individuals. The average 
age of businesses, interpreted as experience, is 11 years, with a standard deviation of 8 years, 
and a range of 3 – 51 years. This indicates that most of the SMEs are relatively young. 
Females constitute 37% of the sample. Although 63% of the SMEs indicated that they had 
access to a bank account, only 42% have obtained a loan, of which 31% obtained it from a 
formal
30
 institution. 
  
Table 8.2 indicates results for a two tailed test on sub sample means of SMEs with a bank 
account and those without a bank account. Conditional upon obtaining credit, out of 331 
SMEs who had a bank account, a higher number of SMEs had access to credit (43%), 
                                                 
30
 Included commercial banks and microfinance institutions (MFI) 
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regardless of the source, compared with 40%, out of 197 SMEs who did not have an account, 
and there is no significant difference between the two. However, using a two tailed test at 
1%, there is a statistically significant difference between SMEs who accessed credit from a 
formal institution (37%) and those who did not (22%). This observation implies that having a 
bank account is required for those who have loans from formal institution because it makes it 
easier for the lender to track repayments.  On average, a larger proportion of SMEs with a 
bank account (89%) have trust in the banking system compared with 79% of those without a 
bank account. Having the trust in banking system enhances use of the products offered 
especially savings and credit products, because trust is one of the fundamental issues in 
banking. If the public does not have trust in the banks they will be discouraged from saving 
their money with bank, and hence the intermediation role of banks would collapse. 
Implications of problems of discouragement to accessing financial services are more 
important than the credit rationing problem (Levenson and Willard, 2000), and hence 
deserves due attention. 
 
The observed high levels of trust in the sample imply that the low usage of bank accounts is 
caused by factors other than trust. Studies in developing countries have suggested that lack of 
enough income to open and maintain bank accounts, physical location of banks and not 
meeting requirements are among the reasons for low uptake of formal financial services in 
developing countries (Beck et al., 2007; 2008a).  
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Table 8.1 Description and Summary Statistics of Main Variables 
 
Variable Description  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
creditaccess 1 if SME  borrowed , 0 otherwise  528 0.42 0.49 0 1 
creditformal 1 if SME borrowed from formal sources, 0 otherwise  528 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Bank account 1 if SME owner has a bank account, 0 otherwise  528 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Gender 1 if SME head is female, 0 otherwise  684 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Married 1 if SME head married, 0 otherwise  684 0.85 0.36 0 1 
Age Age of SME head in 2014  528 37.05 9.86 18 89 
Age2 Age squared divided by 100  528 14.70 8.85 3.24 79.21 
Business age Age of SME in 2014, since start up  526 11.22 7.57 3 51 
Business age2 Age of SME squared divided by 100  526 1.83 2.67 0.09 26.01 
Revenue natural log of monthly average  revenue for last six months  524 12.01 1.17 9.21 16.30 
Primary SME head education 1 if up to primary school, 0 otherwise  528 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Secondary SME head education 1 if up to secondary school, 0 otherwise  528 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Postsecondary SME head education 1 if up to post-secondary or vocational, 0 otherwise  528 0.05 0.22 0 1 
City 1 if SME operates in Lilongwe, 0 if Blantyre  684 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Trade 1 if SME operates in trade sector, 0 otherwise  528 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Manufacturing 1 if SME operates in manufacturing sector, 0 otherwise  528 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Micro 1 if SME is micro, 0 otherwise  528 0.96 0.20 0 1 
Invest 1 if SME agrees that businesses offer investment opportunity to lenders, 0 otherwise  684 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Gift 1 if SME agrees that businesses  give informal gifts to lenders, 0 otherwise  684 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Trust 1 if SME trusts banks, 0 otherwise  684 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Network member 1 if SME is member to a network, 0 otherwise  684 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Activity involvement 1 if SME involved in activities to interact with lenders, 0 otherwise  684 0.17 0.37 0 1 
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Table 8.2 Main Variables Statistics by Bank Account 
 
SMEs without a bank account SMEs with a bank account 
Variable N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev Mean difference
+ 
Creditaccess 197 0.40 0.49 331 0.43 0.50 -0.56 
Creditformal 197 0.22 0.41 331 0.37 0.48 -3.79*** 
Gender 197 0.74 0.44 331 0.63 0.48 2.74*** 
Married 197 0.84 0.37 331 0.85 0.35 -0.53 
Age 197 37.55 11.14 331 36.76 9.01 0.84 
Age2 197 15.34 10.06 331 14.32 8.03 1.21 
Business age 197 12.65 8.40 329 10.36 6.89 3.24*** 
Business age2 197 2.30 2.99 329 1.55 2.42 3.01*** 
Revenue 195 11.83 1.17 329 12.12 1.17 -2.69*** 
Primary 197 0.60 0.49 331 0.38 0.49 5.15*** 
Secondary 197 0.31 0.47 331 0.53 0.50 -4.90*** 
Postsecondary 197 0.03 0.17 331 0.06 0.24 -1.81* 
City 197 0.43 0.50 331 0.51 0.50 -1.94* 
Trade 197 0.73 0.45 331 0.69 0.46 0.98 
Micro 197 0.95 0.21 331 0.96 0.20 -0.18 
Invest 197 0.55 0.50 331 0.46 0.50 2.16** 
Gift 197 0.56 0.50 331 0.47 0.50 2.08** 
Trust 197 0.79 0.41 331 0.89 0.32 -2.88*** 
Network member 197 0.09 0.29 331 0.11 0.31 -0.65 
Activity involvement 197 0.15 0.36 331 0.19 0.39 -1.05 
Note: + is t statistic value for a two tailed t test 
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8.4.2 Model Estimations 
 
Although 63% of the sample had a bank account, only 10% and 17% respectively indicated 
that they were members of a network or were involved in activities that make them interact 
with formal lenders, respectively. Fifty eight percent of the sample however agreed that 
social connections have an effect on access to credit from formal lenders. To empirically test 
the hypothesis that social connections have an effect on access to credit, the three models are 
estimated which include a simple probit, Heckman selection and multinomial.  Simple probit 
model estimation results are presented in Table 8.3. Model 1 uses all the available 
observations and the results indicate that most of the estimated coefficients have the expected 
signs. Trade and business age has positive signs and are statistically significant at 1%. 
Business age2 has a negative sign indicating that the more experienced a business is, the less 
likely it would get credit. This could be because, regardless of how long a micro business has 
been in operation, if it does not grow, the likelihood that it is not a viable enterprise is high 
hence can be denied to access credit. This could also be because, as time passes, a business 
establishes ties with other stakeholders and hence the need for credit diminishes if the 
business can be assisted by them. Gender has a negative sign and is significant at 1%. This 
corresponds to Muravyev et al.’s (2009), conclusion that compared to male-managed, female-
managed firms are less likely to obtain a bank loan.  Education has negative sign for all three 
variables and postsecondary is significant at 10%.  Social capital variables; network member, 
gift, invest, trust and activity involvement all have a positive sign. The variables gift and 
invest estimate evidence of previous experiences, while trust portrays confidence the 
businesses have to engage with the bank. The lack of statistical significance of these could be 
because they do not give a direct measure of social capital, but rather indicate the possibility 
of the effect.  
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Table 8.3 Credit Access Probit Coefficients  
 
Variables (1) 
Credit access 
(2) 
Credit access 
Bank Account sub sample 
(3) 
Credit access 
Trust sub sample 
Gender -0.35*** -0.29* -0.42*** 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) 
Age -0.02 -0.09* -0.08** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Age2 0.02 0.10* 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Business age 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Postsecondary -0.87** -1.41** -1.15** 
 (0.43) (0.61) (0.52) 
City -0.09 -0.36** -0.15 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) 
Trade 0.33** 0.10 0.27* 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) 
Trust 0.18 0.44* 0.00 
 (0.16) (0.24) (0.00) 
Network member 0.57*** 0.79*** 0.54** 
 (0.20) (0.25) (0.21) 
Activity involvement 0.22 0.34* 0.30* 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.17) 
Model evaluation     
Number of observations 522 327 442 
Log-likelihood value -323.65 -194.59 -270.77 
Likelihood ratio test , χ2(d.f.) 63.41(18)*** 57.83(18)*** 61.30(17)*** 
Pseudo R squared .09 .13 .10 
Hosmer and Lemershow Goodness of fit test, χ2(d.f.) 2.96(8) 13.60(8)* 9.00(8) 
Link test, χ2(d.f.) 63.96(2) 59.63(2) 63.52(2) 
Correctly predicted 66.48% 69.42% 64.93% 
Notes:  Coefficient standard errors are reported in brackets.  * refers to significance at 10%; ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Model 1 dependent variable takes value 1 if SME 
accessed credit, 0 otherwise; model 2 and 3 used same dependent variables as in 1, but regressed on a subsample conditional upon having a bank account, and conditional 
upon trusting banks respectively.  
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The Hosmer and Lemershow goodness of fit, likelihood ratio and link tests all indicate that 
the estimated models adequately fit the sample data (See Table 8.3). Having a bank account 
indicates an expression of interest to use savings and credit products offered by the lending 
institutions. This self-selection behaviour could have an effect on access to credit. Therefore 
following Blanchard et al. (2008) and Muravyev et al. (2009), alternative models are 
estimated using sub samples conditioned on having a bank account and having trust in the 
banking system. The results are presented in models 2 and 3 in Table 8.3. 
 
All signs in the alternative models remain the same as in the full model 1, except for invest 
variable. SMEs with bank accounts may be more optimistic about accessing formal credit 
compared with those who do not have an account because they are clients of a lending 
institution. SMEs that are better networked are more likely to easily access resources hence 
contributing to an overestimation of the importance of social connections.  Therefore as 
expected, the coefficients for social capital variables network member and activity 
involvement are slightly higher than the coefficients in the full sample model 1. Both 
variables are however statistically significant at 1%. Interestingly, trust is significant at 10%, 
in accessing credit but only conditional upon having an account. This suggests that public 
trust in banking institutions contributes to the use of bank accounts. 
 
Heckman selection 
 
To assess the possibility of a selection bias in the estimation, Heckman selection models are 
estimated. To ensure robustness of the results three models are estimated. Model 4 is 
estimated using a full sample while model 5 is condition upon holding a perception that it is 
likely that social connections have an effect on access to formal credit; model 6 is 
conditioned on acknowledging that it is easier to borrow from other sources than from a bank.  
The estimated parameters for all the three models are reported in Table 8.4
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Table 8.4 Credit Access Heckman Selection Coefficients 
 
Variable (4) 
Outcome model :Credit access 
 
 
Selection model: Having bank account 
(5) 
Outcome model :Credit access, likely 
sub sample 
 
Selection model: Having bank account  
(6) 
Outcome model: Credit access, borrow 
easily sub sample 
 
Selection model: Having bank account 
Gender -0.05 -0.41*** 0.18 -0.54*** 0.08 -1.04*** 
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.30) (0.31) 
Married -0.37* 0.19 -0.74*** 0.39* -1.32*** 0.23 
 (0.20) (0.17) (0.28) (0.23) (0.49) (0.34) 
Age -0.09** 0.06* -0.07 0.13** -0.11 0.14 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) 
Age2 0.10** -0.06 0.07 -0.16** 0.09 -0.17* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.08) (0.13) (0.10) 
Business age 0.07** -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Postsecondary -1.27** 0.42 -1.21* 0.28 -1.63 -0.47 
 (0.52) (0.40) (0.63) (0.56) (1.00) (0.81) 
City -0.36*** 0.15 -0.24 0.04 -0.32 -0.06 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.26) (0.23) 
Trade 0.10 -0.09 0.14 -0.13 0.61** -0.50* 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.28) (0.28) 
Network member 0.60** 0.05 0.71*** 0.02 0.58* 0.13 
 (0.25) (0.20) (0.26) (0.22) (0.34) (0.34) 
Revenue  0.16  0.21  0.36 
  (0.05)***  (0.06)***  (0.10)*** 
Trust  0.43  0.80  0.45 
  (0.15)***  (0.20)***  (0.29) 
_cons 1.83 -2.98 1.73 -5.16 3.24 -5.78 
 (0.98)* (1.03)*** (1.64) (1.66)*** (2.48) (2.26)** 
Model Evaluation        
Likelihood ratio test 
of independence of 
equations (ρ=0), 
χ2(d.f.) 
 3.43(1)*  7.76 (1)**  2.80 (1)* 
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Variable (4) 
Outcome model :Credit access 
 
 
Selection model: Having bank account 
(5) 
Outcome model :Credit access, likely 
sub sample 
 
Selection model: Having bank account  
(6) 
Outcome model: Credit access, borrow 
easily sub sample 
 
Selection model: Having bank account 
Log-likelihood value    -504.27  -295.11  -138.92 
Likelihood ratio test 
χ2(d.f.) 
 54.67(16)***  38.31(16)***  39.60(16)*** 
Number of 
observations 
 522  316  165 
Notes: Coefficient standard errors are reported in brackets.  * refers to significance at 10%; ** at 5% and *** at 1%. Model 4 uses the whole sample; Model 5 uses a sub 
sample conditioned on acknowledging that it is likely that social connections affect access to credit; Model 6 uses a sub sample condition on indicating that it is easier to 
borrow from other sources than a bank. 
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The bivariate versions of the simple probit models 1, 2 and 3 are estimated using a Heckman 
selection approach. The model estimates credit access and having a bank account jointly 
while assuming the joint normality of their error terms and non-zero correlation (ρ) 
(Cavaluzzo et al., 2002). If the correlation coefficient is zero (ρ=0), results from the 
univariate model would be considered unbiased and consistent (Woodridge, 2002). All the 
three models (Table 8.4) have a significant correlation coefficient at 10%. However, similar 
to Ruziev and Midmore (2015); Muravyev et al. (2009) and Cavaluzzo et al. (2002), the 
results from the bivariate model do not fundamentally differ from the univariate model. Such 
similarities of estimates do not however suggest absence of a selection problem because this 
may also be caused by other statistical factors (Woodridge, 2006: p.609). 
 
Notably, in the results from a simple probit model in Table 8.3, the education variable has a 
negative sign and it is significant. The Heckman selection model results (Table 8.4) also 
found a negative sign for the education variable in the outcome model, but a positive sign in 
the selection model. This is probably because the sample population was drawn from 
businesses that were not registered (informal) yet (See appendix B1). Most of these informal 
businesses are managed by business owners with low education levels. Over 80% had just 
gone up to secondary school level. Education was significant but only for post-secondary 
level just as it was found in Chapter 7 (Table 7.2), where post-secondary school education 
was significantly affecting access. The sample population, in chapter 7 had an average 
education of a post-secondary school. In addition, In Malawi, commercial banks rarely 
extend business loans to unregistered businesses. 
 
Gender, Revenue and trust significantly affect having a bank account but not access to credit. 
This could be because these obstacles are interrelated; therefore if the interactions are not 
picked the effect on the main variables could be biased. This conforms to observations made 
by Ayyagari et al. (2006) that if inter-related obstacles in finance affecting firm growth are 
not chosen, access to finance seems to always be the most important constraint to firm 
growth. In agreement with Uzzi and Lancaster (2003), and Ruziev and Midmore (2015), 
social capital proxied by network member significantly affects access to credit in both the 
univariate and bivariate models. These results further suggest that entrepreneurs are more 
willing to have a bank account with a formal institution if they have trust in the banking 
system. The higher the revenue the more likely the business would be to have a bank account 
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because, as the business grows, the higher the need for external financing from formal 
institutions. Being married has a negative and significant influence on access to credit. This 
could be explained because, culturally, women have limited control over resources and 
limited decision making power in the households including over family business resources 
(Wanyeki, 2003).  
 
Marginal effects of the probit and Heckman models were computed to understand the 
magnitude of the effect of the independent variables on access to credit. Table 8.5 presents 
the results. 
 
Table 8.5 Marginal Effects for Probit and Heckman Models 
 
*** refers to significance at 1%; ** at 5%, and * at 10% 
 
The marginal effect is a partial derivative of y with respect to xk .Marginal effects are an 
informative means for summarising how a change in a response variable is related to a 
change in an explanatory variable in a model. Table 8.5 indicates the marginal effects results 
for the simple probit and Heckman probit models. In both probit and Heckman selection 
models, low education levels reduce the probability of accessing formal credit by 28 % and 
46% respectively. Probability of accessing formal credit increases by 20%, if one is a 
member of a business networking grouping. The probability increases by 2% and 3% with a 
unit increase in number of years the business is operating. In the Heckman model, younger 
entrepreneurs have a reduced probability of obtaining credit by 4%. 
Probit model Heckman model 
Variable   Effect  Variable  Effect 
Gender -0.14*** Married -0.13** 
  (0.05)   (0.07) 
Business age 0.02*** Business age 0.03*** 
  (0.01)   (0.01) 
Education -0.28*** Education -0.46*** 
  (0.10)   (0.14) 
Trade 0.13** City -0.13*** 
  (0.05)   (0.05) 
Network member 0.22*** Network member 0.20*** 
  (0.07)   (0.08) 
    Age -0.04*** 
      (0.01) 
    Age2 0.04** 
      (0.02) 
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Multinomial Logit 
 
Using the whole sample, a multinomial logit model was estimated to assess the determinants 
of access to different sources of credit. The diagnostic checks for the model revealed a good 
fit (see Table 8.6). The independence of irrelevant attributes (IIA) tests produced conflicting 
results hence they were disregarded. Long and Freese (2006: p.243) indicated that IIA tests 
sometimes show conflicting results hence not very useful for assessing violation of IIA 
assumptions. The Wald test to combine alternative choices was rejected at 1% level of 
significance. The odds of obtaining formal credit compared to no credit and the odds of 
obtaining informal credit as opposed to no credit are therefore obtained. The estimated odds 
are reported in Table 8.6. 
 
Results obtained are similar to results obtained using simple probit model. Holding all other 
factors constant, the odds of obtaining formal credit relative to no credit for female 
entrepreneur’s decreases by 0.88 units. On the contrary, the odds of getting informal credit 
increases, relative to no credit, for females. This could be because businesses need external 
finances to grow and therefore, because female businesses face greater hindrances to obtain 
formal credit than males, the next feasible option is informal finance. A one unit increase in 
the number of years the business has been operating increases the odds of accessing both 
formal credit and informal credit, relative to no credit. The odds of getting formal and 
informal credit decrease for entrepreneurs with some education, but the effect is not 
significant. The odds of getting credit from both formal and inform credit increases for 
entrepreneurs with social connections although gift, invest, trust and activity involvement are 
not significant. The odds of accessing formal credit for entrepreneurs, who trust the banking 
system increases, while the odds of access to informal credit, relative to no credit, decreases. 
However, the trust variable is not significant. Being a member of a network significantly 
affects access to formal credit, relative to no credit. Interestingly network membership does 
not affect access to informal credit. This could be because entrepreneurs who fulfil the 
requirements to access credit from formal institutions might not access credit from informal 
sources. Informal interrelationships in networks that enhance access to formal credit would 
be different from networks which can obtain help with accessing informal credit. The odds of 
accessing formal credit, when an entrepreneur is a member of a network, which supports their 
business, increases by 1.03 units. 
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Table 8.6 Multinomial Logit Coefficients  
 
Variable Formal Informal 
Gender -0.88*** 0.16 
 (0.26) (0.39) 
Business age 0.09** 0.15** 
 (0.04) (0.07) 
Business age2 -0.09 -0.23 
 (0.12) (0.19) 
Secondary -0.02 -1.37* 
 (0.60) (0.71) 
Trade 0.72*** 0.30 
 (0.27) (0.38) 
Network member 1.03*** 0.72 
 (0.37) (0.54) 
_cons -3.31* -3.68 
 (1.95) (2.79) 
Model evaluation tests  
Log likelihood value -386.80 
LR test χ2 , d.f 98.31 (36)*** 
Pseudo R
2 
 0.11 
Note: Coefficient standard errors reported in brackets.  * refers to significance at 10%; ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
The dependent variable is 1 if formal; 2 if informal; 3 if no credit. No credit is the reference outcome. 
 
8.5 Chapter Synthesis 
 
The issue of lack of and unequal access to formal finance due to a number of firm 
characteristics has been discussed widely in the literature. In developing countries, 
particularly, this problem is complicated further due to extent of information asymmetry 
problems. To provide evidence for social capital as an additional factor, three models are 
estimated and they provide similar results relating to the effect of various firm characteristics 
on access to formal credit. Although results for network membership and other social capital 
proxy measures were also similar across the models, multinomial logit estimates provide the 
most robust results because they account for all individuals who have or have not accessed 
credit. The chapter concludes that social capital has an effect on access to formal credit for 
small and medium enterprises, and hence a key determinant in access to formal credit. These 
results are in line with Ruziev and Midmore (2015) who, despite using different proxy 
measures, found a significant effect of social capital on access to formal finance. The analysis 
also revealed that trust in the banking system and revenue affects the probability of operating 
a bank account. Various studies have revealed that distance to banks affects access to 
financial services. Distance was not an issue in this study because all respondents were drawn 
from within city centres where banking facilities are readily available. 
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These findings show that social capital is a determinant of access to formal credit for small 
and medium enterprises in developing countries. The suggestion is that policy makers 
concerned with promoting entrepreneurship should not only be concerned about enhancing 
the wider macroeconomic environment. They should also consider ways of strengthening and 
mobilising social attributes within the environment, to enhance access to formal credit. 
Deliberate efforts need to be employed to attract as many entrepreneurs as possible to use 
formal financial services because access to formal finance is associated with faster enterprise 
growth (Ayyagari et al., 2010). This chapter proposes improvements in a range of 
communication methods including social media to remove the myth that formal financial 
services are for enterprises that have high revenues. Additionally, use of interpersonal 
networks can be enhanced through ensuring an environment for vibrant networks, which can 
serve as links to financial institutions, as a first step in accessing formal credit. These 
linkages will enable entrepreneurs and the wider public to have better knowledge about 
services offered by the formal financial service providers. 
 
Although the results provide evidence of the effect of social capital on credit access, further 
research on two key questions would complement such evidence for policy making. Since 
there are various types of networks, it would be interesting to know which specific networks 
are important and how the identified networks enhance access to formal credit, before 
recommending strategies of enhancing use of social capital in formal credit access. The 
discussion so far has concentrated on providing evidence of the role of social capital in 
determining access to formal credit for SMEs. However, regardless of ease of access to 
formal credit, formal lenders would not offer credit if they do not have a sustainable source of 
funds for lending. Chapter 9 discusses the supply side of formal credit by exploring whether 
domestic savings mobilisation by depository institutions might affect credit to the private 
sector.  
  
134 
 
CHAPTER 9 DOMESTIC SAVINGS MOBILISATION AND PRIVATE SECTOR 
CREDIT: A COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS FOR MALAWI   
 
While increased aid commitments to developing countries should be commended, it is still 
necessary to stress the importance of mobilising domestic resources to increase supply of 
private credit, as an engine for sustainable development. Chapter 3 revealed the gap in 
literature on use of domestic savings mobilization to improve credit flow to SMEs in 
developing countries. In this chapter we show that in a low income country, savings 
mobilized domestically by commercial banks do not have a significant effect on credit 
extended to the private sector. However, mobilised savings significantly affect credit, 
supplied by the financial sector, to all other productive sectors of the economy. This chapter 
also uses econometric methodologies to compare causality results for three indicators of 
financial intermediation, using time series data for Malawi. The finding broadens our 
knowledge on the efficiency of commercial banks in allocating credit to small and medium 
enterprises, as a contribution to sustainable economic growth in a low income country.  
 
9.1 Finance for Development 
 
Many developing countries depend on external financial flows to support their development 
initiatives. Countries are therefore inclined to borrow more from overseas due to an 
increasing gap between national savings and domestic investment (Tiruneh, 2004), which 
results in a vicious circle of indebtedness. Countries borrow more to finance the deficits. 
However the deficits also keep increasing because of weak efforts to intensify domestic 
savings mobilisation. In corresponding with this view,  Boone (1996) and Djankov et al. 
(2006) showed that there was a negative relationship between aid and investment because  aid 
encourages rent-seeking behaviours, and makes it possible for policy makers to avoid 
necessary but painful reforms (Gyimah-Brempong & Racine, 2010). Therefore, relying 
mainly on aid flows, as a source of development finance, may result in non-attainment of 
development goals. Additionally,  the 2007 global financial crisis reduced external flows into 
African economies, which made it more difficult,  and expensive to attract private capital 
than before (Aryeetey, 2009). For example, it was estimated that the weighted average 
growth in sub Saharan Africa dropped from 6.5% between 2002 and 2007, the highest that it 
had been in more than 30 years, to only 1 per cent in 2009. This was after almost a decade of 
strong performance (Aryeetey and Ackah, 2011). Therefore, developing countries need to 
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increase efforts of mobilising domestic funds to finance their development needs. This also 
corresponds with the Monterrey Consensus, (2002), and hence financial institutions are 
expected to play an important role to support such efforts in the development process. 
 
Private savings mobilisation is of crucial importance for achieving sustainable development 
and poverty-reducing growth (Mavrotas and Kelly, 2001). However, this growth can only be 
achieved if the savings are effectively channelled to the private sector for investment. 
Although there is some progress in research and policy on the domestic resource mobilisation 
debate, there are still unresolved issues that need attention (Mavrotas, 2008). To contribute to 
the debate, this chapter uses the bounds test of cointegration, proposed by Pesaran et al. 
(2001), and the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) test for non-causality, to examine the short-term 
and long-term relationships between domestic credit flows to the private sector, and financial 
intermediation indicators for Malawi.  
 
9.1.1 Why Domestic Savings Mobilization? 
 
To achieve sustainable growth, the banking sector has to be efficient and effective to respond 
favourably to the needs of the productive sectors of the economy (Chirwa, 2001). Finance is 
one of the key sectors for modern economies’ economic growth (Beim and Calomiris, 2001: 
p.56). However, knowledge to inform policy formation, of the extent to which the financial 
system in developing countries effectively mobilizes domestic resources for private 
investments, is limited. Whether economic growth is achieved through better information 
flows, as a result of innovative technologies, or capital accumulation from increased 
investments, is of secondary importance to the sustainable source of funds that can facilitate 
such processes. 
 
Earlier work of Schumpeter (1911) and McKinnon and Shaw (1973) argued for financial 
liberalisation because state restrictions on the banking sector were inhibiting investment. In 
support of this proposition, a wide body of literature exists on the impact of financial sector 
reforms on efficiency of commercial banks in mobilising savings and economic growth. The 
literature covers both developing and developed economies (Claessens and Leaven, 2004; 
Mavrotas, 2005; Kelly and Mavrotas, 2008; Kasekende et al., 2009).  However, the empirical 
evidence on financial development (financial savings) and economic growth is not only 
136 
 
inconclusive in supporting or rejecting the proposed impacts, but it has also yielded 
conflicting results (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of similar empirical studies).  
 
In a study of a heterogeneous panel of 17 African countries, Kelly and Mavrotas (2008) used 
panel integration and cointegration tests to examine the impact of financial sector 
development on private savings. The relationship between financial sector development and 
private savings was inconclusive, although in most countries a positive relationship was 
observed. Using data on selected developing countries, Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2003) 
concluded that liberalisation failed to enhance savings mobilisation and financial deepening 
for Sub Saharan economies. Similarly, a study by Anoruo and Ahmad (2001) concluded that 
there was a long-run relationship between economic growth and the savings growth rate for 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia. Levine and Zervos (1998), 
Bandiera et al. (2000) and Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2003) concluded that financial reforms 
and development indicators can either have a negative impact or are not significant for 
financial savings in developing countries. Levine et al. (2000) found a significant impact of 
financial intermediation on economic growth and productivity. Using the Ghanaian economy 
as a case, Adenutsi (2002) concluded that the effect of financial liberalisation on economic 
performance was harmful, but a positive indirect effect existed through improved 
mobilisation of savings by commercial banks. 
 
9.2 Savings and Investment Nexus 
 
Financial sector reforms contribute to how the financial system operates in an economy. The 
financial system, which consists of markets and intermediaries, is essential for an economy. 
This is because it spurs economic growth through channeling of funds from savers to 
investors. Therefore, well-functioning financial markets and intermediaries are needed to 
improve economic efficiency, and are crucial for a healthy economy (Mishkin, 1997). 
 
9.2.1 Savings, Investments and Economic Growth 
  
In literature the existence of a positive relationship between savings and economic growth is 
explained through two hypotheses; (1) savings affect economic growth through investment 
according to Harrod (1939), Domar (1946), and Solow (1956) and given empirical support by 
Alguacil et al. (2004) and Singh (2010); (2) economic growth affects savings, a theory which 
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is empirically supported by Agrawal (2001), Anoruo and Ahmad (2001), and Narayan and 
Narayan (2006), among others. Regardless of which factor affects the other, conventionally 
savings are an essential component in promoting investment, and hence economic growth.  
In literature, the existence of an efficient financial system, as an important ingredient of 
economic growth, is taken into consideration by the recent growth models (Shah and Shah, 
2011). Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2003) noted that  financial liberalization policies promote 
economic growth by affecting savings and investments through the interest channel (the asset 
returns effect) and enhancement of  availability and allocation of credit (the credit channel). 
In agreement, Lungu (2007) concluded that the bank lending channel works for countries in 
the SADC region alongside the asset returns channel. 
 
9.2.2 Savings Mobilization and Developing Countries 
 
Savings are simply postponed consumption, in other words investment for rational decision 
makers who want to maximise utility. Savings, export earnings and tax revenues are all 
sources of finance for development, in addition to aid. However, while export earnings 
depend on quantity, quality of production and availability of markets outside the country, 
which cannot always be guaranteed. It is difficult for a number of developing countries to 
raise tax revenues due to the shallow economic base, and presence of a large informal sector 
(Ghura, 1998; Stotsky and Woldemariam, 1997). In the long run, domestic resource 
mobilization for Africa emerges as critical in building more resilient economies, 
implementation of their own development agendas, as well as fighting poverty (Africa 
Economic outlook, 2010). 
  
Domestic resource mobilization is the generation of domestic resources from public (taxation 
and other forms of public revenue) and private sectors (household and business savings) 
through financial sector intermediaries, and the subsequent allocation to productive 
investment (Culpeper, 2008). African countries need to make deliberate policy moves to 
mobilize additional domestic resources to offset the reduced flow of foreign resources, and to 
promote sustainable development (Aryeteey, 2009). Such strategies would also enhance 
accountability between governments and its citizens (Culpeper and Bushan, 2010). Rigorous 
efforts are being made to attract foreign resources in order to achieve planned development 
goals. Unfortunately these efforts can reduce initiatives to mobilize domestic resources, 
(Adam and O’Connell, 1999). On average over 30% of the budget in Malawi was supported 
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by donor aid until 2009, when donors withheld aid due to alleged poor governance. In 
2009/2010 the government was forced to implement a zero deficit budget. Donor aid resumed 
in 2011 following the unexpected death of the late former president Bingu wa Mutharika. 
Revelations of the ‘cash-gate’ scandal (See Chapter 4) resulted in donors withholding aid 
again. The Malawi Government has once again been forced to start implementing a zero-aid 
budget for the 2015/2016 financial year. In addition measures to increase domestic resource 
mobilisation through taxation have been strengthened. 
 
Domestic savings mobilisation is therefore a significant means of contributing to domestic 
resource mobilisation. Since commercial banks dominate the financial systems of developing 
countries, deposit mobilisation by banks stands out as another important contribution to 
domestic resource mobilisation efforts. Deposit mobilisation is the process where customers 
are encouraged to deposit cash with the bank, and attract new clients to open accounts with 
the bank (Elser et al., 1999). Commercial banks in developing countries are therefore critical 
for the performance of the financial system in enhancing development, through effective 
credit allocation. 
 
9.2.3 Financial System Functions 
 
Facilitation of the linkage between financial sector development and economic growth is 
understood through the five functions of the financial system categorized by Levine (1997). 
All the five functions are directly or indirectly related to resource allocation. These are: (1) 
allocating resources: when financial intermediation is effective firms compete for savings 
which not only benefits savers but also causes capital to be channelled to investment 
opportunities offering greatest returns (Beim and Calorimis, 2001: p.44); (2) mobilizing 
savings – financial systems induce mobilization of savings through pooling together 
individual household savings for on lending (Ang, 2008); (3) reducing risks – Since there is a 
large number of borrowers, financial intermediaries are able to offer services to suit varying 
liquidity preferences (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983); (4) facilitating exchange of goods and 
services; and (5) exercising corporate control.  All financial institutions perform some of 
these functions, but only commercial banks perform all of them, and hence are responsible 
for the evolution of all the functions.  
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Measures of efficiency of the financial sector have mostly used banking system indicators as 
proxies for efficiency of the financial system for developing countries, because banks consist 
of the largest share of the financial sector in developing countries (Lungu, 2007). Banks serve 
as intermediaries accepting commercial and individual deposits (savings) and transform them 
into loans for investments (Kutan et al., 2010). This role enables the banks to offer capital at 
competitive rates, if they can efficiently mobilise deposits. 
 
9.2.4 Measuring Efficiency in Financial Systems 
 
The global financial system crisis of 2007 demonstrated how inefficiencies in the financial 
system can contribute to vulnerabilities over time. This emphasized the need for tracking 
efficiency indicators in financial systems, both at national and international levels. The 
financial sector generates the largest impact on economic growth by mobilizing savings and 
ensuring efficiency in resource allocation. The need to focus attention on how efficiently a 
system performs this function is therefore necessary. Currently, the research community is 
increasingly accepting Stiglitz’s (1993) suggestion that financial markets are the ‘brain’ of 
the entire economic system – if they work, economic performance will be enhanced, but if 
they fail, the performance of the entire economic system may be hampered. However, 
although  many analysts accept the importance of this ‘brain’, they do not fully understand 
how it works (Tennant et al., 2011). 
 
To evaluate the financial system’s functions four separate criteria can be used, which are 
information arbitrage, fundamental valuation, full insurance and functional efficiency (Tobin, 
1984). Information arbitrage measures the extent to which it is possible to gain from trading 
on the basis of available information.  Fundamental valuation focuses on the extent to which 
asset market values accurately reflect the present value of future payments associated with 
investing in them. Full insurance measures the degree to which the financial system offers 
ways of hedging against future risks (Fry, 1995:  p.296). Functional efficiency, which is the 
focus of this research, makes an assessment of risk pooling, resource mobilization, general 
insurance, administering the payment mechanism and mobilizing savings for investment. 
Bloor and Hunt (2011) described measurement of efficiency through analysing whether the 
financial system is helping to allocate resources to their best use (allocative efficiency); doing 
so in a cost-effective manner (technical efficiency); and whether it responds to both changing 
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demand and uncertainty over time through the development of new financial processes, 
services and products (dynamic efficiency).  
  
The allocative efficiency approach will be relevant for the case study country because it is 
dominated by banks with small and underdeveloped bond and equity markets. A number of 
studies of financial system efficiency have used the institutional or sectorial lens approach, 
where performance of institutions is compared within the country or with other countries 
(Bloor and Hunt, 2011). This chapter uses a functional approach analysis because functions 
are less dynamic over time and across borders as opposed to institutions which are also 
structured according to functions (Merton, 1995) 
  
9.3 Empirical Studies on Savings in Malawi 
  
Empirical studies on financial sector reforms, savings mobilization and economic growth in 
Malawi have been limited despite the sector’s importance to development. This kind of 
investigation has mostly been conducted in South Asian and Latin American countries, 
leaving some of the poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with little or no attention 
(Odhiambo, 2009). Chipeta and Mkandawire (1991, 1992) looked at the role of the informal 
sector and the linkages that exists between the formal and informal sector in Malawi. Their 
results may not portray the current status quo because, following these studies, a number of 
initiatives affecting the financial sector have subsequently taken place since 1992 (see 
Chapter 4). Other well-documented studies undertaken concentrated on the effects of 
liberalization on savings; profitability of the banking industry; monetary policy; and other 
industries and firms (Chirwa, 2001; Chirwa & Mlachila, 2004; Kabango & Paloni, 2011; 
Ngalawa, 2010). The most recent study (Bittencourt, 2012) investigated effects of financial 
reforms on consumption behaviour in Malawi, and concluded that these are a result of both 
liquidity constraints and myopia. The increase in consumption in Malawi can be explained 
along by factors other than financial liberalization. In most of these studies the expectation 
was that reforms would affect mobilization of savings and investment through their effect on 
availability and allocation of credit. On the contrary, they demonstrated that savings and 
private credit declined, while aggregate household consumption increased during the 
liberalisation period in the 1980’s and 1990’s in Malawi (Bittencourt, 2012). This chapter 
contributes to this body of literature for Malawi by analysing causality relationships between 
savings and credit to the private sector. 
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9.4 The Economic Model 
 
Financial reforms and liberalisation programmes are largely implemented in economies to 
enhance resource mobilisation and allocation, to improve productivity, ultimately leading to 
economic growth.  If such reforms are successful, credit availability and allocation should be 
achieved efficiently by the financial system. This is as a result of improved resource 
mobilisation due to higher public confidence in the banking system. Credit extended to the 
private sector contributes to capital accumulation through investments. The private sector 
credit ratio to GDP is the variable of interest which is chosen following Beck et al. (2000). 
This measure only captures credit issued to the private sector, and it is also an estimate of 
credit issued by intermediaries other than the central bank. 
 
To further capture credit issued to the private sector by commercial banks, private sector 
credit provided by banks as a percentage of GDP (DCPSB) was used, as an alternative 
measure of financial intermediation. The overall intermediation role was further captured 
using yet other financial intermediation indicators which are; deposit money bank assets as a 
percentage of GDP (DMBA), and domestic credit provided by the financial sector (DCPSF). 
However, DCPSF does not differentiate between credits to the private and public sectors of 
the economy. 
 
Indicators of financial size and depth include a ratio  of private sector credit to GDP, ratio of 
broad money to GDP (BM) and ratio of bank deposits (BD) to GDP (IMF, 2004). Bank 
deposits also indicate extent of savings mobilised by the deposit taking institutions. Banks are 
in the business of lending money, which is sourced from both the public and private sectors. 
In Malawi, bank deposits are so far the largest source of funds for banks followed by debt and 
owners’ equity (Figure 9.1). Deposits contributed, on average, 70% of the total commercial 
bank funding between 2002 and 2012. Holding other factors constant, ultimate savers will 
increase their savings if they have confidence in the banking system, and when the services 
are made available to the savers. 
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Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi 
 
Figure 9.1 Sources of Bank Funding 
 
An increase in the supply of financial assets in an economy is referred to as financial 
deepening. This is also an indication of higher public confidence in the banking system 
(Adenutsi, 2002). Broad money (M2) as a ratio of GDP is used as a proxy for financial 
deepening. If the public is confident with the banking system they are more likely to use the 
products offered, which are mainly savings and lending products. Investment in Government 
securities is one of the various uses of funds sourced by banks (See Chapter 4.1) However, a 
common idea in policy discussions is that government borrowing may crowd out credit to 
private sector in developing countries. Credit extended to government and parastatals is 
therefore included as an endogenous variable. 
 
A high inflation rate is another factor which negatively affects savings mobilised by banks. 
This worsens the situation further, especially in low income countries, where the propensity 
to save is already low. If there are not enough savings mobilised by the banking sector, 
investment is negatively affected. Inflation is therefore a key factor that can affect savings 
mobilisation.  According to macroeconomic theory, if savings are mobilised efficiently, 
excess liquidity is reduced in the system resulting in lower inflation. The real inflation rate, 
RIR is therefore included in the model. 
 
The economic model is therefore fitted as: 
 
DCPSB= f (BM, BD, RIR, CGVT, GDP) …………………………………………… (9.1) 
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9.5 Methodology 
 
As noted, in Chapter 3 section 2.3, different types of data and proxy variables have been used 
in empirical studies on causality between finance and economic growth. Generally,  growth 
equations are mostly used in purely cross-country and panel analyses, while time series 
analyses usually adopt a vector auto-regressive (VAR) framework or a single equation error-
correction framework  (Ang, 2008). This chapter uses time series data, and hence a VAR 
approach is adopted. When setting up an econometric model for time series data, knowing the 
order of integration is required to aid in selecting the appropriate model to use. Different 
methodologies to determine interaction between two or more time series variables have been 
proposed in the econometric literature. The maximum likelihood based approach proposed by   
Johansen (1988), Johansen and Juselius (1990), and the Engle and Granger (1987) method 
are among the most widely used. However these methods have a drawback in that they 
require all variables being investigated to be integrated in the first order, I (1). In order to 
achieve this, practically, stationarity tests are involved which might introduce uncertainty into 
the analysis. Furthermore, Harris (1995) noted that they also have low power when dealing 
with small samples. This study therefore uses other popular approaches available in literature 
namely the bounds test to cointegration proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) and the Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995) test for non-causality. These tests are notably more efficient in small 
sample data sizes and are also appropriate for series where the order of integration is not 
known or may not be the same for all variables (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). Additionally, 
every variable in the fitted model is presupposed as endogenous with short run and Long run 
parameters simultaneously estimated. This approach has hence been widely used in several 
empirical studies that have applied the bounds approach to small sample sizes, for example 
Tang and Nair (2002), Narayan and Smyth (2003) and Enisan and Olufisayo (2009). These 
researchers all used the approach on small number of observations. The Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995) method is adopted to derive inferences regarding the direction of causality, because it 
does not require pre testing for cointegration properties. 
 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller test is conducted to confirm that none of the series in the 
model are integrated of orders higher than one. This is done because the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model breaks down in the presence of I(2) or higher series (Enders, 
1995). For the cointegration procedure, the Wald or F-statistic in a generalized Dickey-Fuller 
type regression is used to test the significance of lagged levels of the variables under 
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consideration in a conditional unrestricted equilibrium error correction model (ECM) 
(Pesaran et al., 2001) 
 
9.5.1 Data Sources 
 
Available annual time series data from 1981 to 2011 for the selected finance variables in 
equation 1 (Section 9.5) was used in the analysis. The data was sourced from the Reserve 
Bank of Malawi, World Development Indicators database as published by the World Bank, 
International Financial statistics (IFS), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Data on 
the following indicator variables was downloaded in May, 2014; bank deposits to GDP (%), 
deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%), domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP), broad money (% of GDP), real rate of inflation (%), domestic credit to private sector 
(% of GDP), credit to government and state owned enterprises (% of GDP) and GDP growth 
rate (%). In cases where heteroskedasticity was detected in a model, some variables were 
transformed into natural logarithms to address the problem. 
 
9.5.2 Empirical Analysis 
 
An Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model was used in the analysis. This model 
contains both lagged values of the dependent variables, and the independent variables. The 
general form of the model, with p lags of y and q lags of x, is represented in equation (9.2) 
          
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑦𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝐵′𝑖 
𝑞
𝑖=0 𝑥𝑡−1  + 𝑣𝑡  ………………………………….. (9.2) 
 
Where 𝛼 is a constant, 𝑥𝑡 is a 5 dimensional column vector process, 𝐵′𝑖 and 𝐴𝑖  are row 
vectors and scalar coefficients to be estimated and 𝑣𝑡 is a scalar zero mean error term. The 
ARDL error correction model representation of the economic model (9.1) is as follows: 
 
𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛼1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=𝐼 ∆𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑡−1  + ∑ 𝛼2𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 ∆𝐵𝑀𝑡−1  + ∑ 𝛼3𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1  +
 ∑ 𝛼4𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 ∆𝐵𝐷𝑡−1  + ∑ 𝛼5𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 ∆𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼6𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=0 ∆𝐶𝐺𝑉𝑇𝑡−1  + 𝛽2𝐵𝑀𝑡−1  + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1  +
 𝛽4𝐵𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐺𝑉𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑆𝐵𝑡−1 +  𝜆𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝑣1𝑡 ………………. (9.3) 
 
Where ∆  is the first difference operator and 𝑣1𝑡 is the white noise disturbance term. DCPSB, 
the dependent variable, is percentage ratio of domestic credit extended to private sector by 
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banks to GDP. GDP is annual gross domestic product growth rate and bank deposit (BD) is a 
measure of intermediation representing bank deposits as a ratio of GDP
31
. Two measures of 
financial reform are used, following Baliamoune and Chowdhury (2003), which are broad 
money (BM), a measure of volume of intermediation or financial depth, and it is calculated as 
the ratio of broad money to GDP, and real inflation rate (RIR), as a measure of financial 
liberalisation. Credit to Government and state owned an enterprise (CGVT) is a measure of 
credit extended to government. It is calculated as a percentage to GDP. 𝐸𝐶𝑡−1, is the error 
correction term,  𝛽 represents the long run relationship, and α measures the short run 
relationship among the variables. The speed of adjustment of the parameters is measured by 
𝜆. In order to assess the sensitivity of results to changes in proxy indicators, three models 
were estimated, with credit to private sector, credit provided by the financial sector and 
deposit money bank assets as dependent variables, respectively. 
 
In the first stage of the analysis, a null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested using the F 
statistic, which is expressed as:  
H0: β1 = β2 = ……. Βn =0   
H1: β1 = β2 = ……. Βn ≠0 
 
In the second stage, lag length is selected using the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and 
then long run and short run coefficients are estimated using a vector error correction model 
(VECM). This is done following the ARDL testing and confirmation of presence of 
cointegration. In the VECM each variable in the model has one error correction equation. 
 
9.6 Analytical Outcomes 
9.6.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
An association among the chosen variables was investigated, using a correlation matrix, 
before fitting a model. Table 9.1 displays the correlation coefficients among the endogenous 
variables. The results indicate a high positive correlation among the financial sector 
development proxy indicators private sector credit by banks, private sector credit, deposit 
money bank assets and private sector credit by financial sector. A high positive association 
                                                 
31
 Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks as a share of GDP, calculated using the following 
deflation method: {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is demand and time and saving deposits, 
P_e is end-of period CPI, and P_a is average annual CPI.( IFS & IMF) 
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between credit to private sector by banks (DCPSB), bank deposits (BD) and financial 
deepening (BM) is also observed. A negative week association is noted between inflation rate 
(RIR), GDP growth (GDP) and DCPSB. 
  
Table 9.1 Correlation Matrix 
 
 DCPSB DMBA DCPS DCPSF BD BM RIR CGVT GDP 
DCPSB
32
 1.0000         
DMBA
33
 0.9432 1.0000        
DCPS
34
 0.9761 0.8882 1.0000       
DCFS
35
 0.8790 0.9453 0.8256 1.0000      
BD 0.8204 0.8468 0.7735 0.7833 1.0000     
BM 0.7682 0.7704 0.7274 0.7147 0.9472 1.0000    
RIR -0.0615 -0.1126 0.0140 -0.1011 -0.0879 -0.0740 1.0000   
CGVT 0.2347 0.4803 0.1462 0.4394 0.3837 0.4062 -0.0627 1.0000  
GDP -0.2938 -0.2114 -0.3472 -0.2840 -0.2609 -0.2382 -0.0365 0.2696 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Financial resources to the private sector provided by the deposit money banks 
33
 Claims on domestic real non-financial sector by deposit money. 
34
 Financial resources to the private sector provided by the financial corporations and deposit money banks 
35
 All credit from the financial sector  to various sectors except credit to central government 
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Figure 9.2 Endogenous Variables Series Trend 
 
A line plot for the variables of interest indicated that the series are trending hence potentially 
as I (1) processes (see Figure 9.2). However to confirm the visual diagnosis, properties of 
time series data need to be checked before estimation. Estimations done using non-stationary 
series lead to spurious regression results because the series do not return to a long run 
deterministic trend, and variance of the series is dependent on time (Glynn et al., 2007). Most 
macroeconomics and financial variables tend to be non-stationary hence non-stationarity was 
tested using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. Table 9.2 shows results of the ADF 
test. 
 
Table 9.2 ADF Test Results with Trend and Constant 
 
Variable Level 1
st
 Difference Order of integration 
PS
+
 credit by banks -0.143 -6.570 I(1) 
PS credit -0.668 -5.971 I(1) 
Claims on real sector 1.952 -3.896 I(1) 
PS credit by financial sector -0.477 -5.590 I(1) 
Bank deposits 1.728 -4.42 I(1) 
Broad money -0.022 -5.11 I(1) 
Inflation rate -5.247  I(0) 
Credit to Government -2.538 -5.269 I(1) 
Gross domestic product -7.549  I(0) 
Note: 5% critical value, -3.584; + private sector 
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The ADF test results in Table 9.2 indicate that all variables are I (1) except inflation rate and 
GDP growth, which are I (0) processes. Having confirmed that variables to be included are I 
(0) and I (1), an ARDL model was used to conduct a cointegration test. ARDL was chosen 
because it is capable of jointly handling I (0) and I (1) processes (see section 9.4 for more 
details).  
 
9.6.2 Cointegration and Granger Causality Analysis 
 
Although selection of the number of lags is not necessary when conducting ARDL, a lag of 3 
was selected following SBIC, AIC and HQIC criteria. Results of the ARDL (3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3) 
are presented in Table 9.3. The Wald statistic is used to examine the integration relationship. 
However, because this statistic does not have a standard distribution, critical values provided 
in Pesaran et al. (2001) are used for the test. If the computed F statistic is lower than the 
critical lower bound, the null hypothesis is not rejected and the conclusion is that there is no 
long run relationship between credits provided to the private sector and the independent 
variables, and vice versa where the F statistic is higher than the upper bound. The result is 
inconclusive if the obtained F statistic falls in between the lower and the upper bound. The F 
statistic is obtained when each variable is considered as a dependent variable. The results 
indicated presence of 2 cointegrating relationships in a model. This rank was chosen, using a 
trace statistic of 37.98, which was less than the critical value of 47.21. A bounds test was 
conducted to investigate the relationships further. The bounds test results are presented in 
Table 9.3. 
 
Table 9.3 Bounds Test Results 
 
Dependent variable AIC lags F statistic* Decision 
PS credit by banks 3 8.83 Cointegration 
Bank deposits 3 8.19 Cointegration 
Broad money 3 2.78 No cointegration 
Inflation rate 3 3.06 No cointegration 
Credit to government 3 2.79 No cointegration 
Gross domestic product 3 1.28 No cointegration 
* Lower bound critical value at 1% 4.32 and upper bound critical value at 1% 5.624 (Adapted from Pesaran et 
al., 2001)  
 
The results of the bounds test, in Table 9.3, indicate that there is a long run relationship 
among the variables in the model when private sector credit by banks and bank deposits are 
dependent variables. However, for inflation rate, broad money, GDP and credit to 
149 
 
government variables the null hypothesis of no cointegration fails to be rejected. This result 
confirms the earlier cointegrating rank test results, which indicated presence of two 
cointegrating relationships among the variables. Although, cointegration indicates presence 
of Granger causality (in one direction), the direction of causality among the variables is better 
detected through use of a vector error correction model (VECM) (Odhiambo, 2009). Table 
9.4 to Table 9.6 displays results for Granger causality for private sector credit by banks 
variable. 
 
Table 9.4 Long Run Autoregressive Distributed Lag Estimates 
 
Variable Coefficient  
(standard error) 
P value 
Bank deposits -0.42 (0.02) 0.0000*** 
Broad money 0.27 (0.03) 0.0000*** 
Gross domestic product -0.19 (0.1) 0.0000*** 
Credit to government 0.21 (0.02) 0.0000*** 
ECM(-1) -0.48 (0.13) 0.0000*** 
***Significance at 1% 
 
The fit for the ARDL underlying equation was good and significant overall at 1% level. The 
diagnostic tests of Durbin Watson, Breusch-Godfrey, Engle’s Lagrange Multiplier (ARCH) 
and Jarque-Bera indicated a good model fit (see Table 9.5). The negative coefficient of the 
error correction model in Table 9.4 indicates significant long run causality from the 
independent variables to private sector credit by banks. Bank deposits, broad money, credit to 
government and GDP growth rate have a significant effect on private sector credit by banks 
(DCPSB) in the long run. A negative relationship is observed for bank deposit and GDP. A 
possible explanation is that not all deposits mobilised by the bank are invested in private 
sector credit (see Chapter 4.1.) Credit to government and statutory bodies are positively 
related to DCPSB. Growth in gross domestic product is not only contributed by credit 
extended by banks, and hence the negative relationship. Grants, credit from other 
development institutions, and foreign direct investments are among other significant factors. 
This result supports the findings of Simwaka et al. (2012) who reported that for the Malawi 
economy, capacity utilisation rather than financial development has a significant impact on 
economic growth. 
  
In the short run only bank deposits in the second lag and broad money has a positive and 
significant effect on DCPSB (see Table 9.5). Pairwise Granger causality results for all the 
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variables are presented in Table 9.6. There is a one-way causality from DCPSB to GDP, 
supporting the hypothesis that financial development can cause economic growth through the 
credit channel. However, for the case of Malawi, the absence of causality running from bank 
deposits to DCPSB could indicate that banks invest most of the mobilised deposits in money 
markets and other high earning, less risky financial assets at the expense of credit to private 
sector. However a positive association observed in the short run could indicate that bank 
mobilised deposits are invested in short term credit to the private sector. This is in response to 
the unfavourable macroeconomic environment. High interest, high inflation rates and 
fluctuating value of currency, contributed to a net domestic credit to the government between 
2000 and 2004, which affected real investments in Malawi (Gondwe, 2005). The null 
hypothesis of no Granger causality from bank deposits to private sector credit by banks is not 
rejected.  
 
Table 9.5 Short Run Estimates for Private Sector Credit by Banks 
 
Variable Coefficient  P value 
BD(-2) 1.20 0.001*** 
BM (-1) 0.64 0.093* 
***significance at 1% *significance at 10% 
Adjusted R
2 
 = 0.77, F statistic = 8.83, p<0.01, standard error = 0.24 
Breusch-Pagan chi2 0.81, p>0.05 
LM test (Lag1)32.69, p= 0.62; (Lag2) 45.73, p=0.12 
Durbin Watson 2.51 
Jarque-Bera test χ2( 5.753) ,  p = 0.93 
 
Table 9.6 Granger Causality for Private Sector Credit by Banks 
 
Null hypothesis F Statistic P value 
Credit by bank does not Granger cause GDP 24.76 0.0000*** 
GDP does not Granger cause credit by bank 5.70 0.0577** 
Bank deposits does not Granger cause GDP 9.95 0.0001*** 
Broad money does not Granger cause Bank deposits 52.10 0.0000*** 
Broad money does not Granger cause GDP 15.58 0.0000*** 
Credit to government does not Granger cause broad money 8.44 0.0147** 
Credit by banks does not Granger cause credit to government 9.85 0.0073*** 
Credit to government does not Granger cause GDP 11.81 0.0027*** 
***significance at 1%, **significance at 5%, *significance at 10%  
 
  
9.6.3 Stability Tests 
 
The structural stability test for the model was tested by plotting cumulative sum of recursive 
residuals (CUSUM), and the CUSUM squares of residuals. CUSUM test detects any 
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systematic eventual movements where the coefficient values indicate a possible structural 
instability (Farhani, 2012). Random movements not emanating from structural change in 
coefficients is tested by employing the CUSUMSQ test. Figure 9.3 and Figure 9.4 present the 
results.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.3 CUSUM Stability Plot for Private Sector Credit by Banks 
 
C
U
S
U
M
Year
 CUSUM
1988 2011
0 0
----5% significance level 
152 
 
 
Figure 9.4 CUSUMSQ Stability Plot for Private Sector Credit by Banks 
 
On the basis of this model, the results indicate a possible break in parameter constancy 
around 1997, as indicated by the CUSUM plot which breaks below the lower bound (Figure 
9.3). However, the CUSUMSQ plot indicates stability (Figure 9.4). A structural break may be 
a change in a time series as a result of a unique economic event (Glynn et al., 2007). If 
present in a series, it can affect the unit root tests. Three tests were therefore employed to test 
for presence of exogenous, one endogenous and two endogenous structural breaks on the 
series. The Chow test tests the difference between results from a model run on two samples, 
one before and the other after an identified break date. However, results from Chow tests can 
be misleading if the break date is correlated with the data (Hansen, 2001). A Zivot-Andrews 
test was done to test for one endogenous break and the Clemente, Montanez and Reyes test 
was employed to test for endogenous structural breaks. The results for the three tests, on 
DCPSB and BD, compared with ADF test results, are presented in Table 9.7 and Figure 9.5. 
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Table 9.7 Unit Root tests with Structural Breaks 
 
Variable ADF Chow test 
(p=0.10) 
Zivot-Andrews Clemente, Montanez and 
Reyes 
    AO IO 
DCPSB Unit root No break  Unit root Unit root, no 
unit root 
Unit root 
BD Unit root Unit root Unit root Unit root, no 
unit root 
Unit root 
Break Dates 
DCPSB       - No break  2005 1992, 2007 1993, 2007 
BD       - 1986 2006 1992, 2007 1989, 1993 
 
 
 
Figure 9.5 Additive Outlier Test Plot 
 
The results indicate that the DCPSB and BD series exhibit an Additive Outlier (AO) model 
structural break in 1992 and 2007, with 2007 being significant. AO models assume changes 
taking place rapidly hence a break in slope only as opposed to Innovative Outlier(IO) model, 
which assumes a break in both intercept and slope (Perron and Vogelsand, 1992; Perron, 
1997). A visual inspection of the trend in Figure 9.2 indicates an increasing trend from 2007 
onwards for DCPSB, BD and BM. The visual trend is also backed by a series of events that 
took place around that time. Following a change on the political front in Malawi, in 2004, the 
economy took a positive turn as a result of good rains and a fertiliser subsidy programme. 
The Malawi economy grew by 8.5% in 2006 and 7.6% in 2007 compared with 2.2% in 2005 
(Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2010). In 2006, the external inflows from debt relief sources 
increased and cancellation of debt following attainment of HIPC completion point. The 
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positive outturn was also attributed to the lagged effects of a downward adjustment of interest 
rates during 2006 and the second half of 2007.  
 
The instability in the recursive residuals could be attributed to these effects. However 
although the constancy in parameters graph (Figure 9.3) indicates that the breaks could have 
started around 1996, this is not supported by any statistical tests. The figure also indicates a 
decline in all the endogenous variables, except GDP in 1994/95. A cointegration analysis that 
takes into account structural breaks would, therefore, be ideal to confirm the structural break 
effect on the series results. However, this is another full analysis, which was not covered in 
this chapter.  
 
9.6.4 Effect of Change of Proxy Variables 
 
Research on finance and development conducted for both developing and developed 
countries has employed a wide variety of proxy indicators to describe financial sector 
development (see Chapter 3.2.3 for a discussion). In order to explore the extent to which 
results differ when different proxies are used, equation (9.3) was re-estimated with the 
following dependent variables; deposit money bank assets (DMBA), referred to as model 2 
hereon; domestic credit to private sector (DCPS), referred to as model 3 hereon; and domestic 
credit provided by the financial sector (DCPSF), referred to as model 4 hereon. Similar steps 
as discussed in section 9.4.2 were followed in the analysis. Table 9.8 present the results. A 
natural log transformation of the dependent variables was used in the models. 
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Table 9.8 Bounds Test Results for Private Sector Credit, Deposit Assets and Credit by Financial Sector 
 
* Lower bound critical value at 1% 4.32 and upper bound critical value at 1% 5.624 (Adapted from Pesaran et al 2001) 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable F 
statistic* 
Decision Dependent variable F 
statistic* 
Decision Dependent variable F 
statistic* 
Decision 
Private sector credit 8.81 Cointegration Deposit money 
assets 
24.75 Cointegration  Credit by financial 
sector 
15.53 Cointegration 
Bank deposits 8.02 Cointegration Bank deposits 11.10 Cointegration Bank deposits 10.77 Cointegration 
Broad money 2.94 No 
cointegration 
Broad money 4.44 Inconclusive Broad money 3.57 Inconclusive 
Inflation rate 2.02 No 
cointegration 
Inflation rate 3.02 No 
cointegration 
Inflation rate 2.60 No 
cointegration 
Credit to 
government 
2.49 No 
cointegration 
Credit to 
government 
2.78 No 
cointegration 
Credit to government 1.63 No 
cointegration 
GDP 0.83 No 
cointegration 
GDP 1.50 No 
Cointegration 
GDP 1.37 No 
cointegration 
156 
 
All the four proxy indicators namely private sector credit by banks(DCPSB),  private sector 
credit (DCPS), deposit money bank assets (DMBA) and domestic credit by the financial 
sector (DCPSF), indicate similar results of cointegration. A null hypothesis of no 
cointegration is not rejected for bank deposits, but it failed to be rejected for the other 
endogenous variables in the model (Table 9.3).  
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Table 9.9 ARDL Cointegration Results for Three Financial Sector Proxy Variables. 
 
(2) 
PS Credit (DCPS) 
(3) 
Deposit Money Bank Assets (DMBA) 
(4) 
 PS Credit by Financial Sector (DCPSF) 
Variable Coefficient  p value Variable Coefficient  p value Variable Coefficient  p value 
Long Run 
Bank Deposits  -0.25(0.02) 0.000*** Bank Deposits  -0.23(0.01) 0.000*** Bank Deposits  -0.31(0.01) 0.000*** 
Broad Money 0.22(0.03) 0.000*** Broad Money 0.20(0.02) 0.000*** Broad Money 0.20(0.02) 0.000*** 
Inflation rate 0.05(0.01) 0.000*** Inflation rate -0.01(0.01) 0.031*** Inflation rate 0.02(0.004) 0.01*** 
Credit to Government - - Credit to Government 0.12(0.02) 0.000*** Credit to Government - - 
GDP 0.05(0.01) 0.000*** GDP -0.11(0.01) 0.000*** GDP 0.06(0.01) 0.000*** 
ECM(-1) -0.86(0.23) 0.000*** ECM(-1) -0.37(0.10) 0.000*** ECM(-1) -0.72(0.20) 0.000*** 
Short Run 
DCPS (-1) 0.93(0.30) 0.002*** DMBA (-1) 0.84(0.25) 0.001*** DCPSF (-1) 0.54(0.22) 0.014** 
Bank deposits (-2) 0.14(0.05) 0.009*** Bank deposits (-1) -0.09(0.04) 0.030** DCPSF (-2) -0.58(0.29) 0.046** 
Inflation rate(-1) 0.02(0.01) 0.029** Bank deposits (-2) 0.08(0.03) 0.002*** Bank deposits (-2) 0.16(0.05) 0.001*** 
   Broad money (-1) 0.05(0.02) 0.012** Broad money (-1) 0.11(0.04) 0.004*** 
   Inflation rate (-1) -0.01(0.003) 0.008*** Credit to Government 0.10(0.03) 0.009*** 
   Credit to Government 0.05(0.03) 0.047** GDP(-1) 0.06(0.01) 0.000*** 
      GDP(-2) 0.02(0.01) 0.006*** 
         
***significance at 1%, ** 5% 
Adjusted R
2 
 = 0.77, F statistic = 8.81, p<0.01, Standard 
error = 0.19 
Breusch-Pagan chi2 0.05, p>0.05 
LM test 40.28, p= 0.28 
Durbin Watson 2.63 
Jarque-Bera test χ2(4.195) ,  p = 0.97 
***significance at 1%, ** 5% 
Adjusted R
2
= 0.88, F statistic= 24.75, p<0.01, Standard 
error = 0.11 
Breusch-Pagan chi2 2.38, p>0.05 
LM test 40.09, p= 0.29 
Durbin Watson 2.18 
Jarque-Bera test χ2( 16.76) ,  p = 0.16 
***significance at 1%, ** 5% 
Adjusted R
2 
 = 0.86, F statistic = 15.53, p<0.01, standard 
error = 0.17 
Breusch-Pagan chi2 0.85, p>0.05 
LM test 43.03, p= 0.20 
Durbin Watson 2.29 
Jarque-Bera test χ2( 10.02) ,  p = 0.61 
 
158 
 
There is a significant long run relationship running from the independent variables to all three 
financial sector proxy variables (Table 9.9). The short run results indicate a positive and 
significant relationship for second lag of bank deposits in all the four models. A positive and 
significant relationship is also observed with credit to Government and statutory corporations 
in the DMBA and DCPSF models in the short run. In the long run bank deposits have a 
negative and significant relationship in all the four estimated models. This indicates less 
utilisation of bank deposits for domestic credit to the private sector in the long term. 
 
Pair-wise causality results indicate that for proxy variable, domestic credit to the private 
sector by banks (DCPSB), there is a bi-directional causality from finance to economic growth 
and vice versa (Table 9.10). However, the reverse causality from GDP is weak, with 
significance at 10% level. A one way causality running from GDP to finance is stablished 
when the proxy variable is domestic credit to private sector (DCPS), deposit bank money 
assets, and credit to private sector by financial sector (DCPSF) (see Table 9.6, Table 9.10, 
Table 9.11 and Table 9.12). Regardless of the proxy indicator used, uni-directional causality 
from economic growth to finance is observed at 1% level of significance. This result is 
similar to the results reported by Simwaka et al. (2012), who also found that causality runs 
from economic growth to finance for Malawi.  Uni-directional causality from bank deposits 
to all the financial sector proxy variables, except domestic credit to private sector by banks, 
was established. This is evidence that deposit mobilisation granger causes credit to the private 
sector. Uni-directional causality from broad money to bank deposits is established, regardless 
of the proxy variable used in the model. This indicates the intermediation role that banks play 
in channelling mobilised savings to the deficit sectors. Financial deepening, a major 
development issue, can therefore help enhance domestic savings mobilisation.  
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Table 9.10 Pairwise Causality for Credit to Private Sector 
 
Null hypothesis F Statistic P value 
DCPS does not Granger cause interest rate 11.80 0.0027*** 
Bank deposits does not Granger cause DCPS 16.01 0.0003*** 
Broad money does not Granger cause DCPS 7.51 0.0233** 
GDP does not Granger cause DCPS 20.85 0.0000*** 
GDP does not Granger cause credit to Government 7.93 0.0195** 
GDP does not Granger cause bank deposits 7.40 0.0248** 
GDP does not Granger cause inflation rate 12.41 0.0008*** 
Broad money does not Granger cause bank deposits 16.88 0.0002*** 
Bank deposits does not Granger cause broad money 9.02 0.0110** 
Broad money does not Granger cause inflation rate 18.34 0.0001*** 
***refers to significance at 1% and ** at 5%. 
 
Table 9.11 Pairwise Causality for Deposit Money Bank Asset 
 
Null hypothesis F Statistic P value 
DMBA does not granger cause GDP 14.89 0.0006*** 
DMBA does not granger cause inflation rate 15.11 0.0005*** 
DMBA does not granger cause credit to Government 16.35 0.0003*** 
Bank deposits does not Granger cause DMBA 11.84 0.0027*** 
Broad money does not Granger cause DMBA 13.82 0.0010*** 
GDP does not Granger cause inflation rate 6.98 0.0305** 
Bank deposits does not Granger cause inflation rate 9.39 0.0092*** 
Broad money does not Granger cause inflation rate 19.17 0.0001*** 
Credit to Government does not Granger cause inflation rate 10.93 0.0042*** 
Broad money does not Granger cause bank deposits 12.93 0.0016*** 
Credit to Government does not Granger cause GDP 8.81 0.0122*** 
*** refers to significance at 1%; ** significance at 5% 
 
Table 9.12 Pairwise Causality for Private Sector Credit by Financial Sector 
 
Null hypothesis F Statistic P value 
DCPSF does not Granger cause bank deposits 6.42 0.0404** 
Bank deposits does not Granger cause DCPSF 11.78 0.0028*** 
Broad money  does not Granger cause DCPSF 17.66 0.0000*** 
GDP does not Granger cause DCPSF 15.66 0.0004*** 
Credit to Government does not Granger cause DCPSF 8.48 0.0144** 
Broad money does not Granger cause Bank deposit 21.16 0.0000*** 
Bank deposit does not Granger cause broad money 9.97 0.0068*** 
GDP does not Granger cause broad money 6.39 0.0409** 
GDP does not Granger cause inflation rate 8.24 0.0162** 
Broad money does not Granger cause inflation rate 18.38 0.0004*** 
*** refers to significance at 1%; ** at 5% 
 
Using domestic credit to private sector by the financial sector (DCPSF), domestic credit to 
private sector by banks (DCPSB), and deposit money bank assets (DMBA) as a proxy 
measure, a uni-directional Granger causality for credit to Government and parastatals is 
observed. The direction of causality runs from credit to Government for DCPSF, while the 
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opposite is true for DCPSB and DMBA. Contrary to informal beliefs, this gives evidence that 
it is not only banks who invest in Government securities. Although banks invest mobilised 
funds in Government securities, they also invest significantly in private sector credit. This is 
evidenced by the absence of Granger causality between bank deposits and credit to 
government. However, Granger causality is established for bank deposits in all the four 
models. 
 
Most but not all granger causality relationships observed in models 1, 2 and 3 are also 
observed in model 4 (Table 9.12). For example, in the long run GDP has an effect on the four 
dependent variables. However, for DMBA and DCPSB the relationship is negative because 
banks do not only invest by extending domestic credit. In the short run, there is no 
relationship established for GDP, except for DCPSF which indicates a positive and 
significant relationship at 1% level of significance. This suggests a need to make conclusions 
on finance and growth causality analysis considering what the proxy actually measures. The 
dependent variable in model 4 captures all credit provided by the financial sector to various 
sectors except the government.  
 
Stability tests for models 2, 3 and 4 are presented in Figure 9.6. Visual inspection of CUSUM 
plots for model 2 indicated some instability. However the Chow test, Zivot-Andrews and 
Clemente-Meyer was not significant. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots for models 3 and 4 
indicate stability in parameters.  
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Figure 9.6 Stability Plots for Private Sector Credit, Deposit Assets and Credit by 
Financial Sector 
 
9.7 Chapter Synthesis  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide empirical evidence on the domestic resource 
mobilisation role of commercial banks, in a developing country. The evidence is established 
through analysing the effect of bank intermediation and financial sector indicators on 
domestic credit to the private sector, provided by the banks and other financial institutions. 
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The discussion on domestic resource mobilisation and the empirical results from this study 
indicate that there are important effects in both the short run and in the long run. In the long 
run, there is a negative and significant relationship between bank deposits and credit to the 
private sector. This indicates that mobilised deposits are not significantly invested in long 
term credit to the domestic private sector. In the short run, a positive influence of bank 
deposits on credit to the private sector is established, regardless of proxy variable used. 
 
A granger causality of domestic credit to private sector by banks to GDP provides evidence 
for the credit channel. In a recent study using Malawi data, Simwaka et al. (2012) concluded 
that there was causality running from GDP to finance while Ahmed (2010) concluded that a 
unidirectional Granger causality existed, from financial development to economic growth. 
This study has concluded that the causality is bi-directional when various indicators are 
considered. However, the granger causality from economic growth to finance is stronger than 
the reverse causality. Empirical results on the impact of financial development on economic 
growth tend to vary with the measures of financial development used and the type of data 
(panel or annual) used for regression estimation (Allen and Ndikumana, 2000; Kelly and 
Mavrotas, 2008). This Chapter established that by using different measures of financial 
development conclusions made on causality of the endogenous variables were, to some 
extent, different. For example using DCPSB, a bi-directional causality from financial sector 
development to economic growth, and vice versa is observed. Using DCPS, DMBA and 
DCPSF, a uni-directional causality from economic growth to finance is established. However, 
conclusions on some variables, for example bank deposits and broad money, remained the 
same regardless of the change in the proxy variable. Policy recommendations need to be 
based on conclusions made from analysing a number of proxy indicators.  
 
Stability checks revealed the presence of structural breaks in the domestic credit to private 
sector by banks series, which was also confirmed by employing formal statistical tests. 
However, the break dates did not coincide with the break dates indicated by the stability 
check tests. Employing estimation methodologies that take into account structural breaks for 
financial sector and growth indicators, where required, is recommended. 
 
Bank deposits granger causes credit to the private sector, hence, providing evidence that 
domestic savings mobilisation matter for economic growth, even for less developed 
countries. Granger causality from broad money to bank deposits implies that deepening the 
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financial sector would have a positive effect on savings mobilised domestically and hence, 
credit to the private sector. Absence of Granger causality between bank deposits and credit to 
Government indicates that although banks invest in Government securities, significant 
mobilised deposits are used to lend to the private sector. However, the effect is positive in the 
short run and negative in the long run. Therefore, efforts to mobilise more savings, and 
encourage banks to lend more to the private sector, especially SMEs should be enhanced. 
Creating an enabling environment for a better flow of credit information is one way of 
enabling the savings to have a greater effect on economic growth through credit extended to 
the private sector. This finding corresponds with Bittencourt (2012), who reported that 
household consumption in Malawi increased compared to a decline in private credit 
following liberalisation. Further research to analyse the impact of the recent changes in 
financial regulatory framework on domestic savings mobilisation and credit to the private 
sector for Malawi is recommended.  
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This research set out to contribute new insights to the debate on causes of low credit access 
by SMEs from formal institutions in developing countries. Factors affecting access to credit 
is an often studied subject, but the topics covered in this thesis are; (1) among the first to 
explore the role of social capital (as a demand factor), and savings mobilisation (as a supply 
factor); and (2) this is one of the first studies to analyse the topic in the context of Malawi, a 
developing country in Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis was informed using triangulated 
data, which was collected using semi-structured and structured interview surveys, in depth 
interviews; and from secondary data sources. This chapter presents an overview of the 
findings, their implications, and suggestions for further research. A critique of the 
methodology followed in the chapter is also presented. 
 
The thesis has addressed the following research questions: 
 Can social capital improve access to formal credit in developing countries? (Chapter 
5) 
 Are factors hindering access to credit for SMEs perceived differently by lenders and 
borrowers in Malawi? (Chapter 6) 
 What factors affect perceptions of SMEs regarding effect of social capital on access 
to credit from commercial banks in Malawi? (Chapter 7) 
 Does social capital affect access to credit for SMEs in Malawi? (Chapter 8) 
 Do savings mobilised domestically affect private credit in Malawi? (Chapter 9) 
 
10.1 Overview Conclusions  
 
This research focused on exploring social capital, as a demand factor, and domestic savings 
mobilisation, as a supply factor, affecting access to credit for SMEs in developing countries. 
The analysis used data from Malawi to provide research evidence on the effect of these 
factors. Overall, the thesis concludes that; (1) Social capital eases the information asymmetry 
problem between lenders and borrowers, and hence affects access to credit; (2) Domestic 
savings mobilisation affects access to credit by the private sector, and hence matters for 
development even in developing countries. However, although banks are extending 
significant credit to the private sector, their efforts would have even greater impact if more 
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SMEs are also targeted. This could be achieved through improvement in flow of credit 
information between lenders and borrowers  
  
Demand side: Despite the lack of consensus in the definition of social capital and how it is 
measured (Halpern, 2005), social capital positively affects economic transactions in the 
market place (Barr, 2000; Fafchamps, 2004; Lin, 2001;Woolcock, 2001; Fukuyama, 2001; 
Antoci et al., 2009; Sacconi and Degli, 2011). This effect is more pronounced in the 
developing country context where education levels are low and law enforcement is weak 
(Guiso et al., 2004). In developing countries, the operating economic environment for SMEs 
presents a challenge, for business operators to easily access credit for growth; and an 
opportunity, for credit providers to offer innovative products to enhance access to credit for 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Considering the various dimensions of social capital, this research argues that, although 
banks mostly rely on objective information about a prospective borrower for credit risk 
assessment, social capital complements the risk assessment process (Chapter 5). Social 
capital, which mostly reveals subjective information, might help in gathering the remaining 
required information. This is the information, which is not readily available for objective 
decision making process. This is the case especially in developing countries, where 
information asymmetry problems are severe. In such cases, relying only on objective 
assessments will not contribute positively to enhancing access to credit for SMEs, since most 
prospective clients are financially excluded. 
 
Apart from broadening outreach strategies and financial literacy programmes, accessing 
credit also greatly relies on information availability about borrowers. This information can 
easily be gathered through use of social connections, which is social capital. Social capital 
can also be a tool for spreading information on the sources of finance (Okten and Osili, 
2004). This research suggests that a formal acceptance should be adapted for using a 
combination of objective and subjective information for credit assessment in formal 
institutions, especially for first time borrowers. All things being equal, this would pave way 
for entrepreneurs to use formal credit, which is in turn beneficial for enterprise growth. Since 
2013, in Malawi all borrowers from commercial banks are requested to give consent for their 
credit information to be shared with the recently established credit reference bureaux. 
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Therefore, as a spill-over effect, in the long term a strategy of using social capital has 
potential to contribute to building the credit registry. 
 
The research further unveiled details about specific information gaps between lenders and 
borrowers which potentially contribute to low access to formal credit by SMEs in Malawi 
(Chapter 6). From a lender’s point of view, non-availability of business financial records is 
the most important hindrance, while from the borrower’s point of view lack of collateral and 
high interest rates are the major hindrances. If borrowers know the value of having up to date 
records, they can make an effort to keep them. Apart from building capacity as a long-term 
solution, social connections can be utilised in the shorter term to gather required information 
to complement credit risk assessments. On the effect of social connections, both 
entrepreneurs and bank officers perceived that when a person is known personally the 
likelihood of getting a loan improves positively (Chapter 6.4.3). However the reasons behind 
such perceptions differed indicating a further gap in information. This gap results in neither 
party achieving what they want as lenders and borrowers.  
 
Having a bank account indicates the trust that borrowers have in the banking system to 
handle their finances. However, knowledge-based trust, which develops following experience 
and behaviour, was low. The level of knowledge-based trust that SMEs have for the banking 
sector was found to be low. Rule-based trust, which develops following the rules and norms 
within a society, was found. Of the SMEs surveyed, 98% had a bank account, which concurs 
with 96% reported by Dermiguc-Kunt and Klapper, (2013). Poor information flow between 
the lenders and the borrowers played a role, because of a lack of vibrant business networks 
which fails to deliver value. A comparison of the perceptions regarding effects of social 
connections on the likelihood of obtaining credit from a commercial bank revealed no 
differences across the micro, small and medium business categories (Chapter 6.4.4). This 
finding could be a reflection of adherence to strict standard procedures being employed for all 
businesses fitting into the SME categories.  
 
The concept of the discouraged borrower suggested by Kon and Storey (2003) indicates that 
negative experiences impact on borrowers’ perceptions and access to credit. In addition to 
experiences, this research concluded that social capital, education and gender also have an 
effect on the perceptions that borrowers have regarding effect of social connections on credit 
access from banks. This indicates the value of social links in information flow (Chapter 7). 
167 
 
However, the negative relationship between the social capital proxy variables (Chapter 7.4.4) 
and perception could be explained by the low utilisation of business networks. This 
consequently influences negative perceptions about the benefit of business information-
sharing. This knowledge is crucial in formulating strategies to lessen hindrances to credit 
access. To bring about solutions to credit access problems, this research proposes that an 
understanding of the opinions, values and social connections of borrowers is necessary, 
because social links affect level of perceptions in accessing and usage of financial products, 
including credit (Kostov et al., 2012). The low levels of financial inclusion in Malawi could 
be explained not only by failure of strategies to broaden access, but also retrogressive 
perceptions, that users hold, about available financial services.  
 
Perceptions affect usage of financial services offered by banks. An analysis of the effect of 
social capital on access to credit for Malawi revealed that social capital, as measured by 
network membership, is a determinant of access to formal credit (Chapter 8). Firm 
characteristics also have an effect on access to credit but on condition of having a bank 
account. This implies that financial inclusion can have positive effects on access to formal 
credit.  
 
While informal connections have the potential to enhance information flow, lacking social 
connections with bank personnel would contribute to financial exclusion. For Malawi, an 
example would be people in rural areas who have limited bank presence, because of poor 
infrastructure. The poor infrastructure contributes to increased transaction costs for service 
providers, and hence rural people have no chance of building social links with bank 
personnel. Such people may not have similar opportunities to interact with bank personnel 
compared with urban dwellers. To worsen this problem further, the low volume of 
transactions in the rural areas does not always justify the cost for the banks. Despite the 
possible benefits of business networks, it is worth noting that not all business groupings are 
active to ensure members reap the benefits. 
 
The findings support Grannovetters’ (1955) embeddedness theory by providing evidence that 
economic phenomenon could be affected through enhanced access to formal finance through 
interpersonal relationships of actors. 
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Recommendation: This research proposes strengthening use of established local networks of 
business associations to act as a centre for business development services. This would create 
a link with other stakeholder’s for example banks. Inclusive development takes place when 
various actors in the market establish forums through which mutual strategies are identified, 
and hence social capital can play its role. This proposal presents a low cost model for 
business information and advisory services for SMEs. Findings of effects of social capital on 
access to credit begs the question of how such linkages can be harnessed without putting the 
bank at greater risk of default due to rent-seeking behaviours, for example fraud and 
corruption. 
 
Supply side: This research established a positive influence on GDP, by domestic credit 
extended to the private sector, providing evidence for the credit channel. Bank deposits 
granger causes credit to the private sector, providing evidence that domestic savings 
mobilisation matters for economic growth even for less developed countries. Bank deposits 
granger causes broad money. This implies that deepening the financial sector would have a 
positive effect on both savings mobilised domestically and hence on credit to the private 
sector, all other things being equal.  
 
Empirical results on the impact of financial development on economic growth tend to vary 
with measures of financial development used and the type of data (panel or annual) used for 
regression estimation (Allen and Ndikumana, 2000; Kelly and Mavrotas, 2008). This study 
established that by using different proxy measures of financial development, conclusions that 
can be drawn regarding causality results were mixed (Chapter 9). This study concluded that 
the causality is bi-directional when various indicators are considered, however causality from 
economic growth to finance was stronger (Chapter 9.6.5). In comparison, using Malawi data, 
a similar study concluded that there was Granger causality running from economic growth to 
finance (Simwaka et al., 2012) while Ahmed (2010) concluded that there is a unidirectional 
Granger causality running from financial development to economic growth for Malawi. 
Therefore, enhancing economic growth can help improve financial sector development in 
Malawi. In line with these findings, policy recommendations need to be based on conclusions 
made by analysing a variety of proxy indicators.  
 
In this study, regardless of the change in the proxy variable, the long run effect of bank 
deposits and broad money remained the same. A negative relationship exists between bank 
169 
 
deposits and credit to private sector. A granger causality running from bank deposits to credit 
to the private sector provides evidence that savings mobilisation is a determinant of the 
supply of credit by financial institutions. Absence of granger causality between credit to 
Government and bank deposits provides evidence that despite banks investing in government 
securities, domestic credit to private sector is still significant. 
  
Stability checks revealed the presence of structural breaks in the domestic credit to private 
sector by banks series, which was also confirmed by employing formal statistical tests. 
However, the break dates did not coincide with the break dates indicated by the stability 
check tests.  
 
Recommendation: It is recommended that, increased efforts to mobilise more savings should 
be encouraged. This would enable the savings to have a greater effect on credit extended to 
the private sector both in the short and long run. Further research using larger dataset should 
be carried out employing estimation methodologies that takes into account structural breaks 
for financial sector and growth indicators. Presence of structural breaks in a series can lead to 
misleading results (Perron, 1989).  
 
Least developed nations need to start acknowledging the increasing inevitability that their 
economies should mobilise resources domestically. Such strategies are also supported in 
literature (Mavrotas, 2008; Mavrotas and Kelly, 2001), due to three major reasons. Firstly, 
microfinance programmes have demonstrated that poor people can save. Secondly, the global 
financial crisis demonstrated the negative consequences of developing countries relying 
heavily on external flows to fund domestic development efforts. Thirdly, research has 
demonstrated that aid encourages rent seeking behaviours and reduces efforts to mobilise 
domestic resources. Empirically, this research has demonstrated that savings mobilised 
domestically in developing countries can have a positive impact on the credit extended to the 
private sector by the financial sector.  
 
10.2 Implications and Recommendations for Policy and Further Research 
 
The research findings have implications for both providers of credit services and policy 
makers. Commercial banks operating in developing countries need to acknowledge the need 
to use other non-traditional methods fitting the local environments to enhance access to credit 
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for SMEs. Subjective information gathered by loan officers, mostly through social 
connections, inevitably complements the credit risk assessment process especially for small 
and medium enterprises operating in developing countries. Therefore use of objective 
information only in such environments potentially excludes most SMEs from accessing credit 
from formal institutions. However, an issue arising from such findings is how to formally 
incorporate information gathered in such a way, while also balancing the negative effects of 
rent-seeking behaviours, which can put the bank at risk. A possible route would be to 
strengthen ties with legally established business networking groups to help with 
disseminating relevant information to both lenders and borrowers through informal social 
connections. This will also help banks to reduce their transaction costs of having loan officers 
interact more with individual businesses. 
 
Gaitho (2013) and Sullivan and Sheffrin (2003) have documented that an efficiently working 
credit reference bureau can tremendously improve credit risk assessment for credit providers. 
However, the first step in supplying such services is ensuring that a majority of potential 
clients are registered on the credit database. All eligible borrowers should be registered for 
maximum effect. Since this service has potential to reduce default risk for lenders, it makes 
economic sense for lenders to support this initiative through making deliberate efforts to 
reach out to a number of businesses and individuals, to enable them use formal financial 
services. With all necessary precautions in place, using social capital to enable first-time 
borrowers to access credit is recommended, as this will directly feed into building a credit 
registry database, which can be used for future objective credit risk assessments. 
 
10.2.1 Policy Implications 
 
Efforts to enhance access to credit are being pioneered by lenders along with other financial 
literacy efforts being championed by development partners and the Government of Malawi. 
Financial literacy efforts should include topics which tackle value of social links in availing 
information and opportunities for both lenders and borrowers. Actors would invest in social 
relations if they perceive to have a high enough expected return, in this case opportunities to 
ease problem of access to credit. Enhancing use of available networks as business 
development services centres could be a possible avenue. The designing of the financial 
sector deepening trust for Malawi needs to incorporate financial literacy programmes at 
various levels to enhance flow of information.  
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Efforts to mobilise domestic savings should not only focus on collection of taxes but also on 
mobilisation of savings through deposit creation by the wider public. This could be achieved 
by supporting efforts being done by the banking sector, through deliberate policies that help 
to build capacity of the masses on financial literacy. The more savings are mobilised, the 
higher the amount of credit is made available for the private sector ceteris paribus. However, 
in reality SMEs face greater hindrances to access the credit due to information asymmetry 
problems. These problems generate contract enforcement challenges because obligations are 
hard to verify by the third party. In such environments, personal trust and reputation, which 
are attributes of social capital, play a significant role in enforcing contracts (Geif, 1993; 
Fafchamps, 1998; Fafchamps, 2002). A potential channel proposed by this research is 
through social links between borrowers and lenders, which can be achieved through use of 
vibrant business networks to minimise costs for credit providers. Policies should encourage 
businesses to belong to business groupings, which should fundamentally demonstrate benefits 
for the SME i.e. transfer of information pertinent to the businesses’ performance. Business 
networks help in reducing transaction costs through circulation of information and 
coordinating punishment of cheaters (Fafchamps, 2004: p.310). In contrast with training and 
start up support, non-family relationships are important for information sharing in business 
(Fafchamps, 2004: p.191). Use of social links would also complement financial inclusion 
efforts, and hence savings mobilisation. Improving information asymmetry problems would 
also encourage banks to lend more to SMEs, and ultimately economic growth. 
  
10.2.3 Critique and Further Research 
 
This research has contributed to knowledge by demonstrating that social capital and domestic 
savings mobilisation are determinants of access to credit for SMEs in developing countries. 
However, the research process was faced with some limitations, most of which relate to data 
availability. In the MSME survey (see Chapter 6), absence of routinely collected data on 
social capital for the case-study country necessitated use of cross sectional primary data 
which brings in limits in the types of analytical techniques that can be employed.  Absence of 
an up to date business registry ruled out use of proportionate sampling techniques in selecting 
respondents. The researcher’s local knowledge helped in selection of areas from which 
businesses were in turn selected. Respondents were selected randomly from well-established 
business designated areas in the two cities of Lilongwe and Blantyre. To ensure reliability 
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and validity of the results standard questions, used to measure social capital in most of this 
type of studies, were used in the questionnaires. The same questions were also asked in a 
different survey (see Chapter 8), with bigger sample size, targeted at the same cities with 
respondents selected using a systematic sampling framework.  
 
Trust is at the root of social connections. Therefore, since questions about social connections 
seemed close to divulging trust-based dealings, a number of respondents were not 
comfortable with answering questions about whether they were part of such dealings. 
However, they were happy to respond on the subject as a third person.  The questionnaire 
therefore contained both direct and indirect questions to capture social capital proxy 
attributes. 
 
The other limitation pertained to the unavailability of time series macroeconomic data. The 
target for the analysis was to test Granger causality between savings mobilised domestically 
and credit extended to small and medium enterprises. However, due to lack of SME 
segregated macroeconomic data, credit extended to the private sector was used as a proxy for 
credit to SMEs because SMEs are included in the private sector. Assuming data availability, 
comparing results with similar analysis but employing structural breaks techniques would be 
interesting because the economic environment of Malawi is volatile. Revelations of the 
positive effect of domestic savings on private credit calls for further research on what 
determines savings in the economy of Malawi. A recently established Pensions Act (2010) 
has introduced mandatory pension savings, which has a potential to boost domestic savings 
mobilisation. An interesting area to explore is the impact such changes will have on credit to 
the private sector, and ultimately on economic growth. 
 
Further questions of research interest arising from this research pertain to social capital. 
Firstly, demonstrating linkage between social capital and access to credit is one thing but the 
question of how such linkages are applied in reality is worth investigating. Specifically, 
evidence on the effectiveness of business networks in enhancing flow of information between 
bankers and borrowers would provide good evidence for policy making. A qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation of the SQL loan facility initiated by Standard Bank would be a 
potential starting point. A social institutional analysis is recommended to identify and analyse 
the status of interrelationships among the stakeholders. 
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Despite shortcomings, most of which can be improved on in further research, this thesis has 
made a significant contribution in the area of development finance. This contribution is in 
terms of its focus on statistically backed evidence of the potential of social capital and 
savings mobilisation in enhancing access to formal credit for SMEs in developing countries. 
Considering the contribution that SMEs make to poverty reduction and economic 
development in least developed countries, continued experimentation and exploration into the 
factors that can enhance access to credit, a major barrier to development, is still desirable and 
important.  
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Appendix A1 Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Questionnaire 
 
IMPROVING ACCESS TO FORMAL CREDIT FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTREPRISES. 
ENTERPRISE ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE [To be administered to the business owner or manager] 
 
Good morning/afternoon. My name is ______________________. We are currently doing a survey on Access 
to financial services for small and medium enterprises, commissioned by Bunda College, LUANAR and 
Aberystwyth University. A total of 120 enterprises within Lilongwe and Blantyre districts will be surveyed. 
Your enterprise was selected randomly. The information collected will be strictly confidential and will only be 
used for the purposes of the study. The information will help the financial providers and policy makers to 
understand how social capital can help with accessing credit. I would like to thank you for accepting to be 
interviewed. 
 
I am going to ask you questions relating to how your business started, how it has grown and sources of funds 
used for the growth and how management relates with other institutions socially for the benefit of the business. 
Feel free to ask any question or clarification at any point during the interview 
 
A-: SURVEY STAFF DETAILS 
A1.  NAME OF ENUMERATOR:  DATA VALIDATED BY: 
A2.  DATE OF INTERVIEW:  DATE OF DATA VALIDATION: 
A3. NAME OF FIELD SUPERVISOR:                                
2. QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER    
3.  NAME OF DATA ENTRY PERSONNEL: 
 
 
 
SECTION 1:  BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT AND ACTIVITIES 
 
1. When was the business established? _______________________________ 
 
2. Is the business registered                              1. Yes, Year __________                           2. No  
 
3. Describe the main type of activity of your business? (in terms of volume of services rendered for the last 
calendar year) 
 
 
 
4. Main field of activity.  (Interviewer, from the business description above,   classify the business into categories). 
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5. How many people are employed in your business? (Interviewer should explain that this is to be used for 
purposes of categorizing the business into small, medium or large)? 
 
 
Number of  permanent  
employees 
   
Number of  seasonal or 
/part-timers 
Total number( add after 
interview) 
   
   
   
 
 
6.   Please, classify the enterprise? (Interviewer use the answer to question 5  to classify) 
 
Type of company Code Step  
Small  (1 – 20 employees)  1 → Continue the interview  
Medium ( 21 – 99 employees)  2 → Continue the interview 
Large enterprises ( 100 and above) 3 → Discontinue interview  
Representative office  4 → Discontinue interview  
Other (specify) “_____________”  5 → Discontinue interview  
 
7. What is the legal status of the enterprise? 
 
Legal status Code 
 Publicly listed company 1 
Limited Liability Company  2 
Partnership  3 
Sole proprietorship  4 
Cooperative 5 
Other (specify) __________________________________________________ 6 
 
 
 
Field of activity Code  
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1 
Mining and quarrying 2. 
Manufacturing 3 
Electricity, gas, refrigeration and air conditioning supply 4 
Construction 5 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 6 
Repair of Motor vehicles and motor cycles 7 
Transportation and storage 8 
Accommodation and food services 9 
Information and Communication 10 
Education 11 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 12 
Real Estate 13 
Professional, Scientific, Administrative and support 14 
Insurance 15 
Other   
Financial services → End 
the 
interview 
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8. What is the ownership structure of your enterprise at the moment? ( If  % ownership not given indicate code 98 
or 99 if do not want to answer) 
 
Ownership Structure  Code Per cent Ownership 
Individual person or family 1  
Several individual persons  2  
Domestic company  3  
Foreign company 4  
Government 5  
 
9. Has ownership structure or  form changed since establishment      1= Yes    2= No 
10. If Yes how?  
 
 
 
SECTION 2: INFORMATION ABOUT THE BUSINESS OWNERS – I will now ask you a few questions 
relating to the businesses top management 
  
11. Are you responsible for making finance? If not, questions following relate to the person responsible for making 
financial decisions.  
 
12. What is the title of this top executive?  
Position Code 
Chief Executive 1 
Director (non-founder)  2 
Founder – individual person 3 
Executive of superior legal entity / ministry or department  4 
Founder combines the functions of Director  5 
Other “specify” “___________________”   
 
 
13. What is the exact or approximate age of the top executive?  
YEARS GROUPED YEARS( If respondent not free to give 
exact age) 
 1 = 18 – 25 
2 = 26 – 30 
3 = 31 – 35 
4 = 36 - 40 
5 = 41 - 45 
6. = 46 – 50 
7 = 51 – 55 
8 = 56 -  60 
9 =  61 or over  
 
14. Please specify the sex of your top executive 
Sex  Encoding  
Male  1 
Female  2 
 
15. Please indicate the highest educational level of the top executive.  
Type of education  Code 
Primary education (up to standard 8)  1 
Secondary education (form 1 to 4)  2 
Secondary education (form 2 to 4)   3 
Vocational training   4 
Some college or university training( certificate, Diploma,)  5 
Graduate degree  ( Domestic University)  6 
Graduate degree ( Foreign University) 7 
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Type of education  Code 
Postgraduate(PhD, Masters Domestic University) 8 
Postgraduate ( PhD, Masters Foreign University) 9 
Difficult to answer  99 
 
16. Have you had any training on financial management? 1= Yes    2= No 
 
SECTION 3. QUESTIONS ON BUSINESS ACTIVITY AND GROWTH STRATEGY – This section will 
ask questions on business operations and growth. 
 
17. What is the approximate monthly turnover for your enterprise? 
 
MK 
 
“I will not answer this question” – “99” 
 
18. Does your turnover fluctuate in a given year? Please indicate in which months you experience a low turnover.  
 
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC 
            
  
19. How has the annual turnover of your organization changed in the past 5 years i.e. from 2008 to date?  
 
 
Answer Code  Percentage 
change, 
(%)  
Why?   
Increased  1   
Decreased  2   
Remained unchanged  3   
Difficult to answer  98   
Our enterprise was 
established not long ago and 
comparison is not possible  
99   
 
20. Please rank the importance of the following factors that limit development and growth of your business. ( Show 
card A) 
 
 Major 
problem  
Small 
problem 
We do not have 
such a problem   
This does not 
concern us  
1. Problems associated with 
cash  and card payments  
1 2 3 99 
2. Obtaining external funding  1 2 3 99 
3. Obtaining various permits 
(e.g. export, sanitary services, 
etc.)  
1 2 3 99 
4. Bureaucracy and bribery  
1 2 3 99 
5. High tax rates  1 2 3 99 
6. Insufficient demand for our 
product / service  
1 2 4 99 
7. Lack of energy (gasoline, 
electricity and gas)  
1 2 4 99 
8. Poor infrastructure (e.g. 
telecommunications, 
transport, etc.)  
1 2 4 99 
9. Forced donations (such as 
for improvement of the city 
and etc.)  
1 2 4 99 
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 Major 
problem  
Small 
problem 
We do not have 
such a problem   
This does not 
concern us  
10. Other (specify) 
“______________________”  
1 2 4 99 
 
21. How many banks do you bank with? 
 
Number/ Name of banks Length of relationship Distance to the 
bank(walking time) 
   
   
   
 
22. Is there a specific reason why you chose to bank with them? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________ 
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SECTION IV. SOURCES OF FUNDING- I am now going to ask you questions relating to the businesses sources of funds initially, additional funding after establishment and future plans. 
 
23. What were the main sources of initial capital, through which this enterprise was established, growing and future plans. Several answers can be selected.  
 
 
 
Source of funding 
1=Commercial 
banks 
2= Credit union 
3=Microfinance 
Institution 
4=Money lenders 
(Katapila) 
5= Public Funds 
6=Individual 
person with 
interest 
7= 
friends/acquaintan
ce without interest 
8=Family 
members 
9= Own savings 
10= supplier 
credit 
11= profits from 
business 
12=Other(Specify
)  
What was source 
of initial capital 
How much? Did you 
invest 
additional 
funds since 
establishm
ent 
1=yes  
2=No 
Source of 
additional 
investment 
Use of funds 
1= Startup capital 
2= Increase of  working 
capital 
3= Acquisition of fixed 
assets 
4= To pay existing debts 
 
Has your business 
got any growth 
plans? 
1=Yes 2=No 
Where do you 
plan to source 
funds for your 
growth plans 
Given a 
chance 
approximat
ely how 
much 
would you 
want to get 
to finance 
the 
growth? 
If you don’t manage to get the 
funds from the chosen source will 
the business plans be abandoned?  
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24. If you have never applied for a loan the past 5 years what was the reason why you did not apply for  
No. Reason 
  
1  
 
2  
 
3  
 
 
25. In general how would you describe your access to financial resources for business from the following sources? 
( Show card B) 
 Very 
easy to 
obtain 
a 
credit 
Easy 
to 
obtain 
a 
credit 
Difficult 
to obtain 
a credit 
Very 
difficult to 
obtain a 
credit 
Difficult 
to 
answer 
Reason 
Commercial banks 1 2 3 4 99  
Credit union 
1 2 3 4 99 
 
 
Microfinance 
Institution 
1 2 3 4 99 
 
Money lenders 
(Katapila) 
1 2 3 4 99 
 
 Public Funds 
1 2 3 4 99 
 
 
Friends/acquaintance 
without interest 
1 2 3 4 99 
 
Family members 1 2 3 4 99  
Friends/acquaintance 
without interest 
1 2 3 4 99 
 
 1 2 3 4 99  
 
26. Thinking about actual and future loans what factors have affected your access to loans? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________ 
 
27. What do you feel you need to do or have in order to be able to easily access loans from a 
bank______________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION V. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND INTERELATIONSHIPS – In this last section I am going to ask 
about social interactions of management as they relate to the business. 
 
28.  Are you or your business a member to a social networking gathering, group or club which helps you be able to 
get business opportunities  
1= Yes, Specify group/club name _____________________________________    
 2. = No 
 
29. Does belonging to this gathering/group/club help your business have access to any of the following  
 
Service Specify how? 
Credit  
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Contracts  
Training   
Other  
  
 
30. Are you involved in any (formal or informal) activities which enable you to interact with bankers (lenders)? 1= 
Yes          2=No 
 
 
31. How likely is it for you to get a loan from a bank if you know the credit officer or any bank officer personally? 
a. Most likely 
b. Very likely 
c. Likely 
d. Maybe 
e. Never 
 
32. Please explain your answer in question 
31._______________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 3 to assess how social connections affect lending decision 
where -3 = Never, -2= very unlikely, -1 = unlikely 0= no effect, 1=likely, 2=very likely, 3= always  
 
Statement Rating 
A friend applicant is more likely to get a loan -3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
An  acquaintance applicant is more likely to get a loan -3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
A government official applicant is more likely to get a 
loan 
-3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
A family relation applicant is more likely to get a loan  -3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
Knowing an applicant personally influences the 
lending decision positively 
-3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
Businesses often offer gifts to influence outcome of 
loan application 
-3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
Businesses offer joint investment opportunities that 
influence outcome of  application 
-3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
 
 
34.  From your point of view, please rate if you agree or disagree with the following sentences to do with business 
men/women in in your sector of work. 
 
Statement Agree Strongly 
agree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Difficult 
to tell 
Most Malawian business people 
in my line of business can be 
trusted to work together with. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Most foreign business people can 
be trusted to work together with 
1 2 3 4 5 
Most businesses easily borrow  
money for investment  from one 
another than  from a bank 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
35. Please comment on your answers to question 34 above where possible? 
_ 
 
 
202 
 
36. Entrepreneurs sometimes have to make gifts or informal payments to officials in order to access resources or 
opportunities etc. Have you ever had to make informal payments or gifts to financiers?  
Answer Code 
Yes  1 
No  2 
I cannot answer this question  3 
 
37. Do you trust that the banks act in your best interest of your business?  1=yes      2=No 
 
38. What would you want the banks to change to enable you as a business person able to easily get credit from 
them? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
39. Do you have any other comments pertaining to what we have discussed that you might want to add? 
_ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR THE INTERVIEW!!! 
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 Appendix A2 Commercial Bank Interview Guide 
 
SOCIAL CONNECTIONS AND SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTREPRISES ACCESS TO FORMAL 
CREDIT INTERVIEW GUIDE 
A. COVERAGE 
1. Describe your role played in credit the 
process____________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
_________ 
2. Years of experience_______________________________________________ 
3. What type of an institution  is it  
i. Commercial Bank 
ii. Microfinance Institution 
4. Number of operating branches 
Type Number Location ( Districts) 
Branch   
 
 
Kiosk   
 
Mobile branch   
 
 
B. LENDING BEHAVIOUR ( reference to past 5 years or less) 
1. How do you define SMEs in your bank and are there differences in lending volumes among the different sizes? 
Type  Definition Average yearly Lending volumes ( past 5 year ) 
  2012/13 2011/12 2010/11 2009/10 
      
      
      
 
2. Do lending volumes differ by sector? Please provide details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Are there seasonal trends in lending by sector or size and why? 
 
 
4. What is your annual lending volumes for the bank( overall picture  for past five years) 
Year Total amount to private sector 
2012/13  
2011/12  
2010/11  
2009/10  
 
  
C. FACTORS AFFECTING LENDING 
1. Does the bank have specific guidelines for lending or it is done adhoc?  
i. Yes 
ii. No, done adhoc 
2. What are the guidelines that direct the lending process (Interviewer note how all the types of capital are captured 
(economic/ human /social) in the guidelines) – ask for documents if possible. 
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3.  From the guidelines stated which factors are considered 
Factor Weighting 
1= Primary 
2= Secondary 
3=Not Considered 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
4. Can you talk us through a credit process for a case that you have come across that was 
i. Successful_________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
______________ 
ii. Borderline_________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________ 
iii. Unsuccessful_______________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________ 
D. UNOFFICIAL /SOCIAL FACTORS AFFECTING LENDING DECISIONS (use of 
friends/acquaintances/relatives/Government) 
Please rate the following statements on a scale of 1 to 3 to assess how social connections affect lending decision 
Statement Rating 
A friend applicant is more likely to get a loan -3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
An  acquaintance applicant is more likely to get a loan -3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
A government official applicant is more likely to get a 
loan 
-3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
A family relation applicant is more likely to get a loan  -3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
Knowing an applicant personally influences the 
lending decision positively 
-3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
Businesses often offer gifts to influence outcome of 
loan application 
-3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
Businesses offer joint investment opportunities that 
influence outcome of  application 
-3     -2     -1     0     1     2     3 
 
1. If a business person openly offers a gift does that influence  the decision on their application 
i. Yes, negatively 
ii. Yes Positively 
iii. No influence 
 
2. From question 2, explain how? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
_________ 
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3. Are there any other ways how businesses influence lending decision on their application. 
 
E. LENDERS SOCIAL CAPITAL 
1. As a lender (Institution), do you join any networks to enhance your access to potential clients? 
i. Yes, Name them _________________________________________________________ 
ii. No 
2. What other  activities( socially) does the bank do  to facilitate getting clients  
Activity Frequency in a year Does the activity help 
1=yes, 2= No 
Comment 
    
    
    
 
3. As a lender (individual) what social / networks are you involved in that may lead to business opportunities in 
your role. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
_________ 
4. Are there any elements in the lending guidelines that businesses find hard to meet to get a 
loan?_____________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________ 
5. In your opinion what would you advise businesses to do to enhance their access to credit? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
_________ 
 
END OF INTERVIEW. THANK YOU 
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Appendix B1 Business Registration Impact Evaluation – Malawi  
 
The Business Impact Evaluation study evaluates the impact of formalization—through business registration, tax 
registration, and business savings accounts—on enterprise performance. The project which is coordinated by 
Innovations for Poverty Action
36
 (IPA) in partnership with Government of Malawi and the World Bank 
participants consist of 3,000 informal MSMEs located in Blantyre and Lilongwe, the major commercial cities in 
Malawi. This study - denominated Business Registration Impact Evaluation (BRIE) - is a randomized controlled 
trial that aims at estimating the impact of business registration for MSMEs in Malawi. It also examines the 
complementary value of business bank accounts as a means for separating firm and household finances. The 
study is being conducted over a four year period.  
 
The research study has four experimental groups, including a control group
37
 (see figure A1). In order to test the 
impact of business registration on business performance, informal firms were randomly assigned to costless 
registration with either just the Department of Registrar’s General (DRG) (750 firms) or to both the DRG and 
Malawian Tax Authority (300 firms). In order to assess the complementary value of separating household 
finance from business finance, a random subsample (1,200 firms)
 38
 was also invited to an information session 
promoted by a local private bank on business bank accounts. Contrary to general financial literacy programs, 
this intervention is targeted at very specific needs of firms in their management of working capital, in mentally 
separating household from business money, and in their relation to financial partners, which may have clear 
benefits in enterprise development. 
  
Sampling 
In this study, the target is the informal MSMEs that could potentially benefit the most from business registration 
and that the government has indicated would be their first group of interest for a future road-show on business 
registration. The target firms are located in urban Lilongwe and Blantyre, the major commercial cities in the 
country. At the end of 2011, over hundred business centres were listed, which included concentrations of firms 
including industrial parks, markets, streets with shops, set of workshops, etc. 46 of these business centres were 
randomly sampled (23 in each city), to list all businesses operating in these areas. 7,603 enterprises were listed 
through this process, 85% of which were not registered at DRG (similar proportion in Blantyre and Lilongwe 
despite the location of the DRG in Blantyre). 
 
For male and female-owned businesses separately, we then used a similar set of criteria, including the number of 
employees of the firm, the physical location (if the firm operates in a fixed location) and the size of the firm 
(measured in revenues) to sample approximately three thousand enterprises to be part of the study. We targeted 
this number of firms to ensure having enough power for detecting impacts on the main outcomes of interest, 
while keeping financial costs of the study under budget. A pre-pilot allowed estimating the power calculations 
incorporating a non-full compliance scenario. In terms of firms that were sampled for the study, it is accepted 
that firms with more structure/size are more likely to use the potential benefits of business registration. 
Therefore, male and female-owned firms that complied with those characteristics and that were at the same time 
still informal were targeted. 
 
In December 2011 to April 2012, a detailed baseline survey on the sampled 3,002 firms – 1,195 female-owned - 
was conducted, to elicit information on characteristics of the firm and entrepreneur, usage of financial services 
and finance, financial literacy, knowledge about the business registration process, performance metrics, 
employment, investment, harassment levels, etc.  
                                                 
36
 http://www.poverty-action.org/project/0433  
37
 The data used in this research is from the control group to avoid the impact of the other project interventions 
on this analysis. 
38
 The groups are unbalanced in size for two reasons: the benefits from business registration are mostly 
associated with the DRG registration. We are interested in testing the additional value of tax registration but do 
not want to reduce the statistical power in detecting low effects of the business registration alone. The larger 
group for registration plus information sessions takes into account take-up rates and the demand from the 
partner private bank in offering services to a high number of firms.  
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Firms interviewed at baseline were stratified on the following five measures: gender; location
39
 (Blantyre, 
Lilongwe); sector (commerce, services, and manufacturing); business owner being able to identify benefits of 
business registration (binary variable); and high capture (this binary variable is similar to Fafchamps et al., 
(2010) and takes the value of 1 if the respondent agrees with the following two statements: “whenever I have 
money on hand, my spouse or other family members always end up requesting some of it”, and “people who do 
well in their business here are likely to receive additional requests from family and friends for money to help out 
with some expense or another”). Thereafter, within each stratum, the sample was randomly assigned to either 
one of the three treatment arms or to the control group.  
 
 
                                                 
39
 Given that the DRG was located only in Blantyre, including firms from Lilongwe in our sample and using 
location as a strata in the randomization help assess whether informal firms closer to the Registrar’s office are 
different than those more distant (and whether impacts are different), as well as assess whether distance matters 
as a factor explaining different takes-up of business registration when support is provided. 
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Figure A1: Impact evaluation design 
 
 
 
Sample of eligible businesses in Lilongwe 
and Blantyre
(3,000)
Costless Registration 
at DRG + 
information session 
+ business bank 
account 
(1,200)
Costless Registration 
at DRG
(750)
Costless Registration 
at DRG and TPIN
(300)
Control Group
(750)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Appendix B2 Enterprise Midline Survey Questionnaire 
 
MALAWI ENTERPRISE MIDLINE SURVEY II 
 
Hello, my name is ______________________ and I am a researcher for Innovations for Poverty Action, a non-
profit organization dedicated to finding innovative solutions to development issues in various countries. We 
have been working in Malawi since 2008. I am visiting you today because we are conducting a study about 
Small Businesses in Malawi. We already visited you twice before, including approximately 9 months ago, and 
we are here today to ask you few other questions about you and your business. We will return in 6 months or so 
to ask you similar questions. / Moni, dzina langa ndine …………………………………………….. ndipo 
ndine wakafukufuku ku Innovations for Poverty Action, bungwe lomwe siligwira ntchito yopeza phindu 
komanso si la boma lomwe ntchito yake ndi kupeza njira zatsopano zothetsela mavuto a zitukuko m’maiko 
osiyanasiyana. Tikugwira ntchito muno m’Malawi kuyambira chaka cha 2008. Ndakuyendelani lero 
chifukwa tikupanga kafukufuku wa mabizinesi ang’onoang’ono muno m’Malawi. Tinakumanapo nanu kale 
pafupifupi miyezi isanu ndi inayi yapitayo ndipo ndabwera lero pano mafunso ena angapo pang’ono 
okhuzana ndi bizinesi yanu.Tidzabweranso miyezi isanu ndi umodzi ikubwerayo kudzakufunsani mafunso 
okhala ngati omwewa. 
 
1. Were you interviewed by me or a colleague of mine about 9-12 months ago?  / kodi munachezapo nane 
kapena mzanga miyezi isanu ndi inayi yapitayo? 
Yes No 
 
2.Was your business partner interviewed by us about 9 -12months ago? /Kodi anzanu/akunyumba kwanu 
anachezapo nafe miyezi isanu ndi inayi yapitayo?   
Yes -12 months ago 
No he supervisor for instructions on how to proceed 
 
The purpose of this survey is to better understand characteristics of small and medium businesses in Malawi, 
and also to learn relevant information about entrepreneurs who own their own businesses. This will help inform 
policies and programs directed at small and medium businesses like yours. 
/ Cholinga cha kafukufuku ameneyu ndi kufuna kumvetsetsa bwino za kayendetsedwe ka bizinesi za 
zing’ono ndi zokulilapo m’Malawi, ndiponso kuphunzirapo mfundo zoyenelera za anthu ochita malonda 
amene ali ndi bizinesi zawozawo. Izi zithandiza kudziwa kayendetsedwe ndi zochitika zomwe zinaikidwa ku 
bizinesi zazing’ono ndi zokulilapo ngati zanuzi. 
 
If you choose to participate, you’ll help complete a short survey that will take approximately 1 hour. The survey 
will cover topics such as operation of your business, current tools used in the business, performance, loans, bank 
accounts, etc./ Ngati mutasankha kutenga nawo mbali , muthandiza kumalizitsa kafukufuku wochepa amene 
atenge pafupifupi mphindi ola imotzi. Kafukufukuyu aonanso mbali za kayendedwe ndi zochitika mu 
bizinesiyi, zipangizo zomwe mukugwiritsa ntchito ku bizinesiyi pakali pano, mmene ikuyendela, ngongole, 
mabuku a ku banki ndi zina zotero.  
 
To compensate for your time, we will give you a small gift (a bar of soap).Mokupepetsani chifukwa cha nthawi 
yanu, tikupatsani ka mphatso kakang’ono (mtanda wa sopo) 
 
You should know that all businesses visited by us will not be identified in any document resulting from this 
survey. All the information that you provide will remain fully confidential and no one will be able to link your 
names to your responses./ Dziwani kuti bizinesi zonse zimene ife taziyendela sizizatchulidwa kapena kuikidwa 
pa pepala lirilonse la zotsatila za kafukufukuyu. Zimene mungayankhule pano zizakhala za chinsinsi ndipo 
palibe amene angazakwanitse kulumikiza dzina lanu ndi mayankho anu. 
 
You can interrupt the interview any time for any reason and this will not have any negative consequences. You 
can contact the phone numbers below for further questions. 
Mukhonza kudukiza/kuyimitsa kuchezaku nthawi ina iliyonse pa zifukwa zina zilizonse ndipo izi 
sizizabweretsa zotsatila zoipa ku mchitidwewo. Mukhonza kuimba ma foni nambala ali mmusi wa ngati pali 
mafunso ena. 
 
Billiat Kunje , Field Manager. 
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Jessica Baumgardner-Zuzik, Field Coordinator. 
 
Do you have any question?/Muli ndi funso lina liri lonse? 
 
If I have answered all your questions, do you agree to participate in this study? / Ngati ndayankha mafunso 
anu onse, mukuvomereza kutenga nawo mbali pa kafukufukuyi? 
 
SECTION A. CONFIRMATION TO BE IN RIGHT PLACE - CONTACT DETAILS OF BUSINESS 
OWNER 
Please administer this survey to the BUSINESS OWNER of the identified firm as per the list provided 
with the IDs. [Q1-Q5 needs to be confirmed with BUSINESS OWNER (to ensure we are the right place)]. 
 
S1q3_b. Gender:               Female  Male S1q4_b. Age [in completed years]:   
S1q5a. Marital Status:     Married monogamously / living with partner Married Polygamously 
Divorced / seperated 
Widow / widower Never married / never lived with partner 
 
S14q5 
What is the highest grade that you have completed? / Kusukulu 
munalekeza kalasi yanji? 
 
Nursery=1 
Not completed Standard 1=2 
Completed Standard 1=3 
Completed Standard 2=4 
Completed Standard 3=5 
Completed Standard 4=6 
Completed Standard 5=7 
Completed Standard 6=8 
Completed Standard 7=9 
Completed Standard 8=10 
Completed Form 1=11 
Completed Form 2=12 
Completed Form 3=13 
Completed Form 4=14 
Adult Vocational=15 
Completed diploma/ degree  and above=16 
Don’t Know=99 
 
S1q9. Number of business owners:  
 
City. Lilongwe or Blantyre 
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SECTION 1: INFORMATION ON BUSINESS OPERATION 
S2q4 
What year did this business first start? / Bizinesi imeneyi 
inayamba mchaka chanji? 
 
   
 
S1q1 
Are you still operating the business that you had when we 
first interviewed you aroundDecember 2011–April2012?/ 
Kodi mudakali kupanga bizinesi yomwe munali nayo 
ulendo oyamba tinadzacheza nanu pakati pa mwezi wa 
December 2011- April 2012? 
 
1=Yes  
2=No 
 
 
S1q2 
When did you stop operating this business? Specify 
month.This should be in 2011, 2012 or 2013. /Ndiliti 
lomwe munasiya kuyendetsa bizinesi imeneyi? Funsani 
mwezi. Izi zikhale mu 2011, 2012 kapena 2013 
MM/YYYY 
 
/  
 
SECTION 2. INFORMATION ABOUT TIME DEDICATED TO BUSINESS 
S2q1 
What does this business do?/Kwenikweni bizinesi yanu 
mumatani/ mumapanga chiyani? 
 
If firm operates in more than one sector, please indicate 
the sector that contributes the most for the profits of the 
business 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 4.CREDIT 
S4q1 
[Ask this question if has spouse/living 
with partner] There are many ways 
people borrow money. Have you 
borrowed for your business in the past 6 
months from your spouse?  
 
/ Pali njira zambiri zomwe munthu 
angathe kubwereka ndalama. 
Munayamba mwabwereka ndalama za 
bizinesi yanu kwa akunyumba kwanu 
pa miyezi isanu ndi umodzi yapitayo? 
 
Yes=1 
No=2 
Not applicable (No spouse)=98 
 
S4q2 
Have you borrowed for your business in 
the past 6 months from any other family 
member or a friend? / Mwangongolapo 
ndalama za bizinesi yanu kwa achibale 
anu kapena anzanu mu miyezi isanu 
ndi umodzi yapitayo? 
Yes=1 
No=2 
 
S4q3 
Have you borrowed for your business in 
the past 6 months from another 
business? / Mwangongolapo ndalama 
za bizinesiyanu pa miyezi isanu ndi 
umodzi yapitayo kuchokera ku bizinesi 
ina? 
 
Yes=1 
No=2 
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S4q6_baseline 
Have you borrowed for your business in 
the past from a microfinance institution? 
/munayamba mwangongola ndalama za 
bizinesi ku mabungwe ang’onoang’ono 
obwereketsa ndalama? 
 
Yes=1; No=2 
 
S4q4 
Have you borrowed for your business in 
the past 6 months from a microfinance 
institution? /Mwangongolapo ndalama 
za bizinesi yanu mu miyezi isanu ndi 
umodzi yapitayo ku mabungwe-
obwereketsa ndalama? 
 
Yes=1 
No=2 
 
S4q7_baseline 
Have you borrowed for your business in 
the past from a bank? / munayamba 
mwangongola ndalama za bizinesi ku 
banki? 
 
Yes=1; No=2 
 
S4q5 
Have you borrowed for your businessin 
the past 6 months from a bank? / 
Mwangongolapo ndalama za bizinesi 
mu miyezi isanu ndi umodzi yapitayo 
kuchokera ku banki? 
 
Yes=1 
No=2 skip to Q7 
 
S4q8_baseline 
 
Have you borrowed for your business in 
the past from any other source? Which?/ 
munayamba mwangongola ndalama za 
bizinesi kwina kulikonse? Kuti? 
 
List up to 2 sources in order of 
importance (size of loan). 
 
 
 
Specify for 
Other:…………………………………………… 
Moneylender=1 
Non-relative (individual)=2 
Government / government agency=3 
Religious group / charity=4 
Cooperative / business association=5 
Supplier / retailer/ local store=6 
Savings and Credit Cooperative 
(SACCO)=7 
Rotating Savings and Credit Association 
(ROSCA)=8 
Other=96, Specify 
Business didn’t borrow in the past 6 
months from any other source=98 
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S4q7 
Have you borrowed for your business in 
the past 6 months from any other 
source? Which?/ Mwangongolapo 
ndalama za bizinesi yanu mu miyezi 
isanu ndi umodzi yapitayo kuchokera 
kwina kuli konse? Kuti? 
 
 
List up to 2 sources in order of 
importance (size of loan).  
 
 
Specify for 
Other:…………………………………………… 
Moneylender=1 
Non-relative (individual)=2 
Government / government agency=3 
Religious group / charity=4 
Cooperative / business association=5 
Supplier / retailer/ local store=6 
Savings and Credit Cooperative 
(SACCO)=7 
Rotating Savings and Credit Association 
(ROSCA)=8 
Other=9, Specify 
Business didn’t borrow in the past from 
any other source=98 
S4q11_baseline 
When did you borrow the most recent 
time?  / Mwangongolapo liti 
posachedwapa? Record month and 
year. 
/  
 
 
SECTION 5. SAVINGS 
 S5q4.Do you have access to money deposited in an [account]?/Muli ndi 
mwayi otenga ndalama zomwe mwasungitsa ku ……. [akaunti]? 
 
Yes=1 
No=2  
 
Bank account in the name of the 
business 
 
Checking / Current bank account 
(NOT in the name of business) 
 
Savings bank account (NOT in 
the name of business) 
 
Loan account (NOT in the name 
of business) 
 
 
 
SECTION 6. REGISTRATION 
S6q2 
Does your business have a Business Registration Certificate, meaning, is your 
business registered?/ Kodi bizinesi yanu ili ndi chiphaso cha mu kaundula, 
kutanthauza,kodi bizinesi yanu inalembetsedwa mu kaundula? 
 
Politely request to see the Business Registration Certificate. 
 
Yes and show certificate=1  
Yes, but doesn’t show the certificate=2  
No=3Go to Q7  
No, I have requested and submitted all the papers but still waiting for the 
certificate=4Go to Q6 
 
Don’t know=99Go to Q7  
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S6q12 
During the past 6 months, has your business received an inspection from any of 
the following?/ Miyezi isanu ndi umodzi yapitayi, kodi bizinesi yanu 
yalandilapo oyang’anira kuchokera ku? 
 
Read out all types of inspectors 
Yes=1 
No=2 
Don’t know=99 
City council / municipality inspector/woyendera 
wochokera ku khonsolo ya mzinda  
Ministry of Industry and Trade 
inspector/woyendera wochokera ku unduna 
wazamalonda 
 
Taxes inspector/wokhometsa msonkho  
Labor inspector/woyang’anila za olembedwa 
ntchito ku unduna wa olembedwa ntchito  
Health inspector/woyendera wochokera ku 
unduna wa za umoyo  
Inspector not identified to any 
organization/woyendera wosadziwika ndi bungwe 
lina liri lonse 
 
If “No” or “Don’t know” to all skip to Q15 
S6q13 
Were you fined as a result of any of these 
inspections in the past 6 
months?/Munalipilitsidwako chindapusa 
chifukwa chaku yendeledwaku mu miyezi 
isanu ndi umodzi yapitayi? 
 
 
Yes=1 
No=2Go to Q15 
S6q14 
How much did you typically pay as fine 
following these inspections in the past 6 
months?/Kodi munalipilistidwa 
chindapusa cha ndalama zingatipa miyezi 
isanu ndi umodzi yapitayi? 
MWK  
 
 
We realize that both business people with documentation and those without often are 
asked to pay bribes for operating their businesses. /Tinazindikira kuti onse pamodzi 
anthu a mapepala ngati awa ndi omwe alibe amafunsidwa kawirikawiri kuti alipire 
ziphuphu poyendetsa bizinesi zawo. 
S6q15 
Out of every 10 business 
owners (not you), how many 
do you think experienced 
requests for bribes relating to 
their business activity from 
inspectors or police at least 
once in the past 6 months? 
/Mwa eni bizinesi khumi 
(osati inu), ndi angati amene 
mukuganiza kuti 
amakumana ndi zofunsidwa 
kupereka ziphuphu 
zokhuzana ndi zochitika za 
bizinesi zawo kuchokera kwa 
oyendela  ndi apolisi mwina 
kamodzi pa miyezi isanu ndi 
umodzi yapitayi? 
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S6q16 
Have you been asked for a 
bribe in the past 6 months 
relating to your business 
activity? / Kodi 
munafunsidwapo kupereka 
chiphuphu pa zochitika za 
bizinesi yanu pa miyezi isanu 
ndi umodzi yapitayi? 
 
Yes=1 
No=2  
 
S6q17 
Could you tell me what best 
describes the identity of the 
person who most often asked 
for a bribe in the past 6 
months? /Mungamufotokozee 
bwanji munthu amene 
anakufusafunsani za 
kupanmga ziphuphu pa 
miyezi isanu ndi umodzi 
yapitayi? 
 
 
See List C 
 
 
 
Specify for 
Other:………………………………………… 
S6q18 
Could you tell me 
approximately how much in 
bribes (including cash, 
merchandise or other goods) 
did you have to pay in the 
PAST MONTH to keep your 
business running smoothly? 
/ Mungandiuze kuti ndi 
pafupifupi ndalama zingati 
/katundu zimene 
munapereka pa ziphuphu 
MWEZI WATHAWU kuti 
bizinesi yanu iziyenda (bwino 
lomwe) myaa? 
 
Input value of any in-kind 
payments (including 
payment in merchandise).  
Code 0 if respondent didn’t 
pay bribes in the past 
month. / Yikani mtengo wa 
kulipila kwina kulikonse 
(kuphatikizila kulipila 
katundu).  
MWK  
216 
 
S6q19 
Have you been asked for a 
bribe in the past [ever] 
relating to your business 
activity by a bank or lending 
officer? /  Mwafunsidwako 
kupereka chiphuphu 
mbuyomu [ever] 
chokhudzana ndi zochitika 
pa bizinesi yanu ndi 
akubanki kapena ofisala 
obwereketsa ndalama 
 
Yes=1 
No=2  
 
S6q20&21 
Now I am going to ask you about other 
types of harasSMEnt that people like 
you may face when trying to run 
their businesses. 
 
/ Tsopano ndi kufunsani za nkhanza 
zomwe anthu ngati inu mumakumana 
nazo poyesera kuyendetsa bizinesi 
zawo. 
 
 
Read out. 
S6q20. Could you tell 
me if you have 
experienced [this] in the 
past 6 months?/ 
Mungandiuzeko ngati 
munakumana nazo 
[izi] a miyezi isanu ndi 
umodzi yapitayo? 
 
Read out. 
Yes=1 
 
S6q21. Could you 
tell me what best 
describes the 
identity of the 
person who did 
[this]. 
/  
Mungamufotokozee 
bwanji munthu 
amene anachita 
[izi]? 
 
 
 
See List C 
Threats to shut down business / 
Kuopsezedwa kutsekeledwa bizinesi 
  
Locking of premises/ 
Kukhoma/Kutseka malowa 
  
Vandalism of premises or merchandise 
/ Kuphwanyiridwa malowa kapena 
kuonongeledwa katundu 
  
Confiscation of property or 
merchandise /Kuchotseledwa kapena 
kulandidwa zinthu zanu kapena 
katundu 
  
Sexual proposals / Kufunsiridwa   
Beating / Kumenyedwa   
 
List C. Person who harassed  or asked for bribe 
Police =1 
City Council / Municipality/ Malawi Bureau of Standards  
personnel=2 
Tax Authority=3 
Ministry of Industry and Trade=4 
Neighboring business=5 
Someone respondent owes money=6 
Spouse/domestic partner=7 
Relative of self/domestic partner=8 
Business partner=9 
Employee=10 
Customer=11 
Stranger=12 
Landlord=13 
Riotting mob=14 
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Bank or lending officer=15 
Other=96, Specify 
 
 
 
SECTION 9. PROFITS, REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
MONTH 
S9q8 
What were the total REVENUES in the past MONTH? /Ndalama zonse zimene munatolera mutatha 
kugulitsa katundu mwezi wathawue ndi zingati? 
 
Ask for the exact amount (middle column) but can complement with range information (min and 
max) -DO NOT LEAVE BLANK- 
Range Min: 
MWK  
 
Past month revenues: 
MWK  
 
Range Min: 
MWK  
 
 
 
SECTION 10. WORKERS AND BUSINESS OWNERS 
S10q1 
CURRENTLY how many people do any work for 
this enterprise?  Also read: Please include unpaid 
people that help in the business including family 
members and all other workers including full-time, 
part-time, temporary, managers and apprentices. 
Please include business owners if they work on 
the day to day of the business (including 
respondent). 
Ndi anthu angati amene pakali pano amagwilira 
ntchito bizinesi ino? Komanso werengani : 
Chonde onjezerani anthu omwe salipidwa amene 
amathandiza pa bizinesiyi kuphatikizila achibale 
ndi antchito ena onse kuphatikizirapo olembedwa 
ntchito, apanthawi, aganyu, oyang’anira ndi 
ophunzira. Chonde phatikiziraninso eni bizinesi 
ngati amagwira ntchito pa tsiku ndi tsiku za 
bizinesiyi (kuphatikizanso ocheza nawo) 
 
 
 
SECTION 11.OPINIONS, INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD 
S11q1 
I am going to read some statements to you. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. 
/Ndikuwerengerani  mawu , chonde ndiuzeni ngati mukugwirizana nazo (kubvomereza) kapena ayi. 
 
Please read out all statements. 
Agree=1 
Disagree=2 
Not applicable=98 
I trust banks. / Ndimakhulupilira ma banki  
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A friend of the bank or lending officer is more likely to get a loan/ Ndizachidziwikire 
kuti munthu odziwika ku banki kapena odziwana ndi obwereketsa ndalama atha 
kutenga ngongole 
 
An acquaintance of the bank or lending officer is more likely to get a loan/Odziwika ku 
bank kapena odziwana ndi obwereketsa ndalama atha kutenga ngongole 
 
A government official is more likely to get a loan/ Ndizachidziwikire kuti akulu a 
m’boma atha kutenga ngongole 
 
A family relation of the bank or lending officer is more likely to get a loan/ 
Ndizachidziwikire kuti wachibale ndi anthu a ku banki kapena ndi anthu 
obwereketsa ndalama atha kutenga ngongole 
 
Business people offer gifts (including cash, merchandise or other goods) to influence 
the outcome of a loan application/ Anthu amabizinesi amapereka mphatso (ndalama , 
katundu kapena zinthu zina) kuti ziathandize kupeza mwai wa ngongole 
 
Business people offer investment opportunities as an incentive to the bank or lending 
officer to influence the outcome of a loan application/Anthu a mabizinesi amapereka 
mwai wa zamalonda kwa anthu a kubank kapena obwereketsa ndalama kuti zotsatila 
zapempho la ngongole ziwakomere. 
 
I trust most Malawian business people in my sector to help each other./ 
Ndimakhulupilira a Malawi ambiri opanga bizinesi ngati yangayi kuti tizithandizana 
 
I trust most foreign business people in my sector to help each other./ Ndimakhulupilira 
anthu akunja ambiri opanga bizinesi ngati yangayi kuti tizithandizana 
 
 
It is easier to borrow money from other businesses than a bank or lending institution./ 
Ndikwapafupi kubwereka ndalama kwa ma bizinesi ena kusiyana ndi ku banki 
kapena bungwe lobwereketsa ndalama 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 12.SOCIAL NETWORKS AND INTERELATIONSHIPS 
 
S12q1 
Are you or your business a member of a social 
networking gathering, group, or club, which helps 
you find business opportunities? 
Group/club/network/gathering refers for a group 
with at least 3 members. / Inuyo kapena bizinesi 
yanu ndi membala wa gulu la social networking 
gathering, gulu kapena kalabu yomwe 
imakuthandizani kupeza mimwayi ya bizinesi? 
Gulu/kalabu/network/ likutanthauza ma membala 
osachepera atattu. 
 
Yes= 1 
No= 2  
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S12q2&3 
 
S12q2. Did 
belonging to this 
social networking 
gathering, group, 
or club ever help 
your business 
access [option]? / 
Kodi kukhala 
membala wa 
social 
networking 
gathering, gulu 
kapena kalabu 
kumathandiza 
bizinesi yanu 
chilichonse mwa 
izi? 
Read out all 
statements. 
 
Yes= 1 
No= 2  
S12q3. How did belonging to this social networking 
gathering, group, or club help you to access 
[option]?/Kodi kukhala mugulumu 
kwakuthandizani bwanji kupeza []? 
 
It helped me receive information about [option]=1 
It has acted as guarantor to get loan=2 
It helped me to know a person who helps secure 
credit lines=3 
It helped me to know a personwho helps secure 
contracts=4 
It helped me to meet with clients=5 
It helped me to meet with suppliers=6 
It helped me learn about new equipment available =7 
Other=96, Specify 
 
List up to 2 answers. 
 
Credit/ Ngongole  
 
 
Business Contracts/ 
Mgwirizan o wa 
bizinesi (ma contract) 
 
 
 
Training/ Maphunziro  
 
 
S12q4 
Are you involved in any formal or informal 
activities that enable you to interact with bank or 
lending officers?/ Mumatenga nawo mbali pa 
zichitochito zilizonse zovomerezeka kapena 
zosavomerekeza zomwe zitha kukupasani mwai 
wokambilana ndi a mabanki kapena wobwereketsa 
ndalama? 
 
Yes= 1 
No= 2 
 
 
S12q 5 
How likely is it for you to obtain a loan from a bank 
or lending institution if you personally know the 
bank or lending officer?/ Ndimwachidziwikile 
bwanji kuti mukhoza kupeza ngongole ku banki 
kapena bungwe lobwereketsa ndalama ngati 
mukudziwika ku bankiko kapena ofisala wa 
kubungwe lobwereketsa ndalama? 
 
Read out all options. 
 
 
 
 
Very unlikely=1 
Unlikely=2 
Neither likely nor unlikely= 3 
Likely= 4 
Very likely= 5 
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S12q 6 
Why do you believe it is [answer listed in Q5] for 
you to obtain a loan from a bank or lending 
institution if you personally know the bank or 
lending officer?/Ndichifukwa chani 
mukukhulupilira kuti [yankho lalembedwa 
kufunso 5] kwa inu kutenga ngongole ku banki 
kapena ku bungwe lobwereketsa ndalama ngati 
mukudziwika ku banki kapena mumadziwana ndi 
ofisala wa kubungwe lobwereketsa ndalama? 
 
Do not read out options to respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specify for 
Other:……………………………………… 
Banks and lending institutions follow individual 
lending guidelines=1 
They can track you if you default on their loans =2 
Bank or lending officer does not have the power to 
make the final loan decision=3 
Bank or lending officers have the power to negotiate 
loan decisions, but do not have the final say=4 
It is unprofessional, but that is how loan requests 
are done=5 
It is easier to offer a gift, whether monetary or 
otherwise=6 
It depends on how powerful you are or who you 
know =7 
I have obtained or I know people who have obtained 
loans this way=8 
Bank or lending officer knows my business needs 
personally=9 
Personal friendships do not affect business 
transaction=10 
Other=96, Specify 
 
 
 
 
S12q 7 
What do you believe banks or lending insitutions 
need to change for business people to access credit 
easier?/Mumakhulupilira kuti ndichani chomwe 
ma bank kapena mabungwe obwereketsa ndalama 
akuyenera kusintha kuti anthu azitha kupeza nawo 
mwai wa ngongole mosavutikira? 
 
Do not read out options to respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specify for 
Other:……………………………………… Reduce interest rates=1 
Better target small businesses =2 
Better training opportunities and awareness 
campaigns on loan requirements=3 
Alternative assets considered as collateral=4 
Standardize loan guidelines=5 
Faster loan approvals=6 
Partner with other Microfinance Institutions =7 
Provide flexible lending products=8 
Reduce bribery/corruption=9 
Other=96, Specify 
 
 
